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ABSTRACT 
 
 The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention of Biological 
Diversity, that was adopted on the 29th January, 2000 and became into force 
on 11th September 2003, is the most important global agreement on biosafety 
that governs the transboundary movement of living modified organisms for 
the protection of human health and environment . Malaysia and Singapore 
were among the countries participated during the Protocol negotiations. In 
the end, Malaysia signed the Protocol on 24th May, 2000 and ratified it on 2nd 
December, 2003. However, Singapore ended up not being a party to it. This 
study analyses the different stances taken by both countries towards the 
Protocol, in the domestic biosafety laws implementations. This study, in 
summary, is a comparative legal study with the Singapore legal and 
institutional framework of biosafety laws. 
 
This thesis examines Malaysian compliance towards the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety by analysing the current domestic legal and institutions’ 
compliance with the Protocol requirements. The regulatory theory is used as 
the theoretical framework to investigate the relevancy and application of the 
various regulatory strategies which were the norms in the environmental 
protection, from the traditional command and control approach to the new 
governance such as smart regulation, reflexive and meta-regulation, licence 
model also civil and self-regulation, within the biosafety regulations both in 
Malaysia and Singapore.   
 
Even though Singapore chose not to be a party of the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety, the Protocol is used as a global model of biosafety 
governance as it outlines the most crucial issues of biosafety. Towards the 
end of the comparative study, the similarities and differences of legal and 
institutional biosafety laws in both countries are highlighted, with a view to 
suggest recommendations for improvement of Malaysian future biosafety 
governance.  
 
  
 
II 
 
 
 
The findings of the thesis revealed that Malaysia, like other developing 
countries, is protective of its biosafety laws, in order to balance the needs to 
generate income from the modern biotechnology research, development and 
commercialisation,  and protecting its rich biodiversity. Singaporean biosafety 
and biosecurity laws, on the other hand, are more open and liberal, with less 
legal restrictions thus enabling Singapore becoming top 5 world producers of 
modern biotechnological products.  
 
The study concludes that, as there are differences with Singaporean 
biosafety laws, the harmonisation of biosafety laws of both countries, being 
neighbours and main trading partners, are crucial, and the harmonisation of 
the biosafety laws of the Association of the South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) is desirable.   
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PART I: INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER 
 
1. Introduction and background on biosafety 
 
The biosafety awareness on modern biotechnology came to 
prominence during the negotiations of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) before it was signed on 5th June 1992 at the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED).  
 
CBD acts as a general treaty on biodiversity1 with the objective as 
follows: 
 
…the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its 
components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising 
out of the utilization of genetic resources, including by appropriate 
access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant 
technologies, taking into account all rights over those resources and to 
technologies, and by appropriate funding.2 
 
It was during the CBD negotiations that the majority of the countries 
(except for the United States) demanded that CBD not only to be a 
convention of conservation but also include social and economic aspects of 
biodiversity as well as biotechnology.  
 
The United States of America, one of the most exporting countries of 
LMOs, was concerned about the development, management, safe use and 
release of genetically modified organisms, and about the protection of 
                                   
 
 
1
 Laurence Boisson De Chazournes, “Convention on Biological Diversity and Its Protocol on 
Biosafety” (2009) United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law. 
2
 Convention on Biological Diversity (adopted 5 June 1992, entered into force 29 December 
1993) 2226 U.N.T.S. 20 (CBD) art 1. 
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intellectual property rights (IPRs), and also opposed the prior informed 
consent of exporting biotechnology or its products.3 
  
The developing countries, on the other side, opposed any new 
convention if biotechnology was not included since the raw materials of 
genetic resources are within their territories and favoured national rather than 
international rights over biological resources.4 
 
Thus Article 19 of CBD reflected the agreement on biotechnology that 
‘…the Contracting Parties shall take legislative, administrative or policy 
measures, as appropriate, to provide for the effective participation in 
biotechnological research activities.’ The developing countries that provide 
the genetic resources for research were particularly affected. Article 19(3) 
states that the countries shall consider a Protocol for ‘…safe transfer, 
handling and use of any living modified organism resulting from 
biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity’. The countries by natural or legal 
persons are to provide use, safety regulations and information on the 
potential adverse impacts for the handling of such organisms.5 The CBD later 
led the development of negotiations of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
to the Convention on Biological Diversity (hereinafter referred to as 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety).   
 
                                   
 
 
3
 De Chazournes (n1)2. 
4
 ibid. 
5
 Convention on Biological Diversity, art 19(4). 
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The controversies of modern biotechnology products and process, as 
well as the unknown risk such as contamination with the wild species, social, 
ethical, environmental and health issues, were raised by the public, 
environmental and non-governmental organisations as well as by developing 
countries during the CBD negotiations. 
 
According to Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the term ‘biosafety’ is 
used to describe the efforts in reducing and eliminating potential risk such as 
producing newer toxins and allergens, resulting from biotechnology and its 
products.6 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety was negotiated by various 
countries to protect the potentially harmful effects of modern biotechnology 
products that affect human health and the environment.7 
 
The word ‘biotechnology’ comes from the usage of science and 
technology in biology is said to be coined by Karoly Ereky, a Hungarian 
agricultural engineer. Biotechnology is defined in CBD8 as  ‘…any 
technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or 
derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or processes for specific use.’ 
Biotechnology has been practised for decades and includes plant breeding 
techniques that improve survival and produce better quality crops also 
fermentation process even from the ancient Egypt time such as the making of 
cheese, salami, beer, yoghurt and wine-making process. 
                                   
 
 
6
 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), ‘Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on the 
Cartagena Protocol’ (2012)<https://bch.cbd.int/protocol/cpb_faq.shtml#faq2> accessed 13 
December 2013. 
7
 art 1. 
8
 art 2. 
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The difference between biotechnology and modern biotechnology is of 
great significance. Interestingly, biotechnology has evolved from traditional 
biotechnology to modern biotechnology, i.e. from the early ‘developments’ in 
food production such as fermentation of cheese and curd to the discovery of 
DNA as genetic material and role of DNA in the genetic transfer 
information.10 After the end of the Second World War, using this 
technological advancements DNA knowledge and techniques, scientists are 
now able to transfer the foreign DNA into another host and were even able to 
monitor the transfer of a foreign DNA into the next generation.11 
 
Modern biotechnology can be illustrated as below12 to differentiate it 
from other types of biotechnology. 
 
                                   
 
 
10
 Verma Ashish Swarup and others, ‘Biotechnology in the Realm of History’ (2011) 3(3) J 
Pharm Bioallied Sci 321. 
11
 ibid. 
12
 Ketill Berger/IAASTD and Arendal/UNEP/GRID, ‘Biotechnology and modern biotechnology 
defined’ <http://www.grida.no/graphicslib/detail/biotechnology-and-modern-biotechnology-
defined_b9d8> accessed 1 May 2015. 
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Figure 2: Modern biotechnology 
 
Modern biotechnology is defined in Article 3(i) of the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety as the application of: 
 
a. In vitro nucleic acid techniques, including recombinant 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and direct injection of nucleic 
acid into cells or organelles, or 
b. Fusion of cells beyond the taxonomic family, that overcome 
natural physiological reproductive or recombination barriers 
and that are not techniques used in traditional breeding and 
selection. 
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Modern biotechnology differs from traditional biotechnology, even 
though both involve alteration of the genetic organisms, summarised as 
follows:13 
 
i) traditional biotechnology usually involves same species but genetic 
engineering (from modern biotechnology) can move between 
entirely unrelated genes; 
ii) for the pace of change, traditional biotechnology work within years 
whereas for genetic engineering gene transfer can be made within 
weeks; 
iii) traditional biotechnology relatively involved small number of 
species whereas genetic engineering is far more ambitious as it 
can create micro-organisms, plants and animals that can make 
human products such as insulin, even capable of changing the 
makeup of a human. 
 
Despite the future potential benefits gained from modern 
biotechnology, there are mixed expert and public perceptions. 
 
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 
Panel of Eminent Expert on Ethics in Food and Agriculture14 held its meeting 
session from 26th to 28th September 2000 addressing three issues on 
                                   
 
 
13
 Straughan R and Reiss MJ, Ethics, Morality and Crop Biotechnology (ICI Seeds 
Fernhearst, Surrey, UK 1992) 5. 
14
 The State of Food and Agriculture 2001, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 
Nations, Rome 2001. 
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biotechnology including genetically modified organisms (GMO). The result of 
the meeting on GMOs is summarised as follows: 
 
i) risks, uncertainties and doubts on the use of genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) are acknowledged;  
ii) potential benefits and problems of GMOs are recognised; 
iii) conditions to realise the potential of GMOs and to avoid the risks of 
GMOs. 
 
At this juncture, the benefits of modern biotechnology are 
acknowledged, as well as the risks and uncertainties. The benefits and risks 
of modern biotechnology will be elaborated in the next discussion. Law is 
identified as one of the enabling mediums in realising the potential and 
avoiding the risks of GMOs.15 
 
Whenever issues of modern biotechnology arise, the usual debate will 
be either the products or process of modern biotechnology that is more 
important. The process of 'genetic engineering' however has become the 
primary controversy of modern biotechnology perhaps because the risks of 
process or techniques of genetic engineering or products of LMOS and 
GMOs have been exaggerated or could not be understood by the public as it 
changes God’s creation. 
 
                                   
 
 
15
 Glowka L and Christy LC, Law and Modern Biotechnology: Selected Issues of Relevance 
to Food And Agriculture (Food & Agriculture Org. 2003) 1. 
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The products of modern biotechnology are mainly either living 
modified organisms (LMOs) or genetically modified organisms (GMOs) such 
as GM corn, potato, tomato, rice, drugs, human insulin and many others. This 
product comes with benefits resulted from the used of modern biotechnology 
namely increased micronutrients levels and removal of food allergens. 
However, there is also a potential risk to human health and the environment 
since it can produce newer toxins and allergens. The risk is going to be 
elaborated further below. 
 
Genetic engineering as one of the processes in modern biotechnology 
is defined as the direct modification of an organism’s genetic material 
(genome) directly bypass the conventional breeding method which produces 
novel genetic combinations that would never occur in nature.16 Genetic 
engineering is controversial mainly because the genetic modification or 
genetic engineering physically changes the original DNA of the plants, 
animals and humans. Thus this process is heavily criticised as ‘playing 
God’17 as it alters the source thus raises issues of consent, ethics and 
bioethics as those techniques will physically change the original features of 
those products to different traits perhaps better than before.  
 
 
                                   
 
 
16
 Hutchinson Encyclopaedia of Science (2nd edition). 
17
 Young Tomme R, Genetically Modified Organisms and Biosafety: A Background Paper for 
Decision-Makers and Others to Assist in Consideration of GMO Issues (IUCN 2004)10. 
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2. Living Modified Organisms (LMO) or Genetically Modified Organisms 
(GMO)  
 
LMO or GMO are commonly used terms to describe products of 
modern biotechnology and yet are conceptually difficult to be defined with 
precision. The words LMO or GMO have been used interchangeably to mean 
the same.18 According to science, there is no such thing as Genetically 
Modified Organisms (GMO) as it genetic modification refers more to process 
rather than a final product.19 GMO has long been widely embraced to 
shorthand that refers to the products of genetic manipulation. Thus to 
accurately scientifically define GMO or LMO have been challenging to 
regulators. 
 
As for Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, European Union (EU) 
Directive 2001/18/EC20 and the Norwegian Gene Technology Act 199321, the 
terms LMOs and GMOs have three different definitions but the same legal 
interpretation.22 
 
                                   
 
 
18
 ‘Cartagena Protocol’ <http://bs.biosafetyclearinghouse.net/cartagenaprotocol.shtml> 
accessed 28 August 2015. 
19Genetic Literacy Project. ‘GMO FAQ’ (2016) 
<https://gmo.geneticliteracyproject.org/FAQ/what-are-gmos/> accessed 28 June 2015. 
20
 Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the deliberate 
release into the environment of genetically modified organisms and repealing Council 
Directive 90/220/EEC. Official Journal of the European Union, L 106, 17.4.2001. 
21
 The Norwegian Ministry of Environment (1993) The Act relating to the production and use 
of genetically modified organisms (Gene Technology Act), Act No. 38 of 2 April 1993. 
22Jane Husby, ‘Definitions of GMO/LMO and modern biotechnology’ in Traavik, Terje and 
Lim Li Ching (eds), Biosafety first. Holistic Approaches to Risk and Uncertainty in Genetic 
Engineering and Genetically Modified Organisms (Tapir Academic Press 2007). 
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LMO is the term used in Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is defined in 
Article 3(g) as ‘…any living organism that possesses a novel combination of 
genetic material obtained through the use of modern biotechnology’. GMOs 
include both LMOs (living organisms) and organisms, which are not capable 
of growing, i.e. are dead.23  
 
The linkage between ‘living modified organism’, ‘living organism’ and 
‘modern biotechnology’ is illustrated as follows: 
 
Cartagena Protocol; Article 3, Use of Terms 
g) ‘Living modified organism’ means any living organism that 
possesses a novel combination of genetic material obtained through 
the use of modern biotechnology; 
h) ‘Living organism’ means any biological entity capable of transferring 
or 
replicating genetic material, including sterile organisms, viruses and 
viroids; 
i) ‘Modern biotechnology’ means the application of: 
a. In vitro nucleic acid techniques, including recombinant 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and direct injection of nucleic acid 
into cells or organelles, or 
b. Fusion of cells beyond the taxonomic family that overcome 
natural physiological reproductive or recombination barriers and 
that are not techniques used in traditional breeding and 
selection; 
 
GMO is the term used by EU Directive and the GMO definition in the 
EU directive 2001/18/EC was not altered during the amendment of the old 
directive 90/220/EC. The term GMO is illustrated as follows: 
 
                                   
 
 
23
 ibid. 
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EU Directive 2001/18/EC, Article 2 
Article 2, Definitions 
1) ‘Organism’ means any biological entity capable of replication or of 
transferring genetic material; 
2) ‘Genetically modified organism (GMO)’ means an organism, with 
the exception of human beings, in which the genetic material has been 
altered in a way that does not occur naturally by mating and/or natural 
recombination 
 
The term LMO in Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety has been accepted 
by the EU member countries and interpreted this definition to be in line with 
the definition of  GMO in their directive 90/220/EC.24 
 
Norway was also in agreement with the definition of LMO according to 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety but formulated   a different definition of 
the Protocol and the EU Directive. Norway like EU used the term GMO. 
 
The Norwegian Gene Technology Act; Section 2, Technical area of 
application of the Act. 
 
The Act applies to the production and use of genetically modified 
organisms. The Act also applies to the production of cloned 
vertebrates and crustaceans. The provisions of the Act relating to 
genetically modified organisms also apply to substances and products 
that consist of or contain modified organisms. Unless the genetically 
modified organisms are used as parent organisms, the Act does not 
apply to the production with the aid of cell technology of: 
 
a) Genetically modified plant cells when the same result can be 
obtained using traditional methods of cultivation, or 
                                   
 
 
24
 Article 2(2) Definitions; ‘GMO means an organism, with the exception of human beings, in 
which the genetic material has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by mating 
and/or natural recombination.’ 
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b) Animal cells in culture where the cell material has been obtained 
from different individuals of the same species and where the cells 
could have been produced by natural reproduction, and the use of 
such plant or animal cells. 
 
If the purpose is not to produce cloned individuals, then the act does 
not apply to the cloning of genes, cells or tissue. The Act does not 
apply to the production of non genetically modified cloned animals that 
can occur naturally as a result of natural biological processes. 
 
SECTION 4, DEFINITIONS 
 
In this Act the following terms mean: 
 
a) Microorganisms: any cellular or non-cellular microbiological entity 
that is able to reproduce or transfer genetic material; 
b) Genetically modified organisms: microorganisms, plants and 
animals in which the genetic material has been altered by means of 
gene or cell technology; 
 
From the above three (3) all include an introduction and/or injection of 
nucleic acids (or heritable material, DNA/RNA) into viruses, microorganisms, 
plants, and animals.25 The central requisite of ‘alteration’, ‘modification’ or 
‘recombination’ of genetic material is included in the definitions. The standard 
interpretation is the introduction of any DNA/RNA into cells or organisms 
through the different molecular gene technologies and methodologies in use, 
or to be developed.26 
 
Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) 
defined GMO as ‘…GMOs and products thereof are produced through 
                                   
 
 
25Husby (n22).   
26
 ibid. 
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techniques in which the genetic material has been altered in a way that does 
not occur naturally by mating and/or natural recombination’.27 
 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) adopted the similar GMO 
definition by FAO28 without amendment. 
 
It is interesting to note here that Malaysian Biosafety Act 2007 uses 
the term ‘living modified organisms’ as compared to ‘genetically modified 
organisms’. Section 3 of the Malaysian Biosafety Act 200729 in the 
interpretation section defines ‘living modified organisms’ as ‘…any living 
organisms that have the novel combination of the genetic material obtained 
through the modern biotechnology process’.  
 
This definition is similar to LMO definition in the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety. The definition of LMO in the Protocol is instructive on this point.30 
The products from LMOs, which are not living, and which are therefore not 
covered by the scope of the Protocol, for example, oil produced from 
genetically modified (GM) canola or meat from GM animals.31 
 
                                   
 
 
27
 FAO/WHO, ‘The Codex Alimentarius Commission And The FAO/WHO Food Standards 
Programme, Guidelines For The Production, Processing, Marketing and Labelling of 
Organically Produced Foods’ (2017) 
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y2772e/y2772e04.htm#fn5> accessed 20 November 2015. 
28
'WHO, ‘Frequently asked questions on genetically modified foods’ 
<http://www.who.int/foodsafety/areas_work/food-technology/faq-genetically-modified-
food/en/> accessed 28 July 2015. 
29
 Act 678. 
30
 Lim Li Lin, 'Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety' in Traavik, Terje and Lim Li Ching (eds), 
Biosafety First (Tapir Academic Publishers 2007)4.   
31ibid 5. 
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Thus, it can be seen here that for the EU Directive, Norway 
Technology Act, WHO and FAO use the term GMO. On the other hand, 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and Malaysia Biosafety Act 2007 used the 
term LMO. Even though the terms LMO and GMO might scientifically mean 
different, they are interpreted as similar. In short many countries use the 
terms ‘LMO’ and ‘GMO’ interchangeably, and consider that the terms refer to 
the same thing.32 This thesis will use the term LMO and GMO 
interchangeably as by interpretation they have the same meaning. 
 
 
3. Historical link between food safety issues and the earlier GMO 
regulation in 1990s 
 
Some cases of food safety issues have links with the historical 
controversies on GMOs in the European Union, is of relevance here. It 
started back in 1990 in the United Kingdom (UK) and Europe, as there were 
series of food safety consumption issues such as mad cow disease33, horse 
meat scandal34 and much more thus making people more wary about their 
food intake or sources.  
 
                                   
 
 
32ibid. 
33
 Burgiel SW, ‘The Cartagena Protocol On Biosafety: Taking the Steps from Negotiation to 
Implementation’ (2002) 11(1) Review of European, Comparative & International 
Environmental Law 53.  
34
 Premanandh, J,’Horse meat scandal–A wake-up call for regulatory authorities’ (2013) 
Food control, 34(2), 568-569. 
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It started with the mad cow disease during the late 1997 and foot and 
mouth diseases35 that made Europeans ban beef from the UK. Later the 
horse meat scandal in Europe36 in 2013 that made people lost faith in the 
food safety issues in Europe and in a way contribute to people turning to 
organic food which used less pesticide for health purposes. 
 
At the international level, there were some alleged issues or GM BT 
corn Starlink from the United States (US) that is certified not fit for human 
consumption as it contained some GM corn.37 
 
The peak of the GM products controversy was the case in WTO that is 
EC-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products.38 In 
the EC Biotech case, the complainants the United States, Canada and 
Argentina brought the claim in the WTO against the European Communities 
stating that there was general EC moratorium on approval of agricultural 
biotechnology products. The WTO findings were that the EC applied a 
general de facto moratorium on biotech products approval and inconsistent 
with its obligations under the WTO trade agreements.39 
 
There were anti-GMO campaigns worlwide, propagated by non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) also environmental groups; the most 
                                   
 
 
35
 Burgiel (n33). 
36
 McEvoy JD, ‘Emerging Food Safety Issues: An EU Perspective’ (2016) 8(5-6) Drug 
Testing and Analysis 511. 
37
 Bucchini L and Goldman LR, 'Starlink Corn: A Risk Analysis' (2002) 110(1) Environ Health 
Perspect 5. 
38
 Panel Report WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, 29 Sept 2006 (Biotech). 
39
 Young MA, 'The WTO's Use of Relevant Rules of International Law: An Analysis of the 
Biotech Case' (2007) 56(4) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 907. 
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known is the anti-Monsanto campaign in approximately 400 cities40 that 
fundamentally affect the world’s population belief towards GMO.  
 
During the Convention of Biological Diversity in 1993, there were 
voices raised mainly by developing countries that led to the negotiations of 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. The developing countries had the fear that 
the United States (US) and the like countries will be dumping GMOs on the 
developing countries. Thus there were raising the need for biosafety to be 
regulated for fear of human health and environment.  
 
4. Biotechnology law or biosafety law 
 
The earlier regulation in this area was known as biotechnology law or 
rather modern biotechnology law and regulation. However, later years 
especially during the negotiations of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) in 1992, various countries raised concerns and controversies on the 
effect of modern biotechnology on the safety of human health and the 
environment. Thus the regulation now is focused on biosafety regulation. The 
biosecurity laws are not covered in this thesis, but will be reviewed in the 
discussion on Singapore only, as it has both biosafety and biosecurity laws 
inter-related regarding regulatory or institutional framework. 
 
Biotechnology regulation broadly covers every aspect of biotechnology 
that needs to be regulated that is comprehensive that will include inter alia 
                                   
 
 
40
‘World Stands Up Against Monsanto: Over 400 Cities Protest GMOs’ RT News (25 May 
2015 24 May 2015 2015) News. 
  
 
18 
 
 
 
intellectual property, biopiracy and bioethical issues. On the other hand, 
biosafety regulation only regulates the biosafety issues and concerns of the 
modern biotechnology and its products. Biosafety regulation in particular 
reference to Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety only covers the transboundary 
movement of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) or living modified 
organisms (LMO) also environmental biosafety as other biosafety aspects of 
LMO or GMO are covered by other laws, regulations and agreements. 
 
5. Definition of biosafety 
 
Biosafety, while not clearly defined in the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity but stated in the 
introduction as the Objective, it is referred to as a concept that refers to the 
need to protect the human health and environment from the adverse effects 
of modern biotechnological products. However, that concept is precise and 
general in explaining the term ‘biosafety’ as biosafety can cover extensive 
areas of application. The biosafety definition is said to be very general as 
there is no ‘best’ approach to biosafety analysis.41 Biosafety can be defined 
as the regulatory systems and risk analysis process that is designed to 
perform proper risk assessments, mitigation and communication of GM 
products to ensure their safe use.42 
                                   
 
 
41McLean MA and others, ‘A Conceptual Framework for Implementing Biosafety: Linking 
Policy, Capacity, and Regulation’ (International Service for National Agricultural Research 
(ISNAR) 2002) 1. 
42José B. Falck-Zepeda, ‘Socio-economic Considerations, Article 26.1 of the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety: What are the Issues and What is at Stake?’ (2009) Vol 12 (1) The 
Journal of Agrobiotechnology and Management and Economics 90. Available on the World 
Wide Web: http://www.agbioforum.org.  
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Biosafety regulation is not comprehensive, as Codex Alimentarius 
internationally govern the food safety of GM products (hereinafter referred to 
as Codex) while environmental biosafety by Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 
The scope for environmental biosafety regulation according to the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety is only limited to LMO or GMO. 
 
6. Benefits and risks of modern biotechnology and LMOs 
 
It is imperative to state here that the discussion in this thesis will be 
limited to modern biotechnology products in general and specifically LMO 
and GMO and not covers genetic engineering as a whole. The Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety focuses on the regulation of modern biotechnology and 
its products, i.e. GMO or LMO and not specifically on genetic engineering.43 
There are some benefits and risks of modern biotechnology products in 
general and LMO in specific which will be discussed in turn. Thus it is vital to 
summarise the benefits of the modern biotechnology products. 
 
The benefits of modern biotechnology and its products 
 
The benefits of modern biotechnology, in general, cannot be denied as 
mainly they are claimed to increase world food production as compared to 
the conventional agricultural method that takes longer to be cultivated and 
grown. They can be summarised as follows44 (the list is not exhaustive): 
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 Preamble. 
44
 Ratledge C and Kristiansen B, Basic Biotechnology (Cambridge University Press 2006) 5. 
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1) GM plants that are insect resistance45 and herbicide tolerance46 
 
These GM plants’ traits will have huge impacts on the agriculture 
community regardless whether they have big or small plantations. As 
infection of the plants due to insects is known, therefore if the plant is 
insect resistance, less herbicide will be used.  
 
2) GM plants contain better traits of food47 that can feed the growing 
population in the world.48 
 
The better traits of GM crops, in turn, will produce better food that can 
feed the world. A consumer will perhaps be happier to consume a 
delayed-ripening tomato, papaya that can last longer compared to those 
that will quickly rot. 
 
3) GM plants have increased micronutrients levels,49 removal of food 
allergens50 and productions of vaccines.51 
                                   
 
 
45
 Schuler TH and others, ‘Insect-Resistant Transgenic Plants’ (1998) 16(4) Trends 
Biotechnol 168. 
46
 Shah DM and others, ‘Engineering Herbicide Tolerance in Transgenic Plants’ (1986) 
233(4762) Science 478. 
47
 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Genetically Modified Crops: The Ethical and Social Issues 
(Nuffield Council on Bioethics , May 1999) 30. 
48Conway G and Toenniessen G, ‘Feeding The World in the Twenty-First Century’ (1999) 
402 Nature C55. 
49Bouis HE, Chassy BM and Ochanda JO, ‘2. Genetically Modified Food Crops and Their 
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4) Genetic modification that extends beyond foodstuffs for example cotton 
has been modified to resist essential pests such as boll weevil.5253Fuel for 
electricity generation could be based on GM plants rather than fossil 
fuels.54 These are crucial scientific breakthrough from modern 
biotechnology that could improve on human living rather than depend on 
the natural resources from the biodiversity. Therefore in this regard, the 
modern biotechnology should be commended.  
 
The scientific risks of modern biotechnology and its products 
 
On the other hand, despite the known benefits, there are some 
products of genetically modified organisms as a result of modern 
biotechnology is also said to pose higher risks in the following ways:55 
 
a) genetically modified organisms (GMOs) can adapt and multiply in 
the ecosystem compared to native flora56 
b) GMO can transfer genes57 related to virulence5859 or 
pathogenesis6061 into native microbial6263 flora 
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c) GMO can produce newer toxins6465 and allergens66 
d) GMO can transfer the new traits to the related microbes67 
 
As a consequence, these organisms create situations which are 
unpredictable, unexplained, uncontrolled and unmanageable. However, this 
is not always accurate as it can happen to unmodified organisms as well.68  
 
Biosafety is regulated due to the facts that there are biosafety risks 
and concerns. The biosafety risk is said to be more scientific as it involves 
the process from technology application. However, the risks and concerns 
that are non-scientific will be discussed alongside as they might affect the 
biosafety regulation as well. 
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7. Precautionary principle 
 
 Another problem with modern biotechnology also associated with 
biosafety risk of scientific knowledge is that there are still some grey areas 
and uncertainty in science. Thus in this area precautionary principle as stated 
in Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is being reaffirmed as stated by Principle 
15 of Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.69 Principle 15 states 
that to protect the environment, precautionary principle shall be used by 
states according to their capabilities.   When there are threats of severe 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be reasons to 
postpone taking cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation. 
 
There are some issues related to precautionary principle in biosafety 
application. One of the problems with precautionary principle is the standard 
of scientific knowledge. For developing countries with less science capacity, 
facilities and human resources how do they be up to the standard like other 
developed countries? However, Rio Declaration explicitly provides for the 
difference in capabilities of states, thus perhaps limiting claims of non-
compliance against developing countries when dealing with uncertain areas 
of science. 
 
The problem with precautionary principle will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 2 when criticisms on Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety are 
discussed. 
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8. Potential adverse effects of modern biotechnology on socio-
economics 
 
The discussion of the socio-economic considerations which is part of 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety can be broad likewise complicated and 
convoluted.These issues are called the ‘fourth criterion’70 as they are ‘non-
scientific’ issues and concerns advocated by some groups and seen as 
inadequate measures but yet becoming part of the decision making process. 
It is to be seen how these socio-economic considerations will be placed in 
the regulation and taken into consideration by the regulators in the decision-
making process.  
 
The potential adverse effects of modern biotechnology especially 
LMOs /GMOs are limited within the scope of Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
thus only related to the environmental and human health aspect of biosafety. 
These socioeconomic issues seem to be in line with the socio-economic 
considerations suggested by the Explanatory Guide.71 According to the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), not all socio-economic 
considerations may be taken into consideration but limited only to those 
LMOs affecting the biodiversity. Article 26 of the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety is said to identify some particular socio-economic considerations 
that are expected to be taken into account namely the ‘…especially about the 
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value of biological diversity to indigenous and local communities’. The 
Explanatory Guide72 suggested to include ‘…the ability of indigenous and 
local communities to make use of the biological diversity upon which their 
community’s survival and traditional livelihood depends’.73 
 
The socio-economic considerations can be further elaborated and 
summarised as follows: 
 
a) the continued availability and biodiversity range in the areas 
inhabited or used by indigenous or local communities; 
b) the erosion of genetic and other natural resources, previously 
available to 
indigenous or local communities in their territories; or 
c) the loss of cultural traditions, traditional knowledge, and practices 
in a particular indigenous or local community as a result of the loss 
of biodiversity in their areas.74 
 
The discussion of socio-economic considerations in this thesis is 
limited to these three (3) broad issues listed as follows: 
 
a) Socio economic consideration 
b) Moral and ethical issues 
c) Cultural and religious issues 
                                   
 
 
72ibid. 
73ibid 164. 
74ibid. 
  
 
26 
 
 
 
a) Socio-economic considerations on modern biotechnology 
 
Definition of socio-economics 
 
 The term ‘socio-economic’ seems to be used very broadly as to 
include social and economic factors.75 Such considerations are important in 
part because they are related to values that many countries have already 
officially acknowledged as being relevant and vital in international or 
domestic law.76 Taking them into account in biosafety decisions is therefore 
consistent with such values and law.77 
 
Legal recognition of socio economic considerations in Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety 
 
The primary convention on biosafety the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety legally recognised socio-economic considerations as it is stated in 
Article 26 of the Protocol. According to Article 26 of Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety on socio-economic considerations: 
 
1. The Parties, in reaching a decision on import under this Protocol or 
under its domestic measures implementing the Protocol, may take 
into account, consistent with their international obligations, socio-
economic considerations arising from the impact of living modified 
organisms on the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
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diversity, especially with regard to the value of biological diversity 
to indigenous and local communities.  
 
2. The Parties are encouraged to cooperate on research and 
information exchange on any socio-economic impacts of living 
modified organisms, especially on indigenous and local 
communities. 
 
However, the definition of ‘socio-economic’ is nowhere defined in the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. The only important socio-economic 
consideration issue that is stated in Article 26 is the impact of the living 
modified organisms (LMOs) on the ‘conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity especially about the value of biodiversity to indigenous and local 
communities’. Moreover, it is mentioned in the next part of the Protocol that 
the Parties are expected to collaborate on research and information 
exchange on such issues of socio-economic. The socio-economic 
considerations leaves a room for broad interpretation.  
 
Biosafety risk assessment procedures are now an established 
prerequisite for transboundary movements of GM materials, also for 
research, developments and release of LMO into the environment. Although 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety focused on the potential effects and harms 
of the GMO on the environment as it is the scope of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, the Protocol allows the possibility of including of other 
considerations such as food safety and socio-economic considerations. 
Furthermore, it is true that Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is not the only 
guidance document about risk assessment of GMO, as other treaties and 
agreements exist, such as Codex Alimentarius. However, Cartagena Protocol 
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on Biosafety due to the negotiations between parties has indeed broadened 
the narrower environmental scope of the Protocol.78 Jaffe79 however argues 
that Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety limits its scope to factors affecting 
biodiversity. 
 
An analysis of the socio-economic considerations according to the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
 
Article 26 of the Protocol does not detail out on how this socio-
economic considerations is to be taken into account, but it must be consistent 
with their international obligations such as World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
as it might create trade barriers.80 However, the broad language of Article 
26(1) enables the states to take socio-economic considerations into account 
during: 
 
i) a decision on import under the Protocol or  
ii) under its domestic measures implementing the Protocol 
 
Thus parties may take relevant socio-economic considerations when 
implementing some provisions according to the Protocol81 and also in 
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accordance to its domestic measures in implementing the Protocol to protect 
the impact of the LMOs on its biodiversity.  
 
The pros and cons of including socio-economic considerations in the 
biosafety decision-making process 
 
The inclusion of the broader socio-economic considerations into GMO 
biosafety analysis decision-making process is controversial. Zepeda82 
highlights that there are two opposing views on the issue of inclusion of 
socio-economic considerations in the biosafety risk assessment.  
 
The most important opinion against the inclusion of socio-economics 
in the biosafety decision-making process is that it will serve as a ‘blanket 
justification’ to reject GM technologies without a clear statement or reason. In 
this regard, socio-economic considerations may follow the regulatory 
development pathway in which some countries used the precautionary 
principle that allows them not to make a regulatory decision and/or as pre-
emptive measures to reject GM technologies. Paarlberg (2008)83  presents 
similar arguments in this line of thought. The view states that the inclusion of 
socio-economic view states that a broad, undefined socio-economic 
consideration will be disruption to technology development and transfer.  
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On the other hand, socio-economic consideration is important to 
protect the negative impact of GM products towards local and indigenous 
people. This view includes not just the scientific risk assessment but also 
broader socio-economic considerations including ethical, philosophical and 
religious concerns and by doing so this position potentially aligned itself to 
the precautionary principle. 
 
This thesis is in line with the second view especially about the 
Malaysian context which will be discussed in the next Chapter 3, i.e. to what 
extent socio-economic considerations should be included in the Malaysian 
biosafety law and what issues are relevant to be included. In essence, for the 
inclusion of socio-economic considerations to be successful and fruitful into 
the biosafety and biotechnology decision-making process it is useful to 
characterise the so-called functional biosafety system by Jaffe84 which are 
transparent, well defined, protective and understood by all actors and 
stakeholders. These biosafety regulation aims should serve as a general 
guide for inclusion of the socio-economics in Malaysia biosafety decision-
making. 
 
Isaac85 criticises the different ‘trajectories’ of the United States and the 
European Union in aligning themselves well to scientific and social 
approaches to regulatory paradigms. According to him, the fundamental 
difference between scientific and social rationalities is the fundamental role of 
                                   
 
 
84
 Mackenzie (n 71). 
85
 Grant Isaac, ‘Agricultural Biotechnology and Transatlantic Trade: Regulatory Barriers to 
GM Crops’ (2002) CABI. 
 
  
 
31 
 
 
 
science and technology has to offer to the society. It will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 2. Chapter 2 starts with a general discussion of the 
relationship between law and science and technology which is of relevance 
here in discussing how countries differ in their biosafety risk assessment.  
 
In realising socio-economic considerations into biosafety, the decision-
making process is to identify what are the socio-economic issues at stake 
and why there is the need for these issues to be taken into account. Then 
after agreeing on the relevant issues, next questions will be how are they to 
be realised, how to implement them and at what point of decision-making are 
they relevant. These are general issues when socio-economic considerations 
are to be broadly included in the biosafety decision-making process. 
 
b) Moral and ethical perspectives on biosafety risks from modern 
biotechnology application 
 
Moral issues 
 
This moral issue is another controversial issue as the technology used 
in modern biotechnology, especially genetic engineering and the genetically 
modified products. The issues of moral, ethical and cultural are closely 
related and have connections in which case to some community, religions 
shape their belief. However to those who have no belief in religion, moral is 
their perception and judgment of good and evil or perhaps the current socially 
accepted norms. 
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Social norms serve as foundations of social order, helping to ensure 
that people will act in ways considered pro-social by their society, for 
example from taking care of their children to paying their taxes.86 While in the 
law and technology regulation context, social norms might not play an 
important role, because layman is clueless on the modern biotechnological 
scientific process, only to depend on the information supplied by the science 
community.      
 
The moral is the concept of right or wrong. While there have been 
many debates as to whether there is any relationship between law and 
morality87, this thesis is not going to discuss this issue in detail. There are 
some underlying moral issues regarding genetically modified organisms and 
the genetic engineering mainly: Are humans allowed to intervene the God’s 
creations? 
 
While these issues are controversial and debatable and different 
religions might have slightly different views on these issues, these questions 
might not be relatively easy to answer. However, the general view based on 
religions is that humans are not allowed to change God’s creation. However, 
if the change for instance through science and technology is for human good 
then the process and product is morally acceptable. Therefore religions might 
permit it to be done perhaps subject to some limitations. Thus this 
fundamental issue will then lead to this issue: If we humans create better 
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creations than the original creation of genetic engineering. Are we better than 
God Himself then? This issue is somewhat thought-provoking but should be 
borne in mind, morally at least.  
 
While it is claimed that scientific intervention especially the robust 
technology as in modern biotechnology contradicts with moral belief to 
change God’s original creation sometimes the intervention leads to better life, 
better crops, it then made humans tolerate with that intervention and accept 
it. Therefore the Genetic Engineering (GE) technology and Genetically 
Modified (GM) products should be equally accepted as conventional goods 
provided they do not go beyond certain accepted ethical principles. 
  
Ethical issues in modern biotechnology 
 
Ethics is defined as the system of moral principles.88 Ethics is the way 
how people make decisions and lead their lives usually derived from religious 
belief, philosophies and cultures.  
 
While natural science attempts to tackle the scientific issues 
systematically, ethical dilemmas are not usually dealt with in a systematic 
framework89 and regarded as ‘too vague’. While the ethical argument is 
regarded as vague, the discussion on ethical issues on genetically modified 
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organisms is valid and sound in principle. The peer-reviewed paper by 
Macer90 is of relevance here even though it relates to genetic engineering in 
public health. Genetic engineering process is part of producing genetically 
modified organisms that discuss primarily the same core ethical issues. In the 
author’s opinion , the paper brilliantly laid down fundamental basic ethical 
principles in GM-related issues with the idea of resolving ethical dilemmas. 
 
There are some essential ethical principles in modern biotechnology 
which can be summarised as follows: 
a) animal rights concerns 
b) consent issues 
c) access to information and benefit 
d) autonomy, ethics of technology choices and knowledge 
development  
e) intellectual property rights and technology transfer 
f) the inducement to participation 
g) environmental ethics 
 
a) Animal rights91 concerns 
 
In modern biotechnology, animals are commonly subjected to clinical 
trials for research and development before successful commercialisation. 
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The practice is justified due to the facts that animals’ lack of ability to sense 
pain for example insects.92 However, the painless argument is said to neglect 
the animals’ interest93 and rights even to defend themselves through 
research and development which are meant for human good mostly. 
 
b) Consent issues 
 
The consent issues are especially relevant in GMOs; from trial 
participants, the society on possible environmental risks and on cessation of 
trials. For instance, in the case of release of some GM vectors nearby their 
living area, some people in the society might be unable to express their 
objections due to their lack of literacy, knowledge and information and social 
status. Thus their consent may be abused. The privacy of the data also 
obtained through trials for immunisation for example especially involving 
children without the parents’ consent will also be questionable.94 
 
In that case should every individual be asked for consent if it involved 
specific locality or should a referendum be good enough? The establishment 
of the Ethics Committee in that matter that takes the public view into account 
for instance during the release of some GM mosquitoes to improve the 
existing environment and local diseases is essential. 
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It was also suggested that broad ecological understanding of the 
impact, beyond public health, should be carried out.95 This idea should be 
welcomed especially for countries with abundant biodiversity for 
sustainability. 
 
c) Access to information and benefit 
 
The public access to information by illiterate people as to the 
information and benefits of modern biotechnology is another crucial issue. 
The benefits of modern biotechnology should not be limited based on 
geographical also regardless of wealth. Alternatively, else people with 
political power, for instance, might reject any release of GM vectors in their 
locality leaving others with no choice but to accept the trial at their area. 
Thus, the sharing of the benefits from modern biotechnology with the locality 
is justified as part of compensatory justice.96 
 
d) Autonomy,97 ethics of technology choices and knowledge development.98  
 
Individuals have autonomy in deciding what is good or bad depending 
on what they believe. Consumers of GMOs or LMOs should decide for 
themselves whether to consume the GM products or not. In assisting them to 
choose, thus it is only ethical for them to be informed for instance for the 
                                   
 
 
95
 ibid 18. 
96
 Macer (n 90)20. 
97
 Silverman E, 'The 5 Most Pressing Ethical Issues In Biotech Medicine' (2004) 1(6) 
Biotechnol Healthc 41. 
98Macer (n 90) 20. 
  
 
37 
 
 
 
LMOs to be labelled. This right should also be recognised and translated in 
the form of implementation of GMO labelling. 
 
In most countries nowadays it seems that on technology choices, the 
paternalistic interventions were taken on behalf of citizens. Thus the 
government is taking the lead to accept or reject the technology on behalf of 
the people. Governments rightfully should offer the people the chance to use 
new technology99 if it is for the betterment for instance in agriculture and food 
production under the ethical principle of beneficence.100 
 
However, civil rights movements have empowered people to take 
these decisions themselves. In modern biotechnology, biosafety regulation at 
the international level, the public participation seems to be part of the 
practice, i.e. to include public in the biosafety decision-making process. 
However to what extent their voices are effective is again questionable. 
 
e) Intellectual property rights (IPR) and technology transfer 
 
On the moral rights in agriculture, the GM seeds’ monopoly by some 
biotechnology conglomerates101 will enable those producers to potentially 
gain enormous profits that will stir issues of concerns to the developing 
countries that initially possessed the traditional variety of those. These are 
issues of concern in the future GM plant. It is hoped that win-win cooperation 
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between the countries and producers will benefit humankind as a whole. 
Thus a better trait of plant and more food is produced for people, and the 
people that have the traditional knowledge of the plant should be given 
compensation or royalty such as technology transfer that benefits all. For 
example the basmati rice that is very well known in India and Pakistan.  
Future GM basmati rice seed producer should share the IPR and the 
technology transfer with the people of India and Pakistan.    
 
f) The inducement to participation 
It is ethically believed that the actual or future benefits also financial 
gains from modern biotechnology should not be an incentive to 
participation.102 However, the possibility of reimbursement for an individual's 
time, inconvenience and expenses (if any), should be counted even if there is 
a general distribution of benefits to the community. It is argued that limiting 
the financial return to only some tribal leaders or chief in the community for 
community consent is not in line with solidarity thus considered as a bribe. 
Therefore, for the community in return should obtain inter alia healthcare 
infrastructure, vaccines, tests, drugs, treatments, or other humanitarian 
efforts. 
 
g)  Environmental ethics.103 
 
As humans live, dependant and utilise on the environment such as the 
plants, animals and microorganisms, the environment is therefore justified to 
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be protected. The environment has its value as from the religious point of 
view,  God as the owner creates the world with values. Humans are to make 
use of the environment to preserve its sustainability. 
 
Bioethics 
Bioethics, which was coined by Van Rensselaer Potter in 1971  at the 
University of Wisconsin104 is the study of ethical aspects of the biology, 
medical research and practice.105 In the context of biosafety, bioethics had 
been institutionalised leading the Bioethics Council to be established and 
advising various ethical issues in modern biotechnology.  
 
Bioethics is defined as the broad terrain of the moral problems of the 
life sciences, ordinarily taken to encompass medicine, biology and some 
essential aspects of the environmental, population and social sciences. The 
traditional domain of medical ethics would be included within this array, 
accompanied now by many other topics and problems.106 Therefore bioethics 
is the more specific, relevant and direct moral issues associated with life 
science, especially modern biotechnology. 
 
Bioethics can be viewed as descriptive, prescriptive and interactive 
bioethics.107 Descriptive bioethics is how people view their life, moral 
interactions and responsibilities with living organisms in their life. Prescriptive 
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bioethics is informing people what is ethically good or bad and vital principles 
involved in decision-making process. Interactive bioethics is debate and 
discussion between people, groups and communities about descriptive and 
prescriptive bioethics.  
 
There are some fundamental theories of ethics namely consequence, 
actions and motives.108 The consequential arguments apply to assess the 
ethics of biotechnology applications whether they contribute to well-being or 
not by looking at the outcome. The action-based ethics looks at the morality 
of the act itself without looking at the consequences. The motive-based 
theories judged the ethics by looking at the motive of the action for instance 
whether it was done with good intentions or not.  
 
The underlying ethical principle that is vital in modern biotechnology is 
that it should not harm the human health and the environment, regardless of 
the good motive and benefit it offers. The harm could be done to the animals, 
humans, plants, environment and public. Also, by looking at the fundamental 
theories of ethics, they might conflict among themselves for example in the 
application of modern biotechnology field, for instance, using genetic 
engineering that involves cross gene between animals and plants with the 
good motive of producing better traits of plants. Therefore the bioethics is to 
weigh the benefits and disadvantages of advising on genetic engineering 
process or genetically modified food. Thus careful decision-making should be 
made.109        
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The establishment of bioethics has been in practice in the developed 
countries, whereas in developing countries bioethics might range to almost 
unheard of due to lack of information, knowledge and expertise, to 
development and education process. In developing countries, it is only in 
recent years references were made to Bioethics Council in matters 
concerning sciences as it is quite commonplace for them to adopt and adapt 
the practice from the developed countries. However, it is interesting to see 
the development of bioethics in protecting humans, animals, biodiversity from 
excessive manipulations by human themselves. 
 
 
c) Cultural and religious issues in modern biotechnology 
 
 To some communities, culture is closely associated with religious 
belief as it is the religions that shape their cultural perspective regarding 
habits, rituals and beliefs. The cultural and religious perspectives must be 
taken into account not just to acknowledge the religions that humans profess 
but perhaps a more significant issue of the acceptance and marketing or 
business prospect of the GM products. In the case of GMOs, the religious 
and ethical concerns will be the most controversial issues in the countries 
where religions remain a robust societal force.110 For example on the 
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acceptability of the GM products, the concept of ‘halal’111 or ‘haram’112 sets 
the tone for debate in Muslim societies.113 
 
It is essential to see how much cultural and religious issues shape the 
agricultural landscape of a region and the legality of these measures to be 
examined in a later chapter.   
 
 Although cultural perspectives have been largely ignored for the sake 
of development, modernisation, urbanisation and so, cultural issues can 
interestingly be seen in the case of taro plant in Hawaii. Taro114 according to 
the Hawaiian people is a belief as the incarnation of their ancestors. To 
modify the genetics of Hawaiian taro is to alter that which is divine therefore 
sparked resistance towards GM taro in Hawaii.115 
 
 In the bigger context of religion, there are some known features of 
dietary requirement worldwide. For example, the Buddhists who are vegan 
and vegetarian do not consume animals at all. Hindus do not consume beef 
as cows are regarded as their Gods whereas Muslims are prohibited from 
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consuming pork and liquor as those are banned according to the Al Quran.116 
Therefore these social values issues are vital to be addressed especially 
when the target marketing areas such as the Muslim Middle East countries 
whereby the issue of labelling plays a vital role. The biosafety aspect of the 
GM products is not an issue here but more on the choice of the consumers in 
either consuming or not the GM products that might contain pork, liquor, beef 
even allergens like nuts, gluten that would not be accepted by the consumer 
due to allergies, cultural and religious belief. The religious issue would be a 
legitimate concern on labelling of GM product with similar concern on the 
conventional food. If these concerns are neglected, the producers 
themselves will be losing potential customers. Thus it is of great importance 
apart from food safety issue to take into account of these cultural and 
religious concerns which could reasonably be achieved by a proper labelling 
that enables the consumer to be educated about the products and then to 
make choices whether to consume or not. It is submitted that it is also 
ethically wrong not to provide the necessary, relevant content of the GM 
products by labelling due to cultural and religious concerns although there 
are some countries do not make labelling a requirement in importing these 
GM products.  
 
Labelling is good enough to address the cultural and religious 
concerns on the content of the GM products. However as to the issues of the 
process of GE technology that might have controversial issues, perhaps 
other measures should be taken to address this concern. Apart from ‘halal’ 
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issues in Islam for food consumption the objectives of the Shari’ah,117 the 
issues are discussed in much broader scope which is the benefits of 
protection and preservation of the religion, life, of intellect, of progeny, of 
property, and of the environment.118  
 
On the other hand still in the context of food interestingly enough, 
under Jewish dietary laws (called Kashrut), safety and healthiness of food 
are not necessarily an overriding factor when determining if something is 
‘kosher’.119120 
 
Any consequences of those risks and concerns if they become a 
reality will cause irreversible damage to the human and environment as a 
whole. Therefore there is an essential need for this area of modern 
biotechnology in general and biosafety in specific to be adequately regulated. 
 
In this thesis, the issues on whether this ‘fourth criterion’ will have any 
place in the rules and regulation of biosafety and to what extent they will 
influence the decision-making process will be discussed. These issues are 
essential to understanding the factors that influence rules and regulation in 
the countries specifically Malaysia in this thesis.  
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9. Biosafety risk regulation: risk assessment and socio-economic 
issues 
 
In summary, the principal objections towards the genetically modified 
products of modern biotechnology are based on three reasons, which are as 
follows: 
 
1) possible harm to human health 
2) possible damage to the environment 
3) uneasiness of the state of GM products and technology as being 
unnatural 
 
Risks can be defined as the possibility that something unpleasant or 
unwelcome will happen.121 However, it is important to note here that these 
are only risks that can be foreseen to happen or not happened yet. On the 
issue of regulation, biosafety is very much a risk regulation type which will be 
discussed in the next Chapter 2 on regulatory theory.   
 
It seems that risks identified as above are managed by risk 
assessment and management. Thus the question is whether that 
assessment solved the scientific biosafety issues especially in the areas of 
scientific uncertainty. Another concern is the ‘non-scientific’ issues such as 
the socio economic that includes mainly ethics, moral, religious and cultural 
issues as to how these issues should be managed within the biosafety 
decision-making process.  
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Thus some suggested that there is the need for ‘socio-economic 
assessment’ to be introduced in the biosafety risk assessment. Prima facie 
the inclusion of the so-called ‘socio-economic assessment’ will look daunting 
as it perhaps adds cost to the existing risk assessment and management. 
However, perhaps as a start, these socio-economic risks should be part of 
the biosafety decision-making process. For instance, to be raised and 
included in the risk assessment themselves. Thus the justification and 
explanation for the socio-economic issues should be made clear to all parties 
concerned. As stated above some even suggested the socio-economic 
impact assessment (SEIA) to add further to the bureaucracy process.122  
 
10. The importance of public participation in biosafety regulation 
 
Biosafety stakeholders 
 
Another critical issue in biosafety decision-making is to identify the 
stakeholders involved in biosafety governance as it will have an impact on 
them. Thus it is not an easy task for the decision-makers in considering not 
just the scientific risk assessment also the socio-economic issues, 
simultaneously taking the various stakeholders into account. 
 
There are many stakeholders of the GM products ranging from the 
biotechnology-related industries, scientists, regulators, government, 
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enforcers, farmers, religious bodies, a non-governmental organisation 
(NGO), environmental and consumer groups and public as they are 
consumer themselves. The public as the ultimate consumer of the LMOs 
products is one of the main stakeholder in biosafety. Thus the public 
awareness and participation in the biosafety decision-making process are 
crucial. 
 
Public perception of LMOS 
 
Public perception of GMOs or LMOs will be discussed in detail in the 
Malaysian context as there are some secondary data on public perception on 
LMOs. Apart from the modern biotechnology products benefits such as 
storage qualities and transportation, there are no apparent benefits to the 
consumers.123 Also due to the propaganda mainly from the environmental 
groups, the consumers who have not much trust in science, and because of 
ethical, cultural, and religious beliefs will continuously not consuming them. 
Therefore public confidence must be restored, and they must be educated. 
Unless the GM products have clear benefits such as extra vitamins as 
compared to the conventional food, this should persuade them to consume 
LMOS or GMOs. 
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Therefore, controversies, propagations either by the public or some 
environmental groups will not help until the full understanding of how the 
science work alongside with effective biosafety regulation to protect human 
health and environment is achieved.  
 
Public participation and biosafety 
 
In this thesis, it is identified that there are some critical issues about 
public and LMOS namely as follows: 
a) What is the role of the public in biosafety decision making process? 
b) What is the justification for public involvement in the biosafety 
decision making? 
c) How to go about institutionalising public participation in biosafety?  
d) How compelling so far is the public involvement in biosafety? 
e) What needs to be done to improve public participation in biosafety? 
Public participation in decision-making have been long known but not 
been much widely practised. Recently smart regulation practices such as the 
views from civil rights groups have been taken into consideration by the 
regulators. The public participation has been part of the democratic 
process124 in decision-making either in developed and developing countries. 
Issues of public participation in biosafety decision-making have been very 
much academically discussed. 
 
                                   
 
 
124
 The Co-Intelligence Institute. ‘Principles of Public Participation’ <http://www.co-
intelligence.org/CIPol_publicparticipation.html> accessed 25 December 2016. 
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The justification for the public participation is very much centred on the 
ethical issues,125 as the need to respect consumer and public rights of choice 
to decide whether to consume or not to consume LMOs due to their ethical, 
cultural and religious beliefs. The fact that the decision directly affects their 
lives justifies it. Apart from these issues as discussed above, bioethics issues 
such as consent to participation, the principle of beneficence and technology 
choices are also part of the considerations.126 
An essential part of the justification for public involvement in biosafety 
is the legitimacy and acceptance of the public of the rules, regulations and 
the law. The law in essence for it to be accepted it must be accepted by the 
people or else it faces rejection not being obeyed or followed. Legitimacy is 
not a significant issue provided that it goes through the right legal procedure. 
However next are issues of acceptance of the biosafety law which is of 
concern. 
Thus public participation is included as part of the biosafety decision-
making process, and that effort is justified and it is said to ‘democratise 
biotechnology’.127 However the issues then move on to what extent public 
participation is being entrenched into the biosafety decision-making process, 
and how is it practised. Then the issue moves on to what extent public can 
efficiently contribute to the decision-making process taking into account their 
knowledge and information of the biosafety issues at hand. The issue of 
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awareness of the public and biosafety education to the public will again to be 
discussed in the suggestions and recommendations part.   
 
11. Aims, objectives and research questions 
 
Aims 
 
1) to identify the existing legal and institutional arrangements of biosafety 
regulation at the international and national level 
2) to conceptualise the existing biosafety rules and regulation with the 
regulatory risk theories  
3) to analyse the Malaysian legal and institutional framework of biosafety 
4) to analyse Malaysian compliance towards Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety  
5) to compare the legal and institutional framework on biosafety between 
Malaysia and Singapore 
6) to suggest recommendations for the improvement of biosafety regulation 
in Malaysia 
 
Objectives 
 
1) to analyse the biosafety risk regulations at the national or international 
level 
2) to analyse the legal basis for the decision-making process during the 
importing of living modified organisms (LMOs) at the international level 
and the Malaysian context  
3) to analyse the current scientific and non-scientific issues in biosafety 
regulation such as socio-economic, ethical, moral, cultural, religious also 
taking into account of local conditions in regulating biosafety 
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4) to analyse the issues of compliance  and harmonization especially about 
current national regulations on biosafety and relevant international 
agreements on biosafety 
5) to examine the best strategy in regulating biosafety with the aims of 
conserving the biodiversity and protecting human health 
 
Research questions 
 
1) What are the current legal and institutional regulations on biosafety at the 
national and international level? 
2) What are the current conflicts on the relationship between law and 
biosafety on pertinent issues that need to be regulated? 
3) How do we regulate the biosafety risks and concerns? 
4) What should be the primary role of law and science in biosafety? 
5) How do the different kinds of biosafety risks regulate? 
6) Whether the legal basis of decision-making in importing LMOs is justified 
either at the international or national level? 
7) What are the best regulatory strategies for protecting human health and 
the environment taking into account the nature of biosafety risk involved? 
 
12. Research methodology and sources 
 
Like other legal research, this legal study applies the doctrinal legal 
method whereby primary and secondary sources are being used. The 
sources are from the books and website available to fulfil the research aims, 
objectives and answering the research questions. The relevant statutes, 
regulations, case laws, international agreements such as conventions and its 
supplementary also textbooks, documents of countries reports, decisions, 
policies, journal articles, encyclopedia, dictionary and other types of materials 
are being studied in order to analyse the implementation of Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety and Malaysia compliance with the Protocol. This study 
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also analyses how Singapore legal and institutional frameworks deal with the 
critical issues in biosafety. 
 
 
13. Organisation of the thesis 
 
This thesis is structured in six (6) chapters as follows. The present 
chapter is the Introductory Chapter on the critical terms of biosafety, modern 
biotechnology, living modified organisms (LMOs), also benefits and risks 
relating to them. This chapter is a contextual framework of the thesis. 
Chapter 1 outlines the justifications for a comparative law study between 
Malaysia and Singapore. Chapter 2 focuses on the theoretical framework of 
biosafety legal regulation namely the regulatory theory especially the 
command and control approach also the smart regulation. The critical issues 
contained in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety with strengths and 
criticisms also are being discussed. Next, the discussion on the Malaysian 
legal and institutional framework on biosafety is divided into Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4 respectively although both chapters are inter-related. Chapter 3 
and 4 are analysed as part of Malaysian compliance with Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety. Chapter 5 is the discussion on the Singapore biosafety legal 
and institutional framework. Finally, Chapter 6 is the analysis for both 
Malaysia and Singapore and recommendations chapter for Malaysia 
biosafety laws.    
 
14. Limitations of the thesis 
 
Since the discussion parameter of regulation of biosafety can be quite 
extensive, the area of discussion in this thesis will be limited to environmental 
biosafety according to Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. In this thesis, there 
will be no discussion of issues of conflict between World Trade Organisation 
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(WTO) and Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety but only relevant discussions on 
what both conventions require in GM food regulation.  
 
There will not be so much discussion as to the effectiveness of rules, 
regulations and institutions as this is doctrinal research also a comprehensive 
analysis of Key Protocol issues of biosafety in Malaysia. Thus the scope of 
discussion is different. The vital biosafety issues of Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety in relation to Singapore are being used as guidelines for 
discussion, not as compliance as Singapore is not a party to it.  
 
LMO and GMO are the terms being introduced and used 
interchangeably even though there are issues on the difference between 
both, but this thesis uses both especially in the Malaysian context as the law 
states GMO to mean LMO as well.  
 
The thesis, in essence, discusses how the law regulates biosafety by 
looking at the rules and regulations in compliance with the critical biosafety 
issues. It also covers the discussion of the institutional framework that is 
being practised in Malaysia and Singapore based on the regulatory theory.  
 
So far there has been little discussion or the analysis of the various 
national and international regulations and the best regulatory strategy that 
suits the need for biosafety risk regulation in Malaysia and Singapore, the 
extent to which Malaysia complies with the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
and Singapore legal and institutional biosafety framework in relation to 
international biosafety standard. In making the analysis, the local conditions 
will be taken into account such as the issues of ethical, socioeconomic, 
cultural and religious considerations. The local circumstances is another 
crucial issue that will be analysed to what extent national sovereignty is 
acknowledged under this Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. These are among 
the main aims of this study. 
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Although at the very outset it is stated that among the aims of 
biosafety is to protect human health and environment. However, it is not 
within this thesis to discuss in the great length of the effectiveness of 
biosafety law as to what extent the rules and regulations in protecting human 
health and the environment.  
 
15. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, this chapter gives the basic definitions and background 
of biosafety, biotechnology, modern biotechnology and controversial issues 
related to it, to understand the real biosafety risks either scientific risks or 
socio-economic issues. The background of the GMOs or LMOs needs to be 
understood first before laying out the acceptable rules and regulations also 
an institutional framework for biosafety governance. The biosafety issues in 
Europe and the United States significantly influenced other countries as 
those are the primary worldwide events that shaped the food safety, GMOs, 
modern biotechnology later biosafety rules and regulation internationally. The 
next Chapter 2 will look in more detail of regulatory theory and further the 
background of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 
 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety covered mostly environmental 
biosafety. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety regulated the transboundary 
movement of LMOs and introduced some procedures namely Advanced 
Informed Procedure (AIA), Living Modified for Food, Feed, Processing (LM-
FPP) and Notifications. 
 
However, as it is a comparative legal study between Malaysia and 
Singapore biosafety law, it is important to present the justifications for 
comparison in the next Chapter 1. 
 
  
 
55 
 
 
 
PART II 
A COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDY BETWEEN MALAYSIA AND 
SINGAPORE LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BIOSAFETY FRAMEWORKS 
 
CHAPTER 1: JUSTIFICATION FOR A COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDY 
BETWEEN MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The thesis is a comparative functional legal study on Malaysia and 
Singapore biosafety regulations and institutions. It is interesting to compare 
Malaysia, a party to Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, with Singapore, a non-
party to the said Protocol. Therefore, the justifications for comparing the two 
countries are essentially explained. 
 
It is important to examine as to how the Protocol’s decision criteria of 
scientific risk assessment, precautionary principle, socio-economic 
considerations and other crucial biosafety issues are interpreted or 
institutionalised in both Malaysia and Singapore context. Although in the 
Singapore context some of these criteria are not directly relevant to them as 
they are not a party to the Protocol, it is an essential study, specifically in the 
context of vital global biosafety issues and future biosafety laws 
harmonisation at the South East Asian region. 
 
Singapore was one of the negotiating countries during the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety negotiations. Singapore then took a different stance 
and not being parties to Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, presumably at the 
very outset due to their perception of biosafety and biosecurity concepts, 
approach and also their national and economic aspirations.  
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2. Justifications for comparisons between Malaysia and Singapore 
 
The general difficulties of comparative law approach are known such 
as conceptual and methodological difficulties, is also occurring in comparing 
Malaysia and Singapore in this thesis. The central fact is that Malaysia is a 
party to Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety whereas Singapore is not a party, in 
the South East Asia region (together with Brunei). It is an interesting 
comparison to analyse as to the differences of the stance taken by both 
countries even though being in the same South East Asia region, Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as member also regional biosafety 
cooperation known as Asia Pacific Biosafety (APB). 
 
Malaysia and Singapore were formerly part of the same country 
named Malaysia, also previously part of the British colonial past. Both are 
members of the Commonwealth of Nations. Thus in this regard, it is 
understood that they shared the same legal history. Thus there are 
similarities between them on the legal and political structure. The comparison 
is useful even though at present Malaysia, an emerging economy, is 
ambitiously struggling to be a developed country by the year 2020 as 
opposed to Singapore, a developed economy. The comparison is also 
beneficial as both are neighbouring ASEAN countries thus harmonisation 
between both countries biosafety laws are crucial.  
 
Malaysia, being a party to the Protocol, is bound to comply with the 
requirements of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. Thus, it raises issues 
of harmonisation of regional biosafety laws with the neighbouring countries of 
South East Asian, especially with Singapore and Brunei (being non-parties to 
the said Cartagena Protocol). As of today Malaysia has no formal bilateral 
agreements with Singapore on biosafety and biosecurity. Both countries 
maintain strategic multilateral dialogue on biosecurity together with United 
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States and Indonesia.128 Among the general topics discussed were the 
national priorities for mitigating biosecurity threats; approaches to biological 
risk assessment; biosafety and biosecurity at national laboratories; and the 
growing threat of terrorism and its corresponding implications for both 
regional and international security. 
 
Conceptual and methodological difficulties in comparative law 
 
The case studies in these two countries are not a mere comparison of 
similarities and differences, but an analytical and critical view on Malaysia’s 
and Singapore’s approaches to biosafety decision-making process. Biosafety 
is a vital issue that affects human health and the environment also future 
generation and becoming a critical global issue, especially on the emerging 
new biotechnology innovations and inventions. Thus any different stance 
taken by the Malaysian government might affect its neighbour, Singapore. 
Consequently, it might lead to Malaysia’s different actions on biosafety 
export, import or ban on specific LMOs and GMOs. The different stand might 
affect Malaysia’s relation to trade agreements such as WTO or biodiversity 
agreements, either lateral, bilateral or multilateral agreements. 
 
While the typical pitfalls of conceptual and methodological problems in 
the comparative legal study between countries are known, this study also 
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experiences the same difficulties. The conceptual problems129 in comparative 
law may range from the different concepts, definition, interpretation, 
terminology, scope and coverage of issues of law that need to be 
investigated as countries have different sources of laws namely primary and 
secondary. The fact that the binding nature of those legal sources might 
affect the practice by the countries differently is an aspect that could not 
merely be neglected as it may have different legal implications. 
 
For example, the term biosafety in Malaysia, a party to Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety, mainly covers the domestic use and export of LMO 
and GMO. However, the term biosafety in Singapore encompasses more 
extensive coverage to include regulation of lab biosafety, biosecurity and 
bioterrorism as well. Moreover, Singapore distinguishes between biosafety 
and biosecurity, the former dealing with LMOs whereas the latter with 
biological agents (BA) and toxins. 
 
The methodological problems also arise in the comparative legal 
study. While the methodology is defined as the scientific study of these 
methods,130 the methodology in comparative law is not easy to define. 
Perhaps the functional approach of the analysis of the legal and institutional 
biosafety of both countries will again pose problems as they might cover 
broader aspect beyond biosafety than the names suggested.  However, the 
comparative law approach in relation to this thesis tends to reflect the reality 
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in the words of Zweigert 131 ‘…comparative law and its very merit rest on the 
fact that it brings legal thinking back to reality, to the actualities of law.’  
 
The comparative legal study between Malaysia and Singapore is 
prima facie justified as there are similarities between them on the basis of 
legal history, political structure, legal sources and judicial review aspects. 
This will validate the comparison as there is no striking difference between 
Malaysia and Singapore. This will be discussed in the next discussion in this 
chapter. 
 
The agriculture-related business, population and geographical 
proximity of both countries are the paramount issues of discussion that 
determine the directions of biosafety regulations. 
 
3. Comparison between Malaysia and Singapore Biosafety Law 
 
Background facts of Malaysia and Singapore 
 
As Singapore and Malaysia historical link could not be separated, the 
same with economic as both are main trading partners apart from being 
neighbouring countries. There are some issues of points of similarities and 
differences to be discussed in both countries namely: 
 
a) Country’s economic aspiration 
b) Population, cultural/ local issues 
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c) Public perception of GM goods 
d) Research and development 
e) Current state of food importer or exporter 
Country’s economic aspiration in biotechnology  
 
Agricultural products are mainly the target for modern biotechnological 
innovations and commercialisation. Thus the agricultural-related business 
generates income for many countries especially those with large lands. In 
light of that, Malaysia aspires biotechnology is one of the five strategic 
technologies expected to accelerate Malaysia’s transformation into a highly 
industrialised nation by 2020 due to its rich in natural resources. Therefore 
the policies, Malaysian Development Plan and Annual Budget were allocated 
to fulfil its aspiration. As of 2017 Malaysia’s Growth Domestic Product (GDP) 
stands at USD$314.5 billion.132 In 2018, for the first three quarters, 
Malaysia’s GDP moderated to 4.7 per cent with a value of RM907.2 billion 
(roughly around USD$217.74 billion) at constant prices and RM1, 055.2 
billion (roughly USD $253.25 billion) at current prices.133 
 
Singapore is an industrialised city-state with little natural resources. 
Singapore's vision is to develop as a regional Biomedical Science Hub. In 
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2017 Singapore’s GDP stands at USD323.907 billion.134 Singapore basically 
follows US model in biosafety, emerged as one of the top 10 global in 
biotechnology innovations.135 Scientific American ranked countries’ 
biotechnology innovations based on these criteria namely; intellectual 
property (IP) protection, intensity, enterprise support, education workforce 
and foundations. Overall, Singapore is ranked second after the United 
States.136 In terms of enterprise support whether the country is “business 
friendly”, Singapore is ranked second after the United States, and ranked first 
for education workforce as the more educated the workforce, the better the 
score. Before going into further discussion on Malaysia and Singapore 
biotechnological business, the population aspects of both countries need to 
be understood. 
  
Population, cultural/local issues 
 
Both countries, Malaysia and Singapore are multi-ethnic, multi-
religious and multi-cultural. The major ethnics in both countries are 
comprised of Malay, Chinese and Indian. The only difference is the 
composition of those races. Malaysia’s majority population is Malay whereas 
Singapore majority ethnic is Chinese. Islam is Malaysia’s official religion. 
Thus apart from Malays Muslims, there are other races such as Chinese and 
Indians and the native of Sabah and Sarawak who are Muslims as well. As 
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for Chinese they can be either Buddhist, Christians or Muslims. The same is 
for the Indians. As for Singaporeans, Buddhism/Taoism is the majority 
religion (44.2%), next is Christianity (18.8%), no religion(18.5%), Islam (14%) 
and others (5.7%).137    
 
As most majority Malays are Muslims in Malaysia, thus they observe 
the strict dietary requirement which will be elaborated further in Chapter 3. 
The same applies with the majority Buddhist/Taoist in Singapore, with mostly 
vegetarian dietary requirement. The race composition is explained as it 
marks a great significance culturally or religiously in food consumption and 
dietary requirement. The general ruling on dietary restrictions have been 
summarised in the previous Introductory Chapter. 
 
 Thus the issues concerning GMOs are importation of food, halal 
certification, seed for plantation agriculture, and the need to certify exports.   
 
Malaysian and Singaporean public perceptions of GM products 
 
In Malaysia, the private sector and the consumer groups have shown 
some interest as either advocates or opponents. There are oppositions from 
Consumer’s Association of Penang (CAP) and Third World Network (TWN). 
Genetically modified food is a sensitive issue as in other countries when 
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there is awareness as there are some religious beliefs and sentiments 
associated with GM goods. 
 
Labelling of GM while there is a provision on it, by section 61 of the 
Biosafety Act 2007, the enforcement of the mandatory or voluntary labelling 
is still ongoing. The word ‘shall’ in Biosafety Act 2007 while denotes 
mandatory labelling of GM products, however, the enforcement is still at the 
discussion level. There is labelling regulation138 in the Malaysia Food 
Regulation that states LMOs food must be labelled. However, the clarity of 
this labelling is still a continuing issue.139 
 
While Malaysians are generally being cautious in GM food 
consumption due to their awareness, the Singaporean public perception is 
50% open to GM and some negative sentiments but no report of any 
organised campaign.140 There is no labelling provision at the moment on GM 
products only Biohazard labelling on products that contain BA and toxins on 
transportation and conveyance transporting using public roads.141 
 
While both countries are geographically proximate to each other, there 
might be influences on the issues of religious, dietary, cultural and public 
perception towards the GM products. 
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140Bhumiratana S, Report on Biosafety Policy Options and Capacity Building Related to 
Genetically Modified Organisms in the Food Processing Industry of ASEAN (UNIDO 
2002)18.  
141Singapore Biological Agents And Toxins Act 2005 (Chapter 24A) s5,6,7. 
  
 
64 
 
 
 
Research and development 
 
In Malaysia, there are active ongoing research activities in developing 
varieties both plant and tree crops using gene technology such as palm oil 
and rubber as those agricultural commodities are Malaysia most export. 
However, the most promising GM crops to be commercially released into the 
market are GM rice142 and shorter-ripening palm.143 
 
In realising this research and development, there are some 
government agencies involved namely Malaysian Agricultural Research and 
Development Institute (MARDI) and the Agricultural University of Malaysia 
(UPM). These two bodies are government agencies involved in detection 
techniques for LMOs. MARDI is also responsible for field trials of LMOs. 
 
The Malaysian government has spent $US26 million to build three 
institutes in the new BioValley Malaysia, a massive complex that is part of a 
plan to attract $US10 billion in biotechnology investment within a decade.144 
 
In Singapore, the Institute of Molecular Agro-biology in Singapore, 
undertakes research activity on the development of plant varieties for 
resistance to disease, to produce pharmaceutical products and to obtain 
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higher yields. It is more likely that Singapore will use such transgenic 
varieties for farming. 
  
Singapore invested heavily in biotechnology research and hoped to 
become the “World Class Life Science Hub”. The research is focussed not so 
much on the end product but mostly to generate intellectual property. 
Moreover, in 2001 Singapore started on a 15-year, $US8.2 billion project to 
make Singapore a high-technology hub with a strong emphasis on 
biotechnology’. The plan comprises the $US500 million BioPolis complex.145 
This venture of interest and investment in biotechnology are mainly due to 
infectious disease challenges, economic interests, and security concerns 
about biological weapons.146 
 
In Singapore, the field trials are undertaken in collaboration with 
researchers from China and New Zealand. However, research on sensitive 
issues such as human cloning or stem cell engineering may require approval 
from the National Bioethics Advisory Panel. It seems here Singaporean are 
taking the sensitive ethical issues into great consideration especially dealing 
with experiments on humans147 while being liberal on other types of 
biotechnology research. 
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Singapore played a leading role in the adoption of ASEAN guidelines 
on risk assessment and the harmonisation of risk assessment in ASEAN. 
Singapore is taking the lead being the headquarter of Asia Pacific Biosafety. 
This raise issues of what is Singapore’s ambition in the Asia Pacific Region 
on biosafety and biosecurity. It is argued that due to Singapore’s signing into 
WTO trade-related agreements, that accounts for the development of 
biosafety regulation in Singapore. This will be further discussed in Chapter 5.     
 
Current state of food importer or exporter 
 
Malaysia is a major food importer and, mainly through being the 
world’s major supplier of palm oil, also a food exporter. Therefore Malaysia 
aspires to develop its biotechnology to produce better food not just for local 
consumption also to be exported. Another area for potential modern 
biotechnology research and commercialisation are rice and rubber.  
 
On the other hand, Singapore is a food importing country. The GMO 
policy seems to be more liberal towards GM food and food products with no 
labelling requirement. However, for LMO that relates to agriculture, Genetic 
Modification Advsory Committee (GMAC) function is to analyse the risk 
assessment as to effects on the human health and environment. It seems 
here Singapore performs a risk assessment on LMO agriculture products, 
guided by Singapore GMAC Guidelines.  
 
There is minimal control on GM in Singapore. Singapore develops a 
framework to promote biosafety culture namely as follows: 
 
a) transparent and follows internationally-recognised standards  
b) comprehensive but not prescriptive  
c) balanced between safety and research freedom 
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Singapore follows the steps of other developed countries such as the 
United States and Britain, that separated laws on biosafety and 
biosecurity.148 Singapore defines biosafety and biosecurity. Biosafety is 
based on principles and techniques that protect workers from exposure. 
Biosecurity is based on security measures designed to reduce the risk of 
loss, theft or diversion.149 Therefore the biosafety laws in Singapore are very 
much on Biological Agents and Toxins Act 2005 whereas the regulation of 
GM products or LMOs is by GMAC Guidelines. 
 
Malaysia and Singapore Legal History 
 
Apart from the fact that they are close neighbouring countries with the 
same interests in the modern biotechnological products, also population/ 
cultural attachments, there are strong historical, economic and political ties. 
The most significant similarities between Malaysia and Singapore are the fact 
that both have the same colonial experience, i.e. the British colonialism from 
the period 1819 starting in Singapore until both countries independence in 
1957 for 138 years. 
 
By looking at the past histories of both countries, it is vital to explain 
on the current conditions that provide the background of similar political, legal 
similarities and issues on judicial review that is connected with biosafety 
                                   
 
 
148
 Chang Ai-Lien, 'Biosafety Laws To Instil Research Confidence' 
<http://www.gmac.gov.sg/News/2005/2005_04_12_B.html> accessed on 11th November 
2015. 
149
 Koh Peng Keng, 'Singapore’s Perspectives s Perspectives on Biosafety & Biosecurity' 
<http://www.biosecurity.sandia.gov/ibtr/subpages/pastConf/20032005/redi/koh-peng-
keng.pdf> accessed on 11th November 2015. 
  
 
68 
 
 
 
decision making process. Malaysia and Singapore have been the same 
country since 1963 when Malaysia was formed as among Peninsular 
Malaysia which consists of thirteen (13) states also consists of Sabah and 
Sarawak and three (3) Federal Territories (Kuala Lumpur, Putrajaya and 
Labuan). However, due to some political dispute between both countries, 
Singapore left Malaysia in 1965 and became a different country.   
 
Malaysia and Singapore political and legal similarities 
 
Both countries Malaysia and Singapore have resemblances in their 
political and legal structure. This is because they were from the same country 
(Malaysia) and both share the same, British colonial past, which greatly 
influenced the legal and political administration of both countries. 
 
Malaysia political structure 
 
Executive 
 
Malaysia practices the British style democracy constitutional 
monarchy. The Yang Dipertuan Agong (King of Malaysia) is similar to the 
Queen/ King of England. The executive of Malaysia is made up of the Prime 
Minister and his cabinet ministers whom he appointed at the advice of the 
Yang Dipertuan Agong. They run the day-to-day administration of the country 
as they are elected from the General Election held every 5 years at the 
Federal level and known as Members of Parliament. 
 
Judiciary 
 
The head of the judiciary is the Lord President who is the head of all 
judges in Malaysia and Sabah and Sarawak. There is also the Attorney 
General who is the head of the government prosecution service known as the 
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Attorney General Chambers which is an essential branch of the government 
service.  
 
Legislative  
 
Malaysia is also very much influenced by the British model Parliament 
whereby law is made by the Parliament but subject to the Constitutional 
Supremacy, not as Parliamentary supremacy as in the United Kingdom.150 
 
Today, this country, Malaysia is governed by a Federal Government. 
The Federal matters are under the Ninth Schedule151 of the Federal 
Constitution such as finance, defence, education and other vital issues. The 
Federal Constitution is the supreme written law of the land. The Federal 
Government is ruled by the Prime Minister and his cabinet ministers, 
whereas the State Government administered the state matters152 such as on 
water, land and Islamic law. 
 
Each state has their leaders namely the Chief Ministers, Sultan and 
Tuan Yang Dipertua. The State Governments have their Chief Minister and 
States Excos. For states that have no Sultan/ Malay Ruler such as Pulau 
Pinang, Melaka, Sabah and Sarawak they have their Tuan Yang Dipertua 
instead. For Sabah and Sarawak, they are unique in the sense that they have 
more autonomy in their state matters as they have their own Chief Ministers 
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and cabinet ministers, state election and their exclusive power over their 
immigration matters.153 
 
The head of the country is the Yang Dipertuan Agong, the monarchy. 
The head of the executive is the Prime Minister, and head of the judiciary is 
the Lord President. The Yang Dipertuan Agong is the Head of Islam and for 
states that have no Sultan or Malay ruler. This political and administration 
illustration is essential not for the narrative of it but to show the changing of 
the old structure of Malaya to newborn Malaysia in 1963. There are some 
issues such as land matter, the natural biodiversity, Islamic Law in a 
particular state is not directly governed by the Federal Government but by the 
relevant State Government. The issues of biodiversity (especially Sabah and 
Sarawak)  and Islamic Law jurisdiction the matters for the State Government 
rather than the Federal Government, cause complications in enforcement.  
 
Malaysia legal sources 
 
The highest source of Malaysian law is the Federal Constitution.154 
Article 4 of the Federal Constitution states that any law that is against the 
Federal Constitution is void and invalid. The laws in Malaysia mainly enacted 
by Act of Parliament. The statute is legislated by Parliament through the 
elected House of Representative (Dewan Rakyat) and appointed House of 
Senate (Dewan Negara) and obtained the approval of the Yang Dipertuan 
Agong (The King). 
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From these Acts of Parliament, there are delegated legislation 
whereby certain public institutions are established that gives the power to 
some institutions and to make regulations, and decisions. Biosafety Act 
2007155 is the enabling Act that gives the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment to make biosafety-related laws on the movement of LMOs and 
LMOs inside and outside the country but simultaneously in relation to other 
related government agencies. 
 
Singapore political and legal structure 
 
Singapore is a Republic that has the Prime Minister and the President. 
The Yang Dipertuan Negara is the Head of Government. The Prime Minister 
is the head of Cabinet Minister. The President also plays roles in the 
Singapore government. Thus the administrative structure which is slightly 
different from Malaysia due to the different type of democracy adopted as a 
Republic. The Singapore judiciary departed from Malaysia judiciary but 
greatly influenced by Malaysia and British system, and legislative is very 
much British model Parliament. Singapore highest form of law is the 
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore.156The Singapore Constitution is 
the Supreme law.157 Thus like Malaysia, Singapore upholds constitutional 
supremacy. 
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British Common Law in Malaysia and Singapore 
 
One crucial aspect of the British Common Law is the Doctrine of 
Judicial Precedent or the doctrine of stare decisis, i.e. to stand by its previous 
decided cases, primarily by the higher court in Malaysia the High Court, 
Court of Appeal and the Federal Court. Judges in Malaysian courts were 
trained in Britain previously even the lawyers. Therefore, the British laws 
greatly influenced the Malaysian laws. The English laws are cited and argued 
in courts, but the application of English law is of persuasive authority not of 
binding authority.  
 
The same is true for Singapore courts. Singapore Section 3 of the 
Application of the English Law158159 preserves the application of the common 
law and equity. Section 3(2) states that common law may be modified to suit 
Singapore circumstances. Singapore Section 5160 states that no English 
enactment shall be part of Singapore law save by the Act. Section 4(1)161 the 
Key provision states that the English enactments specified in First Schedule 
or made applicable by any written law should continue in force in 
Singapore.162 
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Judicial review in Malaysia and Singapore 
 
Judicial review is the application to seek the court declaration that the 
administrative decision is ultra vires due to the arguments that are beyond its 
power, illegal, irrational and unfair. It is a very much concept followed the 
English law. According to the English law, judicial review is the check of 
balance among the three central organs of the government namely the 
executive, judiciary and legislative. Judicial review is the act of challenging 
the administrative act of the government in a court of justice who has the 
locus standi to bring the case in court. It is believed that every organ of the 
government should be separate and independent in line with the doctrine 
separation of power by Montesquieu163 to prevent abuse of power.  
 
Every organ of the government is entrusted with defined roles and 
responsibility namely for the executive to run the administration of the 
country, the judiciary to be the upholder of justice and legislative to make 
laws. When any of them used power than what they are supposed to hold, 
therefore their acts are up to challenge in court. In English law, the judicial 
review can be summarised due to these grounds164 namely (a) illegality;  
(b) fairness; and (c) irrationality and proportionality.  
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Judicial review in Malaysia 
 
Although the origin of judicial of judicial review is from English law, it is 
used sparingly in Malaysia and Singapore. In fact, in Malaysia, judicial review 
has been used as against the Federal Government, State Government, and 
local authorities although not as much back in Britain. 
 
In Malaysia judicial review is not an appeal but an application for 
judicial review requires leave of court by virtue of Order 53 rule 1(1) of the 
Rules of the Court 2012.165Order 53 states that ‘…the Order shall govern all 
applications seeking the relief specified in paragraph 1 of the Schedule to the 
Courts of Judicature Act 1964 and for the purposes therein specified and 
subject to the provisions of Chapter VIII of Part 2 of the Specific Relief Act 
1950 [Act 137].’166  
 
Paragraph 1 of the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 
explains; 
 
Power to issue to any person or authority directions, orders or writs, 
including writs of the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, 
quo warranto and certiorari, or any others, for the enforcement of the 
rights conferred by Part II of the Constitution, or any of them, or for 
any purpose. 
 
In the biosafety rules and regulation, there are provisions for the 
appeal against the decision of the biosafety decision makers as provided in 
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Malaysian Biosafety Act 2007.167 Thus any unsuccessful appeal might give 
the applicants to challenge the Ministry’s decision through judicial review. 
However to what extent the court will hear biosafety appeals is doubtful. For 
example, if the National Biosafety Board has decided due to the advice was 
given by Genetic Modification Advisory Committee (GMAC), scientific risk 
assessment and relevant public consultation, it is tricky to see the Malaysian 
courts’ willingness to interfere with the decision. 
 
Judicial review in Singapore 
 
In Singapore, judicial review has been used but subjected to 
restrictions. Order 53 of the Rules of the Court168 application for a mandatory 
order, prohibiting order, quashing order, or declaration is to be obtained with 
leave of the court. The court in granting the relief must be satisfied that ‘…the 
applicant has a cause of action that would have entitled the applicant to any 
appropriate relief if the relevant relief had been claimed in a separate action, 
the Court may, also, grant the applicant the relevant relief.’169 
 
Thus the same legal issue might occur in Singapore. If any applicant is 
aggrieved by the decision of Ministry of Health, for instance, the concern 
arises as to what extent the Singapore court would entertain the judicial 
review application. 
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4. Malaysia and Singapore negotiations in relation to Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety 
 
Both countries’ stances in relation to Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
is an interesting heated discussion and comparison as this lies the heart of 
the discussion. There are considerable differences on this issue. However, 
reasons have yet to be found out as to the different stances towards 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 2000 by both countries. 
 
In this issue, Malaysia is a party to the said Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety whereas Singapore is not. Therefore this comparison is unique and 
interesting to understand as to why both countries adopt different stances 
and approaches towards the Protocol. Perhaps the latter part of this thesis 
will answer this question. 
 
The justifications above are in line with the idea of ‘…comparative law 
as its concepts identify the demands that a particular slice of life poses for 
the law where the social and economic conditions are similar and provide a 
realistic context within which to compare and contrast the various solutions, 
however much they may differ technically or substantially.’170 Therefore the 
comparison between Malaysia and Singapore is justified as both countries 
have almost the same legal, political, social but with different economic 
conditions. 
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It is argued that the critical Protocol issues provide the benchmark of 
discussion in the comparison between Malaysia and Singapore. This is 
because the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety Protocol highlights the most 
critical and accepted issues in biosafety at the international level. Thus this 
thesis studies on how Malaysia and Singapore deal with those crucial 
biosafety issues. This thesis analyses Malaysian compliance with the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. This thesis also examines Singaporean 
implementation and institutionalisation of the most crucial issues on 
biosafety/ biosecurity. Harmonisation of biosafety laws between these 
countries as part of the South East Asia region is crucial in preparing for 
future disputes resolutions.       
 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
agreements 
 
The countries involved in these international trade and biodiversity 
agreements perhaps shape the biosafety rules and regulations. As Malaysia 
is a party to Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, thus the rules and regulations 
on biosafety contain all the vital biosafety issues as mentioned above. 
 
Since Singapore is not a party to the Protocol but a party to the 
various related WTO biosafety, trade and biodiversity agreements, such as 
The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS Agreement), The Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
Agreement and The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Thus 
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the biosafety rules and regulation seem to work well with trade and protection 
of human health but perhaps not biodiversity protection.171  
 
Their involvement also reflects country’s agricultural trade priorities172 
or countries’ trade priorities in general. Thus this explains the different 
approaches taken by both countries about genetically modified, genetically 
engineered, living modified organisms, biological agents and the like. 
 
It is argued due to these differences there will be some conflicting 
issues between Malaysia and Singapore. One issue is the risk assessment 
as to which party bears the cost. Under the SPS Agreement, it is the 
importing country that eventually bears the cost of the risk assessment, while 
under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety the exporting party might be 
required to finance the assessment. 
 
Another issue is on documentation with regard to labelling as part of 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. Thus these issues might need to be 
considered by both countries in future GM dealings. Perhaps this should be 
resolved by the ASEAN cooperation in GM Guidelines and Asia Pacific 
Biosafety whereby both countries are members. Thus in light of this opinion, 
harmonisation of biosafety laws between Malaysia and Singapore is 
essential.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
From this justification chapter, it is hoped that by the end of the study, 
the analysis of similarities or differences between Malaysia and Singapore 
biosafety approaches will be better understood. The comparison is essential 
in understanding the background that shaped the biosafety governance. The 
type of regulatory approach taken by the Singapore biosafety decision-maker 
will be analysed and what Malaysia could learn lessons about that issue. It is 
also interesting to analyse to what extent non-scientific issues such as 
ethical, religious and socio-economic considerations will be taken into 
consideration by Singapore biosafety decision makers in comparison to 
Malaysia. 
  
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is seen by many countries especially 
Europe and developing countries as a model of good biosafety governance 
even though there are many criticisms towards it. Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety outlines the most critical aspect of biosafety governance that is 
being negotiated among various countries. It seems to validate the aims of 
protecting human health and the environment. It can be seen from the 
various Key Protocol issues that are being signed, agreed and implemented 
by many countries. 
  
Singapore has played a leading role in the adoption of ASEAN 
guidelines on risk assessment and the harmonisation of risk assessment in 
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ASEAN173 also in the Asia Pacific Biosafety association. Thus this should 
serve as medium or forum for future reconciliation rather than confrontation 
should any issues of biosafety conflicts arise between Malaysia and 
Singapore. 
The next Chapter 2 will discuss the regulatory theory of biosafety 
regulation. This provides the basic understanding of biosafety regulation as a 
risk regulation. It further discusses on the relevant regulatory strategies in 
implementing biosafety. Next, there will be a discussion on Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety that provides a framework for biosafety regulation. This 
provides a model of biosafety legal and institutional framework as it 
summarises the vital issues in biosafety.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                   
 
 
173Bhumiratana S (n140)18. 
  
 
81 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 THE LEGAL REGULATION OF BIOSAFETY RISKS AND THE 
CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The previous Chapter 1 discussed on the justifications of a 
comparative legal study between Malaysia and Singapore on biosafety legal 
and their respective institutional frameworks.  
 
This chapter discusses two important aspects of this thesis namely; 
 
i) the biosafety risk regulation; and  
ii) the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety  
 
The regulatory theory provides the underlying theoretical framework 
on the biosafety risk regulation. It provides an understanding of the risk 
regulation theories and strategies. This chapter also analyses the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety, the leading international agreement in biosafety risk 
regulation. This is because Malaysia is a party to that Protocol even though 
Singapore is not. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is said to be a model 
national biosafety framework that outlines the most essential biosafety 
issues, is used to as a parameter of discussion between Malaysia and 
Singapore. It is important to understand the background the Protocol, key 
biosafety issues, strengths and criticisms.     
 
This chapter provides the theoretical framework to analyse the 
biosafety risk regulation in Malaysia and Singapore in later Chapters 3,4 and 
5.The discussion is important as it provides the discussion of the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety. 
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2. The legal regulation of biosafety risk 
 
In the previous Introductory Chapter, biosafety risks and concerns 
were outlined. This chapter examines the biosafety as a ‘type’ of risk 
regulation. 
 
Definition of regulation 
 
There is no universal standard definition of regulation due to its 
various perspectives and contexts.  A commonly accepted definition of 
regulation is a specific set of commands174 issued by the government.175  
  
When discussing the topic of regulation, it is usually associated with 
another field such as the economy, finance, law, or politics, thus making it a 
diverse and complex field.  Regulation is seen as a necessity in a civilised 
society, and every aspect must be in order. 
 
Regulation issues have created topical debates and prompted 
numerous activities by international organisations. The criticisms and issues 
were very prominent during the financial crisis in the years between 2007 and 
2009.176 
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Over time, the regulation strategy has changed from the traditional 
command and control approach to new governance such as responsive 
regulation, smart regulation, meta-regulation, self-regulation and so on.  
These essential strategies will be defined, and their applicability to biosafety 
regulation will be analysed. 
 
As Baldwin177 stated, the field of regulation has come to maturity in an 
intellectual and practical sense as almost every aspect of life has been 
‘regulated’. Hence, regulation has been the subject of study across various 
disciplines.  However, biosafety-specific regulation is still in the developing 
stage, as attempts are made to integrate it with the existing theories of 
regulation.  
 
The existence of regulation comes with its pros and cons.  The 
supporter of regulation sees it as a technocratic device, as there is potential 
to exert rational control over significant economic and social activities, 
whereas the sceptic of regulation will see it as nothing more than 
bureaucratic red tape, a hurdle to economic growth.178For instance 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is seen as red tape to the Miami and 
Compromise Groups, and put hurdles in front of the free movement of LMOs 
worldwide.  The Protocol may restrict modern biotechnology growth, research 
and development, and also the billion-dollar industries associated with it. 
While both sides have the truth, this thesis focuses on the advantages of the 
regulation of biosafety. 
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Regulation in the United Kingdom (UK) 
 
The changing trend in regulation is a global phenomenon such as in 
the UK especially on the modern biotechnology. In the UK, the financial crisis 
and the emergence of new technologies and GM products related to mad 
cow179 disease have changed the frontiers of existing regulatory regimes. 
 
As Malaysia was previously part of the British colonial history, it is 
essential to observe the scenario in the UK for better understanding of the 
changing of regulatory strategy from a command and control approach to 
new governance.  Regulation changes also occurred in other countries since 
the UK influenced their perspectives on regulation.  The changes occurred 
mainly because of financial and economic conditions that affected the global 
financial market. This globalisation of regulation change reinforced and 
encouraged international agreements and conventions, especially on 
environmental issues.   
 
There are various issues in UK regulation in the millennial era such as 
the appropriateness of regulatory strategies and structures, and also the 
significant public concern.  The prominent issues in the UK relate to the 
governance of regulatory bodies.   
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Another relevant issue is the emergence of new technologies and 
producers. In the UK, consumers became critical of food production after a 
chain of food safety scandals such as mad cow disease contamination.180  
 
In the areas of GM food and new communication technologies, a raft 
of new control challenges exists.  There is a growing appetite to explore the 
potential of non-traditional methods and strategies of regulation such as 
meta-regulation and self-regulation.  In addition to these responsive 
regulation-type methods, smart regulation and problem-centred regulation 
theories are being explored. These aim for better regulation in general and 
the same diversification of the methods of regulation is also expected for 
other types of technology.  These will be explored in the next discussion of 
strategies of regulation. 
 
However, it is useful to remember that the focus here is mainly on 
biosafety regulation in Malaysia and Singapore.As both countries were 
previously British colonial past as explained in Chapter 1, it is argued that the 
trend of regulation in the UK affected Malaysia especially on the food safety 
controversy and modern biotechnology also biosafety issues. 
 
Regulation in Malaysia 
 
Malaysia experienced the same changes in regulation due to 
globalisation and its involvement in the international treaties. As nothing 
much has been written on the changes in regulation and on strategies in 
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regulatory theories in the Malaysian context, this thesis will lead the way in 
the discussion of regulatory changes in biosafety.  
 
Malaysia, like Britain, is a democratic monarchy and implements its 
laws based on Acts passed in Parliament.  Apart from statutes, there are 
delegated legislation derived from government bodies and agencies. From 
the early establishment of Malaysia in 1963, and perhaps during British 
occupation in Malaya until Independence in 1957, it was traditionally a 
command and control approach to regulation.  However, from 1963 when 
Malaysia was formed, treaties that were signed and ratified by Malaysia were 
also adopted into Malaysian domestic law.  The changes can be seen in the 
case of biosafety legislation in Malaysia that emanates from the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety. 
 
In environmental treaties and biosafety legislation specifically, 
Malaysia has adopted other strategies for regulation apart from the traditional 
command and control such as responsive regulation and smart regulation.  
These strategies in biosafety regulation are to be determined and will be 
analysed later in Chapter 3 and 4.   
 
Biosafety regulation is mainly for the protection of human health and 
the environment to address any biosafety risks and concerns. Thus it is 
essential to understand the relationship between biosafety and the law that 
shapes the biosafety legal and institutional frameworks. 
 
3. The relationship between biosafety and the law 
 
The regulatory perspective provides the theoretical framework of this 
thesis to investigate biosafety regulation in order to understand how biosafety 
risk is shaped and strategies to improve its governance. Therefore it is 
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important first and foremost to understand the essential relationship between 
biosafety, the science, and the law. 
 
Science and the law 
 
Biosafety issues pertaining to modern biotechnology come under the 
regulation of science. It is essential to appreciate the relationship between 
science and the law. Peel181 explained the role of science is to assess health, 
safety and environment. Science, therefore, becomes an essential 
component in risk regulation. Previously, science and expertise had less 
power, but it is now becoming acknowledged and more widely accepted.  
 
The issue now is should science be the only or primary component of 
the decision making process? It is argued that prima facie science alone is 
rarely sufficient basis for credible and legitimate risk decision making under 
international law as it implicates various debatable issues. International law 
and institutions are becoming a legitimate source of risk governance rather 
than science. The Hormones case is an example of the application of 
scientific evidence and risk assessment as required by Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)-WTO at the international level in the late 
1990s. Thus science later appears to be an instrument in legitimising the 
decision-making for risk assessment.  
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The scientific risk assessment in biosafety has been used widely in 
conjunction with the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. While it provides a 
valid instrument for assessing biosafety risk, specifically LMOs, there are 
debates on the inclusion of non-scientific issues such as socio-economic 
factors, or social science issues.  
    
In recent years, and distinct from bioscience, social science has 
gained prominence in the regulatory decision-making process. This can be 
traced back to much of the social science literature by the influential and 
debatable Weiss,182 from which social science research governs the 
decision-making process by providing an educated, informed climate in which 
rational decisions can be made. 
 
In the field of biosafety regulation, the socio-economic benefit is seen 
as an extension of a socially scientific study that examines how the society is 
progressed because of their local economy. The fact that the socio-economic 
outcome has become part of the biosafety decision-making process should 
be welcomed as this view reflects the writer’s view as well. Socio-economic 
benefits, sometimes known as non-scientific benefits (or non-safety183), are 
distinctly different to the scientific benefits in the biosafety context. 
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It is argued that science as the sole perspective in biosafety 
governance is controversial. There are valid reasons for socio-economic 
considerations to be taken into account, and these have been proven since 
they have been incorporated into the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 
However, unlike science (the risk assessment of LMOs) the socio-economic 
perspective, despite being included in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 
lacks a reliable assessment method. Even though the Socio-Economic 
Impact Assessment (SEIA) method has been suggested, its future is 
uncertain.  
 
It is argued that the critical problem in relation to science in biosafety 
regulation is the uncertainty of science. Therefore the precautionary principle 
should be applied in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in cases of 
uncertainty in science. This raises questions about the adequacy of science 
as the primary instrument in biosafety regulation. Hence the issue arises - 
should the rationales for governance in this field (biosafety) be based purely 
on scientific logic? It is argued here that this should not be the case but 
should be supported by socio economic considerations and other issues 
specific to a country’s circumstances. 
 
Technology and the law 
 
The next discussion now moves on to the relationship between 
technology and the law. Technological progress in information technology, 
biotechnology, nanotechnologies and the like are moving forward at a fast 
rate compared to previous decades. This progress is a landmark of human 
achievement, and a country with advanced technologies is considered to be 
a prosperous nation, as many improvements can be done and achieved with 
useful technology.  
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Nevertheless, the problem with rapid technological progress is that the 
law cannot cope with the regulation of the technology industry. Modern 
biotechnological products are commonly imported and exported across 
boundaries. A contaminated LMO exported from the United States may be 
imported by Japan for instance. It is then either the national legal system of 
Japan that prosecutes or the international law can prosecute.  Joint 
international agreements, laws and conventions that legitimise prosecutions 
such as of non-compliance or contamination are crucial and need to be 
established.  
 
Laws seem to become rigid over time and formalities before 
recognition and enforcement of any laws will take some time. The emergence 
of new forms of technology will usually be a disadvantage to a developing 
country as it does not have the capacity building or local expertise to deal 
with the advanced technology.  Hence, legal expertise on that particular kind 
of technology will also be lacking. In a more complex technologies, the legal 
experts need to have the knowledge of that technology or be able to consult 
with the relevant expert in that field of technology before the regulation is 
enacted. This challenge is not just unique to a developing country but also 
the most advanced nations.184 
 
The primary challenge is the adaptation of the legal systems to the 
ever-changing realities and needs that arise with the progress of science and 
                                   
 
 
184Newell P and Glover D, 'Business and Biotechnology: Regulation and the Politics of 
Influence' (2003) 8. 
  
 
91 
 
 
 
technology.185 When adapting becomes problematic, what approach should 
then be used? These are some of the issues of technology and the relevant 
law. 
 
It is interesting that Francioni (2006)186 highlights that, unlike domestic 
law, international law is unable to respond to the challenge of rapid 
technological progress due to institutional mechanisms such as the majority 
vote187 restricting the timely enactment of any legislation.  The challenge of 
technology regulation is not just at the national level but at the international 
level as well. 
 
It is argued that technologies pose risks that need to be regulated. The 
biosafety risks as part of modern biotechnology have been discussed in the 
Introductory Chapter. The issue is then how to regulate the technologies thus 
the regulatory strategy is of paramount importance. 
 
Modern biotechnology and the law 
 
Perhaps the most controversial issue is the relationship between 
modern biotechnology and the law. The problems in regulating the modern 
biotechnology process of genetic engineering and the genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) and its products, such as living modified organisms 
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(LMOs) range from scientific, socio-economic, ethical, religious and cultural 
issues. 
 
The law and modern biotechnology have a strained relationship.  The 
law may be seen as unsuitable in controlling scientific advances as opposed 
to specific behaviours. For instance, the strictly process-based legislation is 
criticised as it should be more related to the resulting product rather than 
process. For example, new legislation on genome editing could define 
plants produced by novel genome editing techniques and could replace old 
legislation so that it stays abreast of scientific progress.188  On the other 
hand, if the scientific progress is for human good, it should be accepted by 
the public. In accepting these scientific and technological advancements, 
there must be some scientifically assessed, ethical, and permissible 
standards developed, especially in the areas of scientific uncertainty.  
 
Modern biotechnology products affect almost everybody within a 
country as they may consume the products daily thus exerting personal 
choices based on their belief. However, modern biotechnology issues are 
more than issues of consumer choices but more significant issues of effects 
to the biodiversity. Nowadays, everybody has access to food that is either 
locally produced or imported from other countries, i.e. transboundary.  
Modern biotechnology, which is generally for the benefit of humankind, raises 
public outcries such as in the cases of the Hormones case, and the Starlink. 
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LMOs corn leads to specific issues of biosafety risks, and these concerns 
have been discussed in the previous Introductory Chapter. 
 
Broad principles are needed to provide a foundation for legal action in 
response to such contemporary bioethical dilemmas189190 such as in the area 
of LMOs.  The different stages of social, scientific developments and 
economic interests of countries facing biological dilemmas should result in 
solutions that are ethically sound but also nationally advantageous.  
Additionally, the force of globalism that is at work in scientific developments 
together with a diversity of cultures and national interests brings a divergence 
of ethical principles. 
 
Thus in order for modern biotechnology to be better regulated, the 
various aspects apart from science should be taken into consideration.  
 
Biosafety and the law 
 
Another controversial issue that will be faced by many countries lies in 
biosafety law. Although biosafety covers general issues of the safety of 
modern biotechnological products, the Protocol restricts biosafety to living 
modified organisms (LMOs), or more accurately the environmental view of 
biosafety.  Biosafety should prevent any adverse effects of modern 
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biotechnological products, but the issue is becoming more complex as the 
Protocol adopts a dual-faceted scientific and non-scientific approach.  
 
There are issues of biosafety and compliance with the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety. The interaction of various cultures, national interests, 
and ethical principles of different countries may raise questions and issues. 
Such issues may not affect non-ratifying countries since they are not 
answerable to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.  The issue of 
harmonisation between the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and a nation 
state’s diversity is one issue to be examined in this study.  
 
The complexity of acquiring effective legal responses to biotechnology 
issues when international cooperation is essential is acknowledged.191The 
factors that stand in the way in such as dialectical,192 economic, and religious 
factors and cultural impediments193 are also shaping the regulation. 
 
The universal problem facing scientific advancement and new 
technologies is that regulation does not seem to be effective.  This might 
explain why some groups differed in their opinions on regulating biodiversity 
and biosafety during the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.  Some groups 
preferred internationally accepted WTO procedures rather than the formal 
Protocol.  This can be seen from their modern biotechnology research, 
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development, the rate of LMOs commercialisation, expertise and exposure 
on LMOs advancement.   
 
There was enormous public and private campaigning by Green 
Peace194 and various environmental groups195 involving many countries on 
the importation and acceptance of genetically modified products at the 
international level. The issue was finally addressed by the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety. 
 
Biosafety is governed at a national and international level since it 
addresses cross boundaries issues of LMOs. This governance seems to be 
an efficient mechanism for control.  The problem with the Protocol adopted 
internationally by 170 countries is that there are some divisional groups like 
the Miami group and the Compromise Group that did not sign the said 
Protocol. It raises the question on the effectiveness of this so-called global 
measure that does not legally bind every country.  However, good national 
biosafety laws, whether they comply with the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety or not, should provide reasonable solutions to the common 
biosafety issues.  
 
The various scientific issues of modern biotechnology present 
biosafety problems and risks. Questions arise as to how biosafety risks are 
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regulated? Since the Cartagena Protocol is the principal international 
agreement that regulates biosafety, there are scientific risk assessments and 
risk management procedures that need to be fulfilled.  All signatory countries 
importing and exporting biotechnological products have to comply with 
Advance Information Agreements (AIA) and other relevant procedures that 
occur before accepting the genetically modified goods.  
 
Another controversial issue contested by various countries during the 
negotiations of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety was the socio-economic 
issue that while not scientific, was of relevance.  Arguably the term ‘biosafety’ 
issue does not include socio-economic or ‘non-safety’ issues.  Nonetheless, it 
is argued in this thesis that the key drivers in biosafety regulation should 
outline not only the scientific issues but also the other ‘non-scientific’, ‘non-
safety’ or socio-economic issues.  
 
One interesting issue that is difficult to assess adequately is the 
limitation period of legal cases that can be brought into litigation concerning 
genetically modified products.  Adverse effects of genetically modified 
organisms products may take a long time to be seen and in some cases 
might exceed the limitation period of 20 years even though the damage has 
been suffered. Therefore the ordinary limitation period of 20 years in civil 
claims should not prevail in genetically modified cases.196  Rodges197 seen 
this is a unique relationship between law and biology. 
                                   
 
 
196Rodgers C, 'Environmental Risk, Environmental Liability and the Regulation of 
Biotechnology: Mediating Law and Biology?' (2009) in Hocking BA (n190) 103. 
197
 ibid. 
  
 
97 
 
 
 
Thus it is then important to determine what should be the role of law in 
biosafety. 
 
The role of law in biosafety 
  
Having seen the role of science as explained above, it is then crucial 
to elaborate on the role of regulation in biosafety. Before proceeding further, 
there might be issues that there exists a dichotomy between science and law 
as different modes of regulation. Some might argue the real issue is how to 
utilise expert scientific information (which might not be neutral) within 
regulatory policy formation especially risk. 
 
It is argued that there are many viewpoints on these issues. One of 
them is the issue of legitimacy as between science and regulation. Thus for 
science to be accepted as part of regulation, it must be a precise science 
with evidence as that will legitimise it. For instance, for risk regulation, a risk 
assessment and management should be an acceptable mode of evidence. 
Another point is that regarding scientific opinion from a scientific expert, 
people tend to believe expert rather than a non-expert. Thus it is argued that 
regulation should be utilised in balancing between these various 
perspectives. The modern view of relationship between science and policy198 
claims that science informs policy by producing objective, valid and reliable 
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knowledge. This then leads to a second step, i.e. to sort out diverse values 
and preferences. 
 
Regulation serves the purpose of controlling business run by public 
departments, private companies, governmental bodies, and other 
stakeholders.  The law plays a vital role in social control. In biosafety control, 
the law must consider that there are uncertain biological risks in genetically 
modified products that are consumed by the public. The law, through its 
mechanisms of regulation and institution, represents the legitimate medium 
of social control. Science manages biosafety in the form of risk assessment 
tools which are essential for safeguarding human life and the environment. 
 
The law on biosafety exists in the form of regulations, Acts of 
Parliament, statutory directions, and guidelines and these have usually 
emanated from government policy.  The policy will also describe the 
country’s capacity to govern biosafety concerns. The fundamental issue 
arises of why there is a need to legitimatise. Whom do we trust more? Do we 
trust the scientists or lawmakers? Are these two players representing various 
stakeholder interests in the public sector, the business or agriculture 
communities, the religious and economist sectors, or any others? 
 
It can be argued that there is good science and bad science even 
though all science aims to be for the benefit of humankind. Modern 
biotechnology is an enormous business sector that involves gigantic 
corporations. These corporations both private and government-owned are 
worth billions of dollars in business that extends worldwide.  Scientists do not 
work alone in their work, with the research and development providing the 
government and private companies with commercial power and business 
interests.  Scientists may have their motives in their work, such as making a 
name for themselves in the industry, fame, reputation, and also the 
company’s reputation. This raises the issue of whether science is it purely 
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benefits humankind? Alternatively, are there hidden agendas that are well 
disguised?  These considerations are some of the underlying issues that we 
need to think about when addressing public concern about whether we trust 
the scientist or the lawmakers.  
 
The lawmakers form part of Parliament in most countries and are a 
group of democratically elected people.  They can be from political, legal and 
non-legal specialists or scientist backgrounds. The lawmakers make laws 
that are often introduced by an executive who might have political motives. 
The executive may aspire to be a political champion, grow the business of 
the government and the public as a whole, or just to obtain a legitimate 
source of income for the people.  
 
When a law is passed, the executive will be the decision maker for the 
government and be advised by scientists and experts.  In some countries, 
some ethics committees will advise on ethical issues.  If something goes 
wrong, the court of law will act as an adjudicator to interpret the law after 
listening to expert evidence by the scientist, government and other relevant 
parties.  This raises the legal issue of locus standi amongst other issues, i.e. 
the public raised objections to the court on the successful applications of 
some LMOs being imported or released into the environment.  This issue will 
be explored further in the next chapters 3 and 4 within the local Malaysian 
context. 
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A court will usually rely on scientific evidence from the scientist since 
the court will not have the expertise to decide on the safety or non-safety of 
biotechnological products.  This was highlighted in the UK case of R v 
Secretary of State of the Environment ex parte Watson.199  This case is 
significant because it illustrates the court’s reluctance to reject the risk 
assessment of the regulator.  In this case, the applicant Watson was an 
organic farmer producing vegetables including sweet corn.  He was worried 
about the trial planting of LMOs maize on the adjoining farm as it might 
cross-pollinate with his organic corn and he could lose his accreditation and 
status as an organic farmer.  Due to the LMOs threat, Watson moved his 
maize plants a further 2km away and asked the respondents not to start on 
the LMO trial. The respondents sought advice from the Advisory Committee 
on the Release to the Environment (ACRE) who replied that the probability of 
cross-pollination was zero.  The respondents replied that they would neither 
vary nor revoke the consent, so Watson later challenged this response by 
way of a judicial review. 
 
The UK Court found that LMOs even though ACRE report fell short of 
an adequate risk assessment as requested by the environmental groups, to 
the Court would not go against the report.  The ACRE guaranteed that there 
would be no risk of cross-pollination. The court, however, struck a balance 
however between competing interests in questions also provides a 
reasonably confident assessment that realistically no more than minimal risk. 
Thus the respondent decision is not irrational. 
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This decision shows the Court’s reluctance to reject the risk 
assessment even though it fell short of a full risk assessment.  It shows the 
court’s willingness to accept a scientific risk report that is deemed to be 
adequately balancing competing interests and is based on grounded 
reasoning.  However, it is yet to be seen how Court will respond to socio-
economic arguments in the future for LMOs agriculture and product trials. 
 
In the area of biosafety, what are the scientific and non-scientific risks 
and areas of concern from the public?  In this area, the risks and concerns of 
the regulators may not be the same as those of the general public.  Some of 
these have been discussed previously will be illustrated further.  In short, 
there are some biosafety risks and concerns that a regulator has the 
mandate to regulate.  On the other hand, there are valid socio-economic 
concerns held by the public and other stakeholders, but the extent to which it 
is incorporated into the decision-making process is unclear. 
 
Therefore, the primary challenge in a democratic, socially 
representative society is to provide a medium within the different decision-
making processes that deal with general public concerns. This challenge has 
seen a change or variation from the traditional command and control 
approach of regulation towards smarter regulation and other regulatory 
options.  These will be discussed in detail later. 
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The functions of regulation in biosafety 
   
The essential functions of the regulation of biosafety can be summarised 
accordingly:200 
 
i) to protect human health  
ii) to protect the environment 
iii) to promote or enable consumer choice 
iv) to foster useful research 
It is suggested that society can manage GMOs in three different ways, 
namely by:201 
 
a) a precautionary principle that bans activities and technologies that 
generate risks 
b) a command and control approach by field testing and a regulatory 
approval process 
c) a market approach by instituting compulsory insurance 
 
While the first two ways are common and institutionalised in the 
national biosafety laws through the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety; the third 
approach will perhaps be practised in the future as LMOs regulation comes 
to maturity and public acceptance of LMO is more positive than before.  
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Why are biosafety issues controversial? 
 
Biosafety is thought to be one of the most controversial issues due to 
the following facts: 
 
i) there are many stakeholders involved in biosafety regulation - 
scientists, the public, decision and lawmakers, government bodies, 
and the business and agricultural communities 
ii) the consumption of genetically modified (GM) products involves a 
public who has different religious, ethical, and cultural beliefs and 
there is resistance by the public 
iii) the roles of non-governmental organisations and influential 
environmental groups dominate the public perception delivered 
through prime media and social media 
iv) the consumption of GM products may involve daily consumption of 
this food consumption, and will likely involve everybody, and also 
impact future generations. 
Due to its controversial nature, all attempts in regulating biosafety will 
have to adhere to some sound principles.  It is acknowledged that the State 
is not left with an easy task in performing its role as the protector of 
biodiversity within the public and business domains.  A nation’s progress 
must be in line with other developing and developed countries. Its regulation 
development needs to proceed with caution as it needs acceptance (both 
inward facing the countries’ people and outward facing the international 
obligations), legitimation and not resistance.  If anything were to go wrong, 
the decision-maker would be blamed, and the irreversible nature of the 
damage would not be recoverable or fiscally compensated. 
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4. Biosafety as risk regulation 
  
Having discussed the relationship between law and biosafety, it is then 
essential to examine biosafety regulation from a risk regulation perspective. 
Biosafety is a form a regulation of risk. Risk plays a significant and an 
important role in regulatory process.202   
 
Biosafety regulation adopted risk assessment and risk management 
tools for GM products. Risk assessment and management tools seem 
efficient and convincing; however, their use seems technocratic and has 
raised a lot of controversial points from the public, consumers, 
environmentalists and ethicists.   
 
The core concepts in regulating risks will be explored in an attempt to 
understand risk regulation in biosafety.  The terms risk and biosafety risk 
elicit questions around their definitions, certainties, and types of risks.  
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Thus there are two essential definitions of risk to be highlighted which 
are summarised as follows: 
 
a) Beck’s definition of risk 
 
‘Risk’ is defined by influential German sociologist, Beck, as part of an 
age that we are living in.203  Biosafety regulation regulates a type of risk. 
Biosafety risks are the result of the advancement of modern biotechnology 
and its activities, and LMOs specifically.  
 
Risks are not a matter of fate but are a result of human decisions and 
actions.  Beck defined ‘advanced modernity’ as requiring specific expertise to 
identify and recognise global risks.  These risks are evaluated by experts 
through scientific methods, but this increases the level of insecurity.  The 
tools for coping with modern risks are limited since their applications are 
likely to have transboundary and possibly global implications.  The same is 
also true in biosafety regulation of LMOs which are transboundary. 
 
Beck argues that contemporary society’s attempts to anticipate risks 
are futile since those risks cannot be calculated.  It is widely known that risk 
assessments underestimate real threats.  The risk assessment is criticised as 
being a methodology that legitimises an individual’s exposure to incalculable 
risks.  It is suggested that other tools be used hand in hand with risk 
assessments to address all possible risks that could be involved.     
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b) Knightian’s definition of risk 
 
Knight’s204 opinion contrasts risk with uncertainty.  He defines risk as 
the probability of a particular event (or hazard) occurring and the 
consequential severity of the impact of that event.205 Whereas risk can be 
quantified, uncertainty is impossible to measure.  Regulation is therefore 
viewed as the control of risk.  Risk regulation is mainly concerned with the 
Knightian management of risk and uncertainty.   
 
Risk and expert analysis 
 
The problem with risk is that either view of risks from Beck or Knight, 
both depends on expert analysis of probabilities.  Baldwin’s206 fundamental 
work on risk regulation is important in understanding of risk regulation in 
general and biosafety risk specifically.  Risk regulation and awareness of 
literature on risk control add a new dimension of our understanding of 
regulation.  Essentially, this leads to understanding perceptions of regulatory 
priorities, construction and development of regulatory agendas and 
legitimation.  
 
We live in an era in which there is a growing distrust towards experts 
and authorities207 which has partly motivated a move towards the ‘regulatory 
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State’.208  Risk regulations pose problems for the regulators and 
implementation.  A new era of debates on how to regulate risks like mad cow 
disease and the safety of GM foods demonstrate these risk regulations 
problems.  It follows that the precautionary principle in the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety209 should be applied as it is justified in such instances.    
 
Technologies are a constructed by society, and social choices have to 
be made to deal with the natural risks.210  This has many implications for 
society.  In biosafety regulation, society should be part of the decision-
making process in dealing with biosafety risks.  Thus, labelling of LMOs is 
justified partly due to social choice.   
 
Beck states that risk is the anticipation of catastrophe.  The literature 
on risk management focuses on the causes of disasters and failures.  
Failures can be attributed to social causes, for example, intentional acts of 
obstructions and unintentional acts.  Some scenarios can occur in biosafety 
regulation.  While intentional acts of transboundary movement of LMOs are 
regulated, unintentional LMOs are also regulated according to the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety. 
 
Risk regulation is seen as an organisational dimension of risk control.  
This organisation provides procedures for decision-making which is the norm 
in biosafety.  In addition to risk assessment, there is also risk management. 
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Risk management, or risk control, is part of the risk quantification process 
whereby individuals or organisation dealing with hazards in their work have 
procedures on how to go about dealing with issues if they arise. These 
processes provide individuals and organisations with rational boundaries and 
outline well-documented biases in decision-making.  
 
Below are some vital features in regulating risks: 
 
a) defining and assessing risks 
b) regulatory challenges in regulating risks 
c) approaches and solutions for risk regulation 
 
Regulatory responses to risk in biosafety 
 
Some theories raise issues about regulatory responses to risk and 
how the regulation can be justified or validated.  A technical approach to risk 
will emphasise leaving risk regulation to experts and establishing regulatory 
priorities from technical evaluations. The economic-cost benefit approach to 
biosafety risk was suggested211 but has never been realised, possibly as it 
might lead to unnecessary bureaucratic measures.   
 
On the other hand, the firm belief that risks are socially constructed212  
might suggest that regulatory priorities and policies cannot be left to the 
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objective evaluations of experts but should emerge from a democratically 
valid process of debate and consultation.213The psychological-public 
tolerance approach could be used to explain why, despite the many risks of 
LMOs, the public in the United States are more tolerant and receptive of 
LMOs compared to the European Union.  Perhaps it is because the benefits 
of GMOs outweigh the risks and so LMOs are treated like conventional food.  
While the cultural theories approach has no measurement of risk; it is a 
theory that could take the disguise of socio-economic concern and thus 
influence biosafety risk regulation. 
 
A final challenge is the level of democratic acceptability of regulations 
and the appropriate degree of participation in risk management decisions.   It 
is challenging in itself to balance expert opinion with unfounded public 
opinion. 
 
Expertise is expensive and comes as an advantage to the wealthy and 
developed nations. Even though some groups of consumers may mistrust 
expert advice, ethicists, or environmentalists due to their negative 
perceptions of GM products and GE technology, expert advice is needed to 
identify the type of risk and to regulate accordingly.  In short, knowledge and 
expertise are also challenges in risk regulation. 
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Breyer’s model of risk 
 
Breyer214 discussed the expertise rationale and stated that small but 
significant health risks are plagued by three serious problems. The problems 
are: 
 
i) tunnel vision (over-regulation that does more harm than good) 
ii) random agenda selection (regulation that focusses more on public 
attention than a rational appraisal of the risks) and 
iii) inconsistency (agencies use different methods to calculate effects 
of regulations).  - 
The basis of these problems creates a ‘vicious cycle’ that eradicates trust in 
regulatory institutions and inhibits rational regulations.  These are listed 
below: 
 
a) public perceptions215 that ‘differ radically from the consensus of 
experts in the field’ and do not ‘reflect rational sets of priorities’ 
b) congressional actions and reactions involving detailed statutory 
directions on the risk that are later proven inappropriate 
c) uncertainties in the technical process due to lack of knowledge, data 
and predictive power that hamper the regulation process 
Breyer proposed that a ‘depoliticised regulatory process might 
produce better results’ if divided into two groups.  The first would be a group 
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of civil servants with experience in health and environmental agencies, 
Congress, and the Office of Management and Budget.   
 
The second would be a small centralised administrative group of civil 
servants that produce a coherent risk programme with rational priorities for 
regulation.  This second group would have jurisdiction over various agencies, 
with a degree of insulation to withstand political pressures.  Their prestige, 
authority, and expertise would make their decisions more legitimate.   
 
One criticism of this type of group is that they may consider public 
perception and desires less than other priorities. Breyer’s approach fits a 
command and control model. The command and control approach will be 
elaborated further below. 
 
Shrader-Frechette’s model of risk 
 
Shrader-Frechette,216 on the other hand, offers a risk-cost-benefit 
analysis (RCBA) and adds scientific proceduralism using three mechanisms.  
 
These are as follows: 
 
a) ethical weighting that designates a public role in deciding, rather than 
an RCBA  
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b) alternative risk analysis and evaluation that allows the public, not the 
experts, a more significant role in determining risk choices 
c) weighted expert opinions 
 
This Shrader-Frechette model offers a more appealing system to 
public involvement with more ethical issues being taken into account.  In 
biosafety regulation, however, the implementation of an RCBA seems 
fundamentally complicated and adds bureaucratic burden to the decision-
making process. The Shrader-Frechette model reflects the new governance 
approach. 
 
The proposed ‘depoliticised regulatory process’ institutional structure 
by Breyer seems to be the basis of most national biosafety institutions such 
as Malaysia, with a few modifications. The National Biosafety Board of 
Malaysia consists of representatives from various government departments. 
However the regulatory strategy in biosafety seems to have some elements 
of new governance Shrader-Frechette as well such as the public 
participation, risk assessment, weighted expert opinion and ethical weighting. 
This seems a combination with modification and adoption of both 
approaches.  
 
The process of regulating risk needs a pluralistic approach from any 
analytical perspective in real practice.  Such an approach will ensure more 
vital issues are being taken into account so that a valid and improved risk 
regulation process is created.  
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For future risk regulation, it is essential to highlight Posner’s217 
suggestions that specific catastrophic risks need anticipative solutions since 
the impact of those risks would lead to the eradication of humankind.  This is 
despite the low probability of an occurrence of any such events.  In biosafety 
regulation, the risk might occur for instance if there is contamination of LMOs 
with substances that are not fit for human consumption.  The contamination 
might occur despite the existence of rules and regulations and compliance 
standards.   
 
Article 17 of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety attempts to address 
this issue and provides for unintentional transboundary movements and 
emergency measures.  Posner218 calls for a fundamental transformation in 
(legal) education, with a stronger emphasis on science and the ability of legal 
and political systems to deal with risks.  However, the non-science aspects 
(or socio-economic considerations) should not be neglected either since it is 
argued that science should not be the sole contributor in the biosafety 
decision-making process. 
 
At this point, it can be argued that biosafety regulation and national 
laws that comply with the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, primarily address 
scientific risks rather than socio-economic concerns.  The scientific risks 
have a unique system of risk assessment and management whereas there is 
no such organised system for the latter.  Socio-economic considerations are 
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being mentioned as part of decision-making processes but, in some 
countries, are only briefly reported.   
 
Biosafety regulation aims 
 
Thus this will ultimately leave biotechnology law with the following 
aims, according to Scott:219 
 
a) to impose bans, for example, on human cloning and genetically 
modified crops 
b) to permit activities only within its agreed limits, for example, 
controls over the use of genetic testing results by insurance 
companies  
c) to permit activities only with a licence 
d) to permit marketing only subject to certain conditions such as 
labelling of genetically modified products 
 
5. Important biosafety regulatory strategies  
 
There are various regulatory strategies according to Baldwin,220 that 
best accommodate various objectives. However, it can be deduced in this 
thesis, as abovementioned in line with Breyer and Shrader-Frechette’s  that 
two main strategies that are relevant in biosafety regulation namely 
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command and control and new governance or non-state regulation 
respectively. 
 
The new governance or non-state regulation can be summarised as 
follows namely: 
 
i) meta-regulation 
ii) self-regulation 
iii) responsive regulation 
iv) smart regulation 
a) Command and control  
 
Command and control regulation involves influencing actions by 
imposing standards backed by criminal sanctions.221  Command and control 
enforce positive actions and prohibits specific actions while laying down the 
terms and conditions for those actions.  This is the most traditionally popular 
regulatory strategy and constitutes the norms, rules, and regulations that are 
enforced by legal institutions and backed up by criminal and civil liabilities.  
An executive or advisory committee on biosafety such as a biosafety board, 
or ethics or genetic modification committee is usually given the mandate by 
the government or by law to regulate or advises on this jurisdiction.  The law 
usually creates the biosafety institution which is backed up by fine and 
punishment for non-compliance with the law.  This is considered a common 
practice for national biosafety laws. 
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While command and control constitutes the primary strategy for 
biosafety regulation, their main strength behind is the force of the law.  
Certain minimum standards of acceptable behaviour are set along with 
unacceptable behaviours, and this strategy is seen as highly protective of the 
public as it imposes penalties that are enforced by authorities.  Considering 
that the interests of human health and environment are at stake, command 
and control is perhaps the most justified strategy for the biosafety sector.  
The difficulties with command and control are its inflexibility, its expensive 
administration, enforcement and compliance, and the fact that it can inhibit 
desirable behaviour.  The command and control approach to biosafety is 
sometimes known as a ‘strictly process-based legislation’.  In other words, it 
creates regulatory hurdles, that are either process or product based, and is 
criticised by the scientists in the industry as being a hindrance to progress 
and research freedom.222 The labelling requirements and the bureaucracy in 
biosafety are said to add costs to biotechnology producers.223 
 
b) New governance 
 
In recent years, the traditional command and control strategy has 
been eroding despite its relevance and legal force.  This is because there are 
many areas of regulation such as technology, biodiversity, economy, and 
financial that are regulated at global conventions and later ratified and signed 
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by different countries.  These conventions were later implemented by 
countries at a national level.  Even though the basis of regulation is still the 
command and control approach, since the law is enacted by Acts of 
Parliament, the approach to these laws has varied.  For example, biosafety 
laws from the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety have some strategies that are 
not command and control regulations. 
 
Besides state rule, regulations can also be carried out by a variety of 
other organisations such as self-regulatory, or non-state, bodies.  Examples 
of these include professional bodies, trade associations, public interest 
groups, business partners, consumers and other associations.224  These non-
state organisations are still supervised by the state through different 
mechanisms.  These mechanisms are listed below: 
 
i) meta-regulation 
ii) self-regulation 
iii) responsive regulation 
iv) smart regulation  
 
i) Meta-regulation 
 
Meta-regulation refers to processes in which a regulatory authority 
oversees a control or risk management system. The authority does not carry 
out the regulation directly225 but it ‘steers rather than rows’.226Meta-regulation 
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is a process of ‘regulating the regulators, whether they are public agencies, 
private corporate self regulators or third party gatekeepers’.227 The 
‘institutional meta-regulation’ is ‘the regulation of one institution by 
another’.228 Through meta-regulation, ‘each layer [of regulation] regulates the 
regulation of each other in various combinations of horizontal and vertical 
influence’.229 
 
 For general biosafety regulation, the ministry responsible within the 
government for biosafety requires the applicant to complete a risk 
assessment and risk management plan.230The applicants are responsible for 
carrying out the risk assessment and risk management, and the National 
Biosafety Board monitors all LMOs activities.  This strategy of biosafety 
regulation will be discussed further in a Malaysian context in Chapter 3 and 
4. 
  
ii) Self-regulation 
 
Self-regulation takes place when a group of companies or individuals 
has power and control over its members and their behaviour. Self-regulation 
‘…rel[ies] substantially on the goodwill and cooperation of individual firms for 
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their compliance’.231 Self-regulation is the process of ‘…standard setting 
bodies…operate independently of, and parallel to, government regulation’ 
and with respect to which, ‘government yields none of its own authority to set 
and implement standards’.232 
 
This type of regulation can be seen in some professions such as 
barristers and solicitors, accountants, professional sports, advertising, 
insurance and the British press.  This type of regulation may exist in other 
countries.  However, in the case of biotechnology and biosafety, this 
regulation does not exist except in regional and national biotechnology and 
biosafety associations. These associations do not have any regulatory force 
and only represent society’s interests, as well as implement the policies, 
rules and regulations of their countries.  Such associations are more of a 
forum for regional interactions that can promote cooperation for 
biotechnology and its safety. Self-regulation alone is apparently not 
appropriate in the context of biosafety as the human health and environment 
are at stake. Furthermore the biotechnology companies are tied to the rules 
and regulations imposed by the regulator. In this sense, there is little room for 
self-regulation.  
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iii) Responsive regulation 
 
 Responsive regulation, according to Ayres and Braithwaite,233 is a 
strategy in which compliance is more likely because a regulatory agency 
operates an enforcement pyramid.   
This enforcement pyramid is illustrated below: 
  
Figure 3: The enforcement pyramid 
 
According to this strategy, regulation always starts at the base of the 
pyramid. However, this pyramid contains sanctions aimed at single 
regulations. This responsive regulation-type pyramid, while hugely influential 
worldwide, is not without criticism.  One main criticism is that step by step 
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implementation of the pyramid may not be appropriate.234In the context of 
biosafety regulation enforcement, there is no pyramid step by step 
progression as it seems unsuitable. Perhaps it is more suitable in 
environmental regulation.   
 
iv) Smart regulation 
 
The advocates of smart regulation (Neil Gunningham, Peter Grabosky 
and Darren Sinclair235) build further upon ‘responsive regulation’.  The main 
difference is that this type of strategy considers a broader range of regulatory 
players than responsive regulation. Responsive regulation is concerned with 
the interaction between two parties, the State and businesses. Smart 
regulation can also be comprised of a group of quasi-legislators such as 
public interest groups, professional bodies and industry associations.236 
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The pyramid of smart regulation can be explained as follows: 
 
GOVERNMENT AS 
REGULATOR 
BUSINESS AS SELF 
REGULATOR 
THIRD PARTIES 
(PUBLIC INTEREST 
GROUPS ETC.) 
DISQUALIFICATIONS DISQUALIFICATION DISMISSAL 
PENAL SANCTIONS SANCTIONS DISCIPLINE 
NOTICES WARNINGS  PROMOTIONS 
WARNINGS GUIDANCE REVIEWS 
PERSUASION EDUCATION INCENTIVES 
EDUCATION ADVICE TRAINING 
SUPERVISION 
ADVICE - ADVICE 
 
Table 1: The pyramid of smart regulation 
 
According to the above table of smart regulation, it has three sides 
and uses some different instruments that implemented by three different 
parties.  The pyramid ‘conceives of escalation to higher levels of 
coerciveness not only within a single instrument but also across several 
instruments’.237 
 
In relation to biosafety regulation, the government as the regulatory 
player can use all of the instruments depending on the type or nature of the 
transaction with various parties, either the businesses or interested third 
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parties.  If the business is the regulator, it is unclear how they go about 
regulating themselves in biosafety and this is discussed in the Malaysian 
context in the next Chapter 3 and 4.  As for third parties as regulators, for 
instance the public, or other environmental groups, this will also be examined 
in the Malaysian context in the next chapter.  
 
Whilst these smart regulation-type strategies are ideally to be 
implemented in the hope of yielding better regulation, it is perhaps not always 
the case. Smart regulation looks to expressly co-opt third-party regulators 
such as other institutions rather than the ministry and government. This is 
going to be explored in more detail in Chapter 4.  
 
One reason is because of the brevity and gravity of the interests to be 
protected i.e. human health and the environment. Another is that the nature 
of issues to be may not always be amenable to smart regulation and the 
government may be a better regulator. The regulation of new technology is 
not easy due to its complexity and the various stakeholders involved and the 
controversial issues that are raised. From the main regulatory strategies 
outlined above, it seems that not all main regulatory strategies are 
appropriate to fulfil the biosafety regulations’ aims and purposes.  
 
The appropriate and relevant strategies in biosafety regulation are 
summarised as follows: 
 
a) command and control 
b) new governance through:  
i) meta-regulation and  
ii) smart regulation 
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Gunningham’s theories on regulatory framework on biotechnology 
seem a better biosafety framework apart from the traditional command and 
control. 
 
6. Gunningham’s main regulatory framework on biotechnology 
 
This thesis tries to import the frameworks of biotechnology regulation 
to the frameworks of biosafety regulation with some adjustments so that they 
comply with the Key Protocol issues in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 
The regulation of biosafety frameworks involves a more specific area in 
modern biotechnology that regulates the transboundary movement of LMOs 
and its products. The Protocol mainly outlines the vital biosafety issues to be 
complied with but not on the suitable regulatory strategies. This will be up to 
the countries’ capacity building and regulatory strategies.  
 
At this juncture, the real cross-cutting issues in this thesis are how the 
different/ same regulatory strategies are able to address the various biosafety 
issues? It is hoped that there will be a clue to this pertinent question in 
biosafety regulation at the end of this thesis. 
 
This biosafety regulatory framework is based on Gunningham’s 
framework of biotechnology regulation.  The starting point for regulation on 
biosafety should be based on Gunningham’s article238 as it underpins the 
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Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the Convention of Biodiversity that 
applied the environmental precautionary principle.  
 
Gunningham listed four main frameworks of biotechnology regulation.  
These are: smart regulation, meta-regulation, civil regulation and licence 
model.  These are essential frameworks for analysis of biosafety regulation.  
These frameworks will be used for a detailed analysis of biosafety 
governance in Malaysia and Singapore. 
 
Even though Gunningham uses the term ‘biotechnology regulation’, it 
is of relevance because by definition biosafety is the regulation from the 
harmful effects of modern biotechnology and its products, especially LMOs, 
on human health and the environment. Biosafety law specifically focus on an 
aspect of biotechnology regulation namely the transboundary movement of 
LMOs.  
  
Gunningham explains the reason for the phenomenon of ‘regulatory 
reconfiguration’ such as state control.  He also considers various 
stakeholders’ interests in regulation inter alia public awareness, and the use 
of science and technology, for example satellite imaging, by the 
environmental groups that put pressure on governments.  This ‘regulatory 
reconfiguration’ that shapes the  landscape for regulation is essential to 
comprehend the way the law and regulations change in many countries from 
traditionally command and control strategies  to new governance. 
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Gunningham’s four (4) main regulatory frameworks on biotechnology 
are explained as follows:   
 
a) Smart regulation and regulatory pluralism 
 
Traditionally, regulation is regarded as a two-part process between the 
government and the business or company, the government being the 
regulator and the business being the regulatee.  In reality,  empirical data 
shows that there is a number of forms in which regulation can occur, better 
known as ‘regulatory pluralism’, and involve numerous players in the decision 
making process239 and the different mechanisms of informal social control240 
often prove more important than the formal ones. 
 
The insights from empirical data have led some policy-makers to 
examine how public agencies can enable institutions and resources outside 
of the public sector to further policy objectives in specific situations. The role 
of the government in this regard changes from ‘rowing the boat to steering’ 
it241 and it regulates from a distance by acting as facilitators of self- and co-
regulation242 rather than regulating directly. 
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Smart regulation as a biosafety regulatory strategy 
 
It is undoubtedly true for biosafety regulation; regulatory pluralism is 
also seen as an important element in the regulatory framework.  In regulatory 
pluralism, environmental policy-making involves governments harnessing the 
capacities of markets, civil society and other institutions to accomplish its 
policy goals more effectively, with greater social acceptance and at less cost 
to the State.243  Gunningham’s method is excellent in emphasising the parties 
of smart regulation that interact with the policy instruments.  Thus, careful 
regulatory design on smart regulation is needed to ensure that the 
regulations are mutually reinforcing rather than repetitive or, even worse, 
conflicting.244 
 
Gunningham and Grabosky’s245 impressive study of the application of 
smart regulation shows considerable effects in environmental regulation but 
is problematic in biotechnology and biosafety.  This discussion will 
summarise their work.  The design principles of smart regulation are 
restricted in their application to biotechnology246 and consequently biosafety 
as well.  This is due to two aspects – namely, the instruments used in smart 
regulation, and the broad range of stakeholders/actors in biosafety.  
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The smart regulation policy instruments have limited application. For 
example, they might include information and education, volunteering, self and 
co-regulation, market-based instruments and direct regulation.  However, 
many of these instruments have little or no role to play.  An increase in 
education and information may not necessarily influence the regulatee i.e. 
business sectors like biotechnology companies.  
 
  The self-regulation instrument may not be credible given that 
businesses usually try to maximise profits and rapidly commercialise their 
products. These aims have to be balanced with public concern over the 
harmful effect of the modern biotechnology products.   
 
Similarly, market-based instruments may not influence the market or 
even consumer behaviour.  It is then up to the government regulation to use 
instruments such as mandatory pre-market risk assessments and approval 
processes, to establish and monitor safety standards, and set liability rules 
for failure to comply with legal standards.  The government might also use 
informational regulation such as labelling and co-regulation.      
 
Smart regulation advocates the involvement of a broad range of 
stakeholders from either the government (regulator), from businesses 
(regulatee) or other third parties.  The limitations in such a broad range 
include the extent to which it is practicable for all parties to be involved even 
though public participation has an influencing role for greater transparency in 
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the decision-making process.  The same can be implied for scientists’ 
involvement in providing expert scientific advice. 
 
Apart from these stakeholders, there is limited scope for surrogate 
regulators247 such as financial institutions, markets, and industry associations 
in the smart regulation system. The efficacy of the surrogate regulators’ role 
and involvement in future biosafety regulation is questionable.  This is not so 
much from a compliance point of view to the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety, but from a country’s economic perspective. 
 
It is important to note here that while the role of the NGOs is crucial 
and should be recognised, the position essentially has a counteractive force.  
It is true that if the State confined itself to ‘steering not rowing’ then the 
fundamental pillars of effective biotechnology regulation (risk assessment, 
mandatory pre-market approval, established safety standards etc.) would be 
undermined. This is the important aspect of biosafety regulation issues. The 
regulator is to balance among the various essential biosafety issues 
matching it with the right regulatory strategies. 
 
It was recommended that in the smart regulation approach, 
instruments should be sequentially utilised by first introducing less 
interventionist measures and sending a clear message that more draconian 
measures will be introduced for non-compliance. In the area of biotechnology 
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and biosafety where irreversible damage occurs to both human health and 
the environment from the harmful effects of modern biotechnology, this smart 
regulation policy failure could lead to catastrophic consequences.  
 
It is difficult in the smart regulation approach to biotechnology to 
accommodate all the stakeholders (public, financial institutions, markets, 
non-governmental organisations and so on).  Whilst biosafety regulation is 
not meant to accommodate every single stakeholder’s conflicting interests 
and aims, it is important that biosafety regulation is accepted by them.   It 
would be detrimental to have resistance to the regulation and even worse to 
be seen by stakeholders as protective, discriminatory or neglectful to some 
but not others. 
 
Another issue is whether smart regulators can capitalize for win-win 
situation is without problem. Biotechnology companies have argued that GM 
products are not materially different from conventional food and that they 
produce cost-effective means of feeding the poor and solving world poverty.   
 
Some principles of smart regulation resonate strongly with 
biotechnology regulation, for example, the considerable scope for 
empowering civil society to act as surrogate regulators, and the informational 
regulation in the form of product labelling.  However product labelling creates 
an issue in itself because there are disagreements amongst some countries 
which mean it is not applied uniformly worldwide.  Hence smart regulation 
offers limited insights into biotechnology and biosafety regulation. 
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Finally, a more general concern with smart regulation in the 
biotechnology and biosafety area is its normative approach.  The advantage 
to it is the ‘good’ public policy and objectives that are set to deliver the goals 
effectively, efficiently and politically acceptable.248  The disadvantage is that it 
is only possible through some common agreement on all the preferred policy 
objectives. 
 
The problem inherent with biotechnology is that the policy agenda is 
shaped by political agendas and the focus is lost on the policy objectives.  
One side to this problem is that individuals are diametrically opposed on 
fundamental issues.  For example, in biotechnology regulation, the moderate 
views on policy goals are:  1) to ensure the safety of products for humans 
and on the environment and engendering public trust; 2) no unnecessary 
burdens that prevent transgenic products being realised. Whilst the first 
objective is agreeable, the second objective is rejected by NGOs.   
 
In biotechnology for instance, at the international WTO and WHO 
level, GM food is treated no differently than conventional food.  The United 
States and the European Union have different approaches and divergent 
views on biosafety regulation.  This is largely based on different political 
constituencies and the influence of different institutional environments rather 
than on rational policy choices. 
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b) Reflexive and meta-regulation 
 
The literature on reflexive law249 recognises that the capacity of the 
regulatory State to deal with increasingly complex social issues has declined 
dramatically. The traditional command and control approach (a form of 
material law)250 is said to be unresponsive to the demands of an enterprise 
and unable to generate sufficient knowledge to function efficiently.  In other 
words, society’s complex needs have outgrown the legal system’s 
possibilities to deal with these needs in a manner that is permissible within 
the constraints of the law.251  For example, in the case of the Three Mile 
Island nuclear accident and quasi-meltdown, the operators were simply 
following the rules.  There was no capacity for strategic thinking in this case.  
Eventually, it was decided that the events that unfolded were not covered by 
a rule, and the operators had no capacity to read the situation and respond 
appropriately.252 
 
Reflexive regulation, in contrast, uses indirect means to achieve broad 
social goals.  It also has a much greater capacity to come to terms with 
interestingly complex social arrangements.  Reflexive regulation is 
procedure-oriented rather than directly focused on a prescribed goal, and 
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seeks to design self-regulating social systems by establishing norms for 
organisational structure and for procedures.253  
 
This strategy can also be viewed as a form of ‘meta-risk management’ 
whereby governments, rather than regulating directly, oversee the risk 
management of individual enterprises. A reflexive environmental law for 
instance is ‘a legal theory and a practical approach to regulation that seeks to 
encourage self-reflective and self-critical processes within social institutions 
concerning the effects’ on the environment.254        
 
This approach has some issues when it comes to regulating 
biotechnology, and these are outlined as follows: 
 
a) Biotechnology is a complex problem that does not lend itself to 
prescriptive regulation.255  It is rightly pointed out by Gunningham that 
regulatory systems are slow to evolve and adapt.  Governments also 
often react to technological change in the private sector rather than 
driving change.  There are some known practical difficulties in 
biosafety regulation such as tracking cross-border trade in GMO, and 
enforcing biosafety regulations at farm level.  These difficulties present 
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technical, logistical and administrative challenges to even the most 
developed countries.256 
 
b) There is a substantial imbalance of knowledge between government 
and the biotechnology industry. The independent risk assessment on 
the information supplied by the companies and risk management. The 
industry is far more capable of identifying the risks at ground level, and 
of managing them, than the regulators.  It is on the basis of this fact 
that some opinions are that the regulation of biotechnology should be 
left to the industry.  
 
Newell and Glover257 rightly described biotechnology companies as 
the ‘street level bureaucrats’ of biotechnology that are expected to 
implement biosafety regulation determined by the government. They 
are the front line producers and distributors of the technology and are 
in a position to provide insights and use their experience to design the 
regulatory system.  The fact that the companies have the in-house 
scientific expertise and capital makes them potentially excellent key 
advisers and also powerful political players.  
 
However, the industry actions will only be effective, if given incentives 
to manage the risks and only if this risk management is closely 
scrutinised by government and the threat of more direct intervention is 
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imminent if it fails in its actions.  Thus, independent risk assessments 
on the risk management information supplied by the industry and its 
companies are needed.  It seems that there is little choice but to take 
this path.   
 
Parker258 states that corporate self-regulation has a public, social, and 
legal responsibility.  The corporate self-regulation area is accountable to 
public debate and public dialogue. 
 
Another issue is that the gap between the meta-regulation framework 
and the reality may be so large it is unattainable in biotechnology and it might 
appear more attractive on paper rather than in reality. 
 
For example, the industry corporate may not view non-compliance in 
the same regard as the regulators but as an aspect of risk management.  
Regulators may view non-compliance as failure. When shareholders are 
looking to maximise their returns, and protect their investments, corporate 
stakeholders may prioritise minimising the loss of reputation rather than 
ensuring compliance when economic benefits are considered.   
 
Baldwin259 is correct in stating that it is not possible to ‘stimulate 
corporate self-regulation’ or to produce coherence and harmony between 
corporate and social needs and that it may rather be a case of ‘confusion and 
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conflict’.  Parker’s260 view in the case of biotechnology is the sort of 
permeability may not be practicable given.   
 
There are also concerns that permeability and deliberation will lead to 
regimes of ‘high cost, high friction management that are characterised by 
delays, obfuscations, smokescreens, indecisiveness, confusion and 
inaction.261  
 
Here, meta-regulation is indeed a viable regulatory option, however its 
credibility is still questionable or that it may be another variant of self-
regulation.  Would meta regulation regain public trust in its government’s 
management of biotechnology safety?  In Europe, public trust is said to be at 
low ebb especially after the food safety scandal illustrated in the Introductory 
Chapter.  
 
b) Civil regulation 
 
Civil regulation is where organisations in society,262 such as NGOs, 
set the standards for business behaviour.  Civil regulation, according to 
Murphy and Bendall,263 is established by organisations such as NGOs and 
enterprises either choose to follow the standards or not.  The arguments 
supporting civil regulation include: a lack of State resources; and political 
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incapability to reach businesses outside national territories.  The goals of civil 
regulation are to fill in the gap left by the State and to compensate for the 
‘deficit of democratic governance that we face as a result of economic 
globalisation’.264 
 
Under civil regulation, there are numerous methods society can 
influence corporations, consumers and markets, often bypassing the State 
and rejecting political lobbying.  In biotechnology, this may be seen by direct 
action against large reputation-sensitive companies, such as boycotting 
products that are environmentally harmful, or market campaigning against 
high-visibility branded retailers. There may also be information campaigns, 
political discourses, lobbying retailers such as McDonalds to reduce demand 
for GM food, influencing inter-government forums for stricter trade 
regulations.  Civil regulation may occur in the form of watchdogs and 
monitoring, or by litigation.265For example, March Against Monsanto is an 
example of civil society opposition to GM food and products that advocated 
for mandatory labelling of GM products. 
 
Governments are gradually providing for more involvement of 
communities, environmental groups and the public which should be 
applauded especially as this in line with the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 
This may be due to particular pressure from outside, or due to the 
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government recognising the limits of State regulation.  Many NGOs are of the 
view that governments are influenced by the multinational biotechnology 
companies.  Hence the norms of the precautionary principle, transparency 
and sustainability should be globally accepted. 
 
It is argued that civil regulation is essentially a form of voluntarism by 
way of corporate social responsibility (CSR).Thus civil regulation alone is 
essentially self-regulation thus not suitable for adaptation. This is further 
supported by the facts that in some countries, the state and business 
community will exert their power and influence over the public. Thus civil 
regulation seems unsuitable strategy of regulation. 
 
On the flip side, the problem with civil regulation is that society cannot 
stand as the sole gatekeeper that produces countervailing forces. For 
instance, lobbying, boycotts and remedial actions create opposition in 
biosafety regulation. Hence it lies the importance of meta regulatory 
strategies such as pre-market approval and risk assessments with 
government oversight.  
 
c) Licence model 
 
As there is not any real development of the new governance 
approaches in biosafety, thus this would fit with the licence model for 
discussion. 
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The licence model developed by Gunningham, Kagan and Thornton 
(2003)266 endeavours to explain why large business enterprises behave the 
way they do towards the environment, and considers the normative and 
policy implications of these behaviours.  
 
Thus it views business enterprises as motivated and constrained by 
the three types of licences which are: 
 
i) a regulatory licence 
ii) a social licence 
iii) an economic licence 
These three licence examples are monitored and enforced by the 
stakeholders who generate them.  Thus in the context of biotechnology, this 
model gives a useful insights of the interaction between these three different 
licence types. 
 
In biosafety regulation, the environmental group may use social 
licence to shame and adversely publicise GM goods.   This group may also 
use economic licence through consumer boycotting of GM products or 
‘Frankenstein’ food.    
 
The impacts from each and every licence may be different.  For 
example, the social activist may be given regulatory licence by having access 
to information such as the level of public participation in the biosafety 
                                   
 
 
266
 Gunningham N, Kagan RA and Thornton D, Shades of Green: Business, Regulation, and 
Environment (Stanford University Press 2003). 
  
 
140 
 
 
 
decision-making process.  As a result, companies that fail to respond to 
social licence or economic licence face the risk of products being rejected by 
consumers.  The NGOs in the biosafety area must subject their expert claims 
to public scrutiny that challenges their risk-based and scientific-based 
decision-making processes.  Hence, important aspects in biosafety such as 
precautionary principle, sustainability and transparency are being 
introduced.267 
 
Regulatory licence plays an important role in curbing the food safety 
risks and environmental risks in biotechnology.  Companies will have to 
perform to the minimum standard and in doing so the economic licence is 
undermined.  Failure to obtain a regulatory licence could cause companies to 
exploit technology that is free from constraints but that ignores ethical and 
social issues.  The companies’ interests would be seen as largely economic.  
However, the extent to which regulatory licence plays such a role depends on 
the political strengths of the key stakeholders. The idea of involving wider 
parties in procurement formulation is important for knowledge and legitimacy 
to provide the space for the socio-economic and cultural factors to be taken 
in the regulatory field. To what extent this licence model could play a role 
would be analysed later in the Malaysian context in Chapter 3 and 4. 
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An analysis of the biosafety regulatory strategies 
 
From the above analysis it can be seen that there are two main 
strategies in biosafety regulation namely the command and control approach 
and new governance. The four regulatory frameworks by Gunningham above 
have their own advantages to offer biosafety regulation.  Smart regulation 
and regulatory pluralism have a plethora of instruments that enable the 
regulatory State to steer rather than row and harness the capacity of second 
and third parties to fill the gaps left by the State.  Meta-regulation will be 
reliable and effective if regulatory structures exist that strengthen the 
capability of individual institutions and enterprises for internal reflection and 
control.  Under civil regulation, the civil institutions will be empowered if the 
state provide mechanisms and make corporations more accountable.  Lastly, 
the licence model framework is viable if mechanisms are devised that 
reinforce the various strands and interactions of the social and economic 
licences. 
 
Gunningham rightly viewed each framework has having something to 
offer and making different contributions in accordance with the nature and 
context of different policy issues.  Gunningham, in his conclusion, stressed 
the importance and relevance of direct state regulation in environmental 
policy,   biotechnology and hence biosafety policy. 
 
  
 
142 
 
 
 
The command and control still play important roles in biosafety 
regulation in many countries. Scott268 criticises the use of old and new 
regulatory instruments that highlight weaknesses which focus narrowly on the 
conduct of government departments and agencies. On the deployment of law 
sets normative standards or incentivises compliance with such standards, 
which Scott also sees as weaknesses. The new governance beyond 
command and control offers variety of mechanisms of regulatory for effective 
implementation. Scott rethinks the biotechnology governance from a different 
perspective that focuses on the process of monitoring and mechanisms of 
behavioural modification. 
 
It is submitted that while the strategy is argued either should be 
command or control or new governance, it is very much dependant on the 
countries’ biosafety capacity building. In most countries where the role of the 
state is central to biosafety regulation, it is hoped that in future there should 
be more involvement of more stakeholders effectively in the decision-making 
process. The idea of involving wider parties is important for knowledge and 
legitimacy in particular to provide a medium for the socio-economic and 
cultural factors as abovementioned. 
 
Top-down and bottom-up approaches in biosafety policy 
implementation 
 
Another issue posed by regulation is whether a top-down or bottom-up 
approach should be taken, as both have their own benefits and implications. 
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From the institutional viewpoint, the strengths and weakness of those 
institutions and ways to improve will be analysed.  Although an institutional 
framework is typically regarded as adding to bureaucracy, it is more 
important to strengthen those institutions to reflect both the expert and 
layperson’s key views. 
 
A top-down approach involves the policy–makers as the central 
actors,269 also known as an autocratic leadership approach whereby the 
upper management make decisions to improve policy.270The bottom-up 
approach involves local stakeholders participating in the decision-making of 
strategies and priorities for their local area.271 
 
In biosafety, legal and institutional frameworks are predominantly seen 
as top-down approaches.  This is due to the fact that the government as the 
regulator and enforcer makes decision such as accepting or refusing LMOs.  
Decisions/sanctions are imposed on the applicants/wrongdoers.  It is 
interesting that, in the biosafety decision-making process, the government’s 
consideration of public views is in line with the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety. The extent to which the public views affect decisions, however, is 
not overtly stated. 
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7. Fundamental pillars of effective biosafety regulation 
 
Having discussed on the relevant biosafety regulatory strategies, the 
discussion moves on the principles of good biosafety regulation. There are 
some important foundations to biosafety regulation, which are the following: 
risk assessment, mandatory pre-market approval, and established safety 
standard. Whilst this thesis does not intend to discuss the effectiveness of 
biosafety regulation in Malaysia (Chapter 3 and 4) in detail, these pillars will 
be examined in order to improve the existing biosafety system not just for 
compliance with the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety but also for capacity 
building. 
 
What is good biosafety regulation?  
 
According to Baldwin,272 there are five (5) key tests that denote good 
regulation, namely: 
 
a) support by legislative authority 
b) accountability 
c) fair, accessible and open 
d) sufficient expertise 
e) efficient  
 
A good biosafety regulation should contain all those characteristics. 
Throughout this thesis, references to Malaysian biosafety rules and 
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regulations will be made as to ascertain the adequacy of those laws, and 
ways to improve those laws will be suggested. However it is noted here this 
is a doctrinal research whereby perhaps some characteristics could not be 
sufficiently, adequately assessed, only on the surface as it based on primary 
and secondary sources only. However a future research on those important 
issues is desirable.  
 
It is further submitted that a good biosafety regulation should ideally 
covers all intended risks including the scientific and non-scientific risks 
(socio-economic considerations namely ethical and religious beliefs, and 
cultural factors). The rationales have been discussed in the Introductory 
Chapter. The present issue is that the scope of socio-economic 
considerations needs to be broadened (Article 26 of the Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety).  
 
A formal method of assessment of risk has not been prescribed; 
hence socio-economic groups have proposed the socio-economic impact 
assessment (SEIA). A sound biosafety regulation should not just be 
technocratic (taking expert opinion into consideration) but should also have a 
layperson’s view for public acceptance of LMOs, rules, and regulations. The 
justification for democratic public participation is a vital element in smart 
regulation.  National biosafety regulation should be transparent, predictable, 
efficient and effective273 whether it is comprehensive or not. 
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National biosafety laws and regulatory strategies 
 
The rules and regulations of biosafety, for most countries, focus on the 
transboundary movement, handling, transit, contained use and release of 
genetically modified organisms into the environment. Some countries 
implement comprehensive biosafety laws, whereas others have partially 
comprehensive or minimal laws. The degree of regulation depends on 
various factors such as countries’ priorities, capacity building, biodiversity 
policies and so on. Regulations are further strengthened by the relevant 
biosafety institution that establishes the biosafety laws. 
 
The framework of biosafety regulation in compliance with Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety has an element of ‘regulatory pluralism’ as it uses 
various strategies. The main strategy is command and control as the 
government is taking the central role in regulating the import, export and 
contained use of genetically modified products with the aims of protecting the 
human health and environment. This approach is criticised as a hindrance to 
the growth of science and technology as it adds more to the regulatory 
costs.274 Another important strategy is of the new governance as it takes into 
account the public’s opinions and concerns. This is directed under Article 23 
of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety that stipulated public awareness and 
participation.  
 
However, the way in which the regulatory framework shapes the law is 
by including the various stakeholders of genetically modified products, 
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namely the regulator, the public and the business community. It is not an 
easy task to fulfil the expectations of these stakeholders, therefore an 
examination of the very basic nature of regulations and law in society seems 
to be a good starting point of analysis for biosafety regulation.  
 
It is interesting to note here that Gunningham acknowledges that the 
political, social, economic and scientific contexts in which biotechnology and 
environmental regulation must operate are very different. Biotechnology 
regulation must take into account several factors such as high scientific 
uncertainty, high risks, an imbalance in knowledge and power between the 
State and the private sector, and the lack of public trust. These are among 
the core issues of biotechnology regulation to that need to be analysed for 
the protection of human health and the environment.  
 
8. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety  
 
Biosafety regulation at the international and national levels   
While the relevant regulatory theory and strategies on biosafety have 
been much discussed above, it is then important to move to the discussion 
on the biosafety regulation in practice i.e. the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety as the internationally signed agreement on biosafety.    
 
Due to globalisation and international concern about environmental 
issues and economic co-operation, it is a growing trend that international 
agreements be ratified by signatory parties at international conventions.  It is 
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true that in the field of biotechnology, the diverse and multicultural nature of 
the international community hinders a consensus on a core set of ethical 
values and interests.275 This was the case in biosafety regulation and in the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, and reflected various countries’ stance and 
ethical values.  These will be discussed more in Chapter 3 within the 
Malaysian context. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the common aims of ensuring effective 
regulation and governance of biosafety are found in many countries, and 
biosafety is regulated through national laws and recognising international 
agreements such as the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.  Biosafety 
regulations are either comprehensive or not comprehensive as they may 
overlap with other laws such as biodiversity, biosecurity and regulations of 
various agencies and ministries which aim to protect human health and the 
environment.   
 
At a national level and in reference to the issues of transboundary 
handling, movement, transit of LMOs, and contained use of genetically 
modified products, the main Biosafety Act will take the lead in ensuring 
compliance with the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.  This will occur in most 
countries that ratified the Protocol, and the power to enforce biosafety laws 
will usually lie with the Ministry of Environment. 
 
There is a full range of frameworks and tools used for ensuring the 
effective regulation of biosafety.  Countries that ratified the Cartagena 
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Protocol will legislate their own biosafety Acts in compliance with the Protocol 
and through the statutes and regulations that permit the establishment of 
national laws and institutional biosafety measures. 
 
LMOs have been regulated at international agreements in various 
WTO instruments. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is the main 
international agreement that regulates any transboundary movement of 
LMOs which is an environmental aspect of biosafety governance.  Other 
areas of biosafety regulation are either ruled by lab protocol and procedures, 
and biosecurity measures for highly contagious biological agents.    
 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety can be seen as the realisation of 
biosafety risk regulation at the national and international level.  It should be 
highly praised as an international environmental biosafety agreement that 
has attempted to balance the benefits of modern biotechnology products 
(mainly LMOs and their rapid development, utilising simultaneous 
biodiversity) with protecting human health and the environment. 
 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention of Biological 
Diversity is an international instrument that achieves agreement on biosafety 
regulations to regulate the transboundary movements of living modified 
organisms (LMOs) that are the result of modern biotechnology.  It was 
adopted on the 29th January 2000 as a supplement to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) and came into force on 11th September 2003.  
 
 Previously, biosafety concerns arose during the CBD that highlighted 
the need to regulate LMOs pursuant to Article 19 of the CBD.  Article 19(1) of 
the CBD emphasised the importance of the Contracting Party especially the 
developing countries to prepare legislative, administrative or policy measures 
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and to provide for the effective participation in biotechnological research 
activities.  More importantly, Article 19(3) states the need for a protocol to set 
out the appropriate procedure, including a specific, detailed informed 
agreement, for the safe transfer, handling and use of any living modified 
organisms from biotechnology that may have an adverse effect on the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. 
 
Thus the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety fulfilled the CBD by 
providing procedures for the transboundary movement of LMOs and called 
these the Advanced Informed Agreements (AIA).276  This included the LMOs 
intended for feed, food, or processing (LMOs-FPP)277 and the AIAs defined 
the practical requirements for handling, transportation, packaging and 
identification of LMOs that undergo transboundary movement.278 This 
Protocol upgraded the procedures from a standard procedure for 
transboundary movement of LMOs to a Protocol or system of rules to be 
followed by the signing countries.  It established the first step in acceptable 
international standard practice and the procedures in handling LMOs. 279  
 
The Protocol also established the Biosafety Clearing-House280 in order 
for countries to facilitate the exchange of scientific, technical, environmental 
and legal information on, and experience with, living modified organisms.281 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety also reaffirms in its preamble the 
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precautionary principle that is contained in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development.  Principle 15 states that for the protection 
of the environment, each State is to apply the precautionary principle 
according to its capabilities in the case of threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, and, where there is a lack of full scientific certainty, this shall not 
prevent them from taking cost effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation. 
 
Historical background of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety  
 
It is interesting and useful for the brief history282 of the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety to be summarised here, as later, certain issues on 
biosafety in the Malaysian and Singapore context need to be understood.  
During the negotiations of the CBD, the majority view called for the 
negotiation of a biosafety protocol as contained in UNEP’s Panel IV Report 
(UNEP 1993), and a minority group rejected the Protocol.  This group 
consisted of the United States and representatives from the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) then promoted the UNEP International 
Guidelines for Safety in Biotechnology in order to stifle the majority call for a 
biosafety protocol.  However, this was soon discovered by developing 
countries and environmental NGOs, and they called for the UNEP Panel IV 
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Report to start negotiations on the Protocol.283  The negotiating countries 
were divided during the Conference of Parties at meetings for the Parties to 
the Protocol (COP-MOP)284 but they later accepted the need to negotiate a 
biosafety protocol due to the risks and effects of LMOs from modern 
biotechnology. However, once biosafety protocol negotiations had started, 
they were divided on whether socio-economic considerations and liability and 
redress issues should be included in the biosafety protocol. In the end, the 
controversial protocol issues were resolved and that led to the establishment 
of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety despite with delays from original 
plans for sign-off in Cartagena in 2000.   
 
Key Protocol Issues  
 
It is relevant to note here that there are some key issues for 
compliance285 with the Protocol and these issues need to be integrated into 
the national laws of the ratifying signatory members.   Specifically: 
 
a) handling, transport, packaging and identification286 
b) liability and redress287 
c) public awareness and participation288 
d) risk assessment289 and risk management290 
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e) socio economic consideration291 
f) risk and precautionary principle  
 
The key protocol issues mentioned above are significant as they affect 
the rules and regulations of the nation State and the way it responds to the 
Biosafety Protocol.  The discussion will also assess whether the relevant 
Malaysian rules and regulations effectively deal with those biosafety issues.   
 
 
a) Handling, transport, packaging and identification (Article 18) 
 
This biosafety measure requires products that contain LMOs for food, 
feed or processing (LMOs-FPP),292 LMOs in contained use,293 and those 
released into the environment,294 to be clearly identified.  This then raises the 
issue of the labelling of LMO products not just during shipment to the 
destined countries but also when they reach the consumers in the form of the 
final products.  There is the issue of the cost of labelling to the industry.  This 
issue will be examined further in the next chapter in a Malaysian context and 
will deal with consumer choices, preferences and beliefs.  
 
However questions arise as to whether effective labelling is a 
consumer-choice issue and has emerged at the expense of the benefits 
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gained from LMOs products. This is closely associated with public awareness 
issues.  
 
Another issue is the halal labelling of LMOs and is a cross-over on 
issues of public awareness, ethics, religion and socio-economic 
consideration.  It could be argued that these issues have no relevance to 
biosafety. It also raises the question as to whether labelling provides a 
solution for consumer choice, ethical, and religious belief issues. There may 
be a more serious sustainability development issue.  
 
In reflecting the addressing of these issues is labelling the answer to 
solve these problems? This perhaps depends on the precise problem that 
needs to be addressed. This is especially relevant in the Malaysian context 
with regard to the halal labelling and LMOs. The question arises - is Halal a 
purely biosafety issue? Or can it be considered a part of the socio-economic 
considerations? These issues are going to be discussed in more detail in the 
next chapter 3 in the Malaysian context. 
 
b) Liability and redress (Article 27) 
 
The COP-MOP will adopt appropriate international rules and 
procedures for liability and redress for damages resulting from transboundary 
movements of living modified organisms, and this process should be 
completed within four years. This is another issue voiced by developing 
countries like Malaysia and in furtherance to that in its decision BS-V/11 the 
COP-MOP adopted the Nagoya – Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on 
Liability and Redress. The Supplementary Protocol provides international 
rules and procedures on liability and redress for damage to biodiversity 
resulting from LMOs. 
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c) Public awareness and participation (Article 23) 
 
In the previous Introductory Chapter, the theories and justifications of 
public participation were discussed. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
requires the signatories of the Protocol to facilitate public awareness and to 
consult the public in the decision-making process since it affects them 
directly. Article 23(3) states that each party must inform the public through 
the Biosafety Clearing-House.  The issues remain on how to go about 
consulting the public and the effectiveness of public participation in the 
biosafety decision-making process.   
   
d) Risk assessment (Article 15) and risk management (Article 16) 
 
There are tools both for risk assessment and risk management. These 
align the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) agreements that include the 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement (SPS Agreement), The 
Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreements), Agreements 
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and 
General Agreements on Tariff and Trade (GATT) with Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety .Risk assessment and risk management are the two main tools 
used when assessing importation and exportation of LMOs. The 
implementation of these tools is different even though they are part and 
parcel of the same process.  
 
The risk assessment part is the scientific assessment that a country 
makes when deciding on the importation of goods.  Risk management utilises 
non-scientific tools to assess other factors in relation to the same issue. A 
discussion, however, on the TBT Agreements, SPS Agreements, TRIPS and 
GATT is beyond the scope of this thesis as the sole focus of this study is on 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. These agreements are to illustrate that 
there are a variety of models used in the global risk regulatory system. Risk 
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assessment, according to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, should be 
carried out in a scientifically sound manner295 and be based on a minimum 
provision of information under the notification procedure.296 Other available 
scientific evidence should also serve to identify and evaluate the possible 
adverse effects of LMOs on biodiversity and the risks to human health. This 
risk assessment must be done by the Party of Import and may require the 
exporter to carry it out.297 
 
The risk management process298 requires all parties to establish and 
maintain appropriate mechanisms, measures and strategies in order to 
regulate, manage and control risks identified in the assessment of the use, 
handling and transboundary movement of LMOs. Thus, risk management 
even though part of the same risk procedure, is classified as a ‘non-scientific’ 
tool. 
 
Professor Beck299 is of the view that risk assessment underestimates 
the real threats and relies on methodologies that legitimise individuals’ 
exposure to incalculable risks. Whilst that may be true, the label ‘risk’ 
suggests only probabilities of those risks as opposed to real danger. In this 
regard, the adoption of the precautionary principle in the Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety is justified.  
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e) Socio-economic considerations (Article 26) 
 
This is one of the most controversial issues in the Protocol as it 
originally outlined the scope of socio-economic considerations arising from 
the impact of LMOs. This includes the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity, especially on the value of biological diversity to 
indigenous and local communities. However, despite its confined scope, 
there were various suggestions on socio-economic considerations from 
countries’ multi-ethnic and multicultural beliefs that attempted to broaden this 
scope. 
 
f) Risk and the precautionary principle 
 
Precautionary principle, mentioned in the preamble of the Protocol, 
reaffirms Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development. This is in relation to the uncertainty in science that leads to the 
precautionary principle being applied. 
 
The precautionary principle was not favoured by WTO and its related 
trade agreements and there was resistance from the Miami Groups.300 
Despite this opposition, the Principle was enforced for the protection of 
human health and the environment due to the modern biotechnology risks. 
Whilst the focus of biosafety regulation is on the risks of modern 
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biotechnology, it is important that the specific (biosafety or LMO) risks are 
identified and the methods for regulating those risks. Thus, risk assessment 
and management plans are good tools for covering the scientific aspects and 
managing the identified risks. In an era of growing information, research and 
development on modern biotechnology, there are still uncertain risks in 
science, thus the precautionary principle is rightly adopted by the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety.     
 
Criticisms of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety  
 
The ground-breaking Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety was signed and 
agreed through various negotiations among various countries who signed the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). The negotiation process was 
lengthy and there were many issues that were not agreed upon by countries 
that later re-grouped themselves.  These groups became the Miami 
Groups,301 Like-Minded Group of Developing Countries,302  European Union, 
Compromise Group,303 Central and Eastern European Group and others. 
During the negotiations, the Miami Groups, Like-minded Group of Developing 
Countries and European Union played more active roles whereas Central 
and Eastern European Group remained rather quiet.304The main issues 
which divided opinions were the inclusion of socio-economic consideration, 
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liability and redress, products of LMO, the precautionary principle, the scope 
of the Protocol, and packaging and labelling. In the end, the content and 
scope of the Protocol concluded with a compromise between the various 
groups’ interests and opinions. However, the compromise also led to some 
countries who had re-grouped not signing the Protocol despite the lengthy 
negotiations. Uruguay from the Miami Group ended up signing and ratifying 
the Protocol.   
 
Australia’s move was timely in enacting the Gene Technology Act 
2001 which specifically regulates gene transfer technology. At the 
international level though, and with criticism from the Miami groups namely 
United States of America and its allies, Australia they refused to sign the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. Australia appears to be more open to the 
acceptance and growing business of biotechnology products. 
 
However if other related WTO agreements on LMOs, modern 
biotechnology and biosafety are taken into account, there would be much 
more debate on issues that are not relevant are here. The difference might 
be about the openness of a country in accepting or not accepting genetically 
modified products. This may be due to local conditions that need to be taken 
into account and that will be discussed later in the Malaysian context. 
 
  
 
160 
 
 
 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety not only provides a minimum305 
set of rules and procedures, it also attempts to deliver global harmonisation 
of biosafety regulation. The Protocol provides a good model for biosafety 
regulation. It is more than an acceptable and common practice for the 
transboundary movement of LMOs; it was a negotiated Protocol that had the 
effect of becoming a legally-binding and comprehensive international 
treaty.306 It is evident that the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is the primary 
force behind the establishment of a national biosafety framework for many 
countries. It provides a common and coordinated approach to address the 
potential risks of LMOs and balances the various competing goals like 
environmental protection, modern biotechnology utilisation, trade, national 
sovereignty and the relationship with other international treaties.307 
 
Strengths of the Protocol 
 
It is important to acknowledge the strengths of the Protocol, as 
discussed by Jaffe,308 which can be summarised as follows: 
 
a) The proportionate risk-based reviews 
 
Cohen309 rightly stated that a good regulatory system looks at each 
application individually and assesses the potential risks to human 
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health and the environment based on a scientific risk-based analysis. 
Each application must meet the relevant safety standards which can 
be seen in the procedures of the Protocol. For LMO release into the 
environment which carries a relatively higher risk, the Advanced 
Informed Agreement (AIA) requires a risk assessment, a risk 
management plan, and consent by the importing party. For LMOs that 
are used for FPP and that carry a significantly lower risk, an AIA is not 
needed but parties are allowed to make decisions based on the safety 
decision of the exporting country or may conduct their own risk 
assessments. For LMOs in contained use such as in labs with lesser 
risks, there are no required safety procedures. Article 7 exempts 
certain LMOs that have no adverse effects from AIAs.  
 
b) Clear and understandable procedures 
The AIA procedures310 laid down in Article 7 to Article 10 of the 
Protocol are clearly explained for LMOs released into the environment, 
and clearly state what type of notification is required by the Party of 
Import.311  Article 10312 also states the procedure expected and the 
timeframe for risk assessment for the Party of Import. For LMFPP,313 
the same procedure is applicable for the parties concerned.  The 
Protocol also states that an AIA does not apply to transit and 
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contained use.314For any new scientific information, review of 
decision,315 is laid down the procedure, rights and timeframe for the 
Parties of Import and Export are also laid down. Thus, the Exporting 
Party will know the type of information that they need to supply and 
the consequences, rights and obligations of the Importing Party, and 
the public will be informed on how such decisions are reached. 
 
c) Risk assessment information and analysis 
 
Annex I requires the information of the intended LMOs for notification 
which are detail in nature as to its origin and taxonomic status. Annex 
II requires the same information for LMFPP. A risk assessment is 
provided in Annex III which should serve as a general guide for 
countries to make their own more detailed risk assessments. Risk 
assessment essentially sets out the general principles, methodology 
and points to consider. These analyses are detailed in nature for risk 
assessment, so as to suit the requirements of the local conditions and 
the nature of biodiversity. 
 
Unsettled aspects of the Protocol 
 
Despite these strengths, there are some important issues that remain 
controversial and unresolved by the Protocol and these could be taken into 
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consideration by individual countries in their national biosafety laws.   They 
are listed below: 
 
a) Legal Safety standards 
 
Whilst the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety’s Article 7 provides AIAs 
for release into the environment, the Protocol lacks an essential safety 
standard for decisions on approvals permitting release.  Such a standard is 
not prescribed anywhere in the Protocol. This may lead to countries applying 
different safety standards. 
 
Below are some good examples of safety standards: 
 
1) EU Regulation 258/97 states that genetically modified food must 
not ‘…present a danger to the consumer...’316 
 
2) United States Food and Drug Administration 1992 for GM food 
states that food additives have ‘…a reasonable certainty of no 
harm…’ 
 
3) US FDA 1992 states that for biotech crops a different standard is 
applied to ensure that it is ‘substantially equivalent ’ to their 
conventional counterpart. 
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Whilst it is up to the national government or sovereign State to apply 
safety standards, their obligations towards other international agreements 
should be considered.  These might include not being overly trade-restrictive, 
not based on scientific assessment, or being over-reliant on socio-economic 
considerations.  
 
b) Socio-economic considerations 
 
As previously mentioned, Article 26 of the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety literally states that countries may take socio-economic factors into 
consideration when assessing the LMOs impact on biodiversity, and  
especially the value of biodiversity to the local and indigenous people. It is 
again at each country’s discretion as to the degree of influence that 
socioeconomic factors will have in the decision-making process.  
 
The definition of socio-economic considerations is also questionable 
as some groups believe that its scope is limited to Article 26.317 This view 
means that it can only include the value of biodiversity to the local and 
indigenous people. 
 
Conversely, there are other stakeholders who believe that socio-
economic considerations may be broader and may include: 
 
'... impacts on farmers' incomes and welfare, cultural practices, 
community wellbeing, traditional crops and varieties, domestic science 
and technology, rural employment, trade and competition, the role of 
                                   
 
 
317
 Ruth (n 71) 163. 
  
 
165 
 
 
 
transnational corporations, indigenous peoples, food security, ethics 
and religion, consumer benefits, and ideas about agriculture, 
technology, and society…’318. 
 
However, the most important thing is that any inclusion of socio-
economic considerations must align with a country’s obligations to other 
international agreements,319 such as WTO agreements for example. 
Countries should consider incorporating broader socio-economic factors that 
could be addressed through other means such as voluntary processes by 
research and institutions, and rules and regulations.320 It is agreed that when 
countries do use socio-economic considerations, it is vital how, when, and 
which factors to be used321 to show transparency and the efficiency of those 
considerations. Fransen322 even presented examples on how socio-economic 
considerations should be analysed for interested countries. 
 
Whilst the US and Canada did not take socio-economic factors into 
account for their risk assessment framework, Argentina requires market 
analyses as a third part to the approval process, and can deny approval if the 
risks or products can affect the economy of the country.323 The next Chapter 
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3 will examine how Malaysia takes socio-economic considerations into 
account. 
 
Scientific and socio-economic issues 
 
The question is often what are the real issues that we are trying to 
regulate? The public are concerned about the goods and products that they 
consume and they neither understand nor believe science. 
 
Biosafety regulations address both issues, namely the scientific risk 
and the public concern. This is explained by the position of the Cartagena 
Protocol and the Malaysian National Biosafety Act 2007. In these, the first 
and foremost issues to be tackled are: the scientific biosafety issue of any 
irreversible damage or harm which is the adverse effect of modern 
biotechnology products (this is the transboundary issue that led to the 
establishment of the Cartagena Protocol); and, the vital public perception 
issue as consumers that affect the production, perception and consumption 
of genetically modified products. The public perceptions may exist due to the 
consumer’s own awareness, or propagation of some known environmental 
groups such as Green Peace, that give the impression that genetically 
modified goods are bad from an ethical viewpoint. 
 
The public concern that should be reflected in biosafety regulations 
was defined in Article 23 of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.  This Article 
introduced public participation and awareness on biosafety, so that the public 
has a say in what they are consuming. In compliance with the Protocol, the 
countries that are party to the Protocol need to adopt public awareness and 
participation strategy into their local regulations..  The discussion will 
examine in more in depth to what extent the public say actually has any 
power in biosafety. 
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The relationship between science and risk regulation, at the national 
and international level, stimulates an interesting discussion on the Biosafety 
Protocol, particularly as to how much reliance is put on science as opposed 
to the non-scientific methods of regulation. One issue highlighted by Peel 324 
is the role of science that is viewed by governments in international risk 
regulation. The capability of science to identify the global risks and provide a 
basis for developing acceptable solutions is not without its flaws. This task 
places substantial demands on science and scientific experts, and these 
expectations will not be met in the case of scientific uncertainties and 
inherent normative aspects of risk regulation.  
 
This scientific reliance, in my view, will cause problems for developing 
countries as they generally do not have the necessary local scientific experts 
and need to rely on foreign scientific experts. However, Peel later recognised 
two views on the science and non-scientific roles. From one viewpoint, 
science-based tools like risk assessments play an important role in curbing 
the excessive political debate on risk issues, they enable systemisation and 
they make the processes of risk decision-making transparent.  
 
From the other viewpoint, there are ‘technical and normative 
frailties’325that affect scientific risk assessments and these require non-
scientific inputs, such as public views, in order to improve both their credibility 
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and broader social acceptance and are the basis for global risk decision-
making. 
 
Due to the nature of scientific uncertainty, it is unacceptable for 
scientific uncertainty to be prioritised without giving due and equal recognition 
to the social values or ‘socio-economic’ issues. There are assessment 
mechanisms for the scientific concerns in accordance with the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety but there is very little scope for social values issues. It 
is contended that social issues are more obvious, predictable and bound to 
happen either immediately or gradually compared to scientific uncertainties 
which can be more worrisome. For example, GM products contain beef which 
cannot be consumed by Hindus and, if not labelled, the consumers consume 
the beef unknowingly. Public outcry would occur if the truth was somehow 
later discovered, and consequently the public would totally distrust GM 
products. This issue is foreseeable and predictable and actions should be 
taken to prevent such failures. Thus, social values should have the same 
significance as scientific concerns.     
 
In summary, both science and law need to be recognised and 
legitimised to be accepted by decision-makers and the public as the end 
users of genetically modified products. For science to be accepted, the 
scientific assessment tools and the GM experts must be fully equipped, 
however this is beyond the scope of this thesis. With regard to the law, it is 
within the scope of this thesis to analyse how far, and in what ways the law 
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can be used to regulate biosafety, at the national and international level, and 
acceptable approaches to regulating it.       
 
c) Public participation326 
 
Article 27 of the Protocol provides for the promotion and facilitation of 
public awareness and participation. The issue is how public participation is 
included and implemented in regulatory decision-making. 
 
In recent years, it is true that public participation has been a central 
element in the legal regulation of science and technology.327 This could be 
related to the earlier argument on the acceptance of biosafety regulation by 
the public. The rationale for increased public participation is that it is critical 
for establishing an effective regulatory framework and this can be traced 
back to the Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development, the 
Aarhus Convention, and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.328 
Furthermore, public participation is important in the overall national biosafety 
framework as well as in individual applications.329 
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Whilst little guidance is provided by the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety on how to implement public participation, the practice of some 
countries could be imported to other countries. Public participation can take 
many forms such as opportunities to provide comment, information on the 
rules, regulations or applications, or even providing written testimony at 
public hearings.330 
 
For instance, the EU Directive 2001/18 specifies that all applications 
will be made publicly available and the public will have 30 days to 
comment.331 In the USA and Australia, the public is informed through 
government publications when a policy or product application is available for 
review and a specific amount of time is given to send relevant comments to 
the decision makers.332 However, this process might only be effective if the 
public are given information and ample time to comprehend the issues before 
providing feedback, or it would be rendered ineffective. This will be examined 
in the Malaysian context in the next chapter 3. Therefore, there needs to be 
transparency of information for the public in the government procedures and 
decision-making. The relevant public should include small farmer groups with 
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different opinions as they should be equally equipped with the relevant 
knowledge and tools to actively participate.333 
 
There is another issue on how these public participations are being 
factored into the decision-making process. This relates to how the 
information and comment on the legal safety of certain LMOs are taken into 
account, and whether countries are limited to scientific and risk assessments 
only. Another medium of public participation is evident when expert scientific 
opinions are sought about a product or government policy such as 
consultation with experts from science advisory committees. However these 
consultations are treated as advice not requirements in government decision-
making.334 The public participation issue is a difficult and complicated one 
and the implementation is thus left to individual countries to determine. 
 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: Important Articles in the Protocol for 
implementation 
 
  According to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, there are 40 
important articles for the countries that ratified and signed the Protocol. 
However, there are only 26 Articles that need to comply with other provisions 
are either definition or explanation sections.  
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The relevant articles are summarised as follows: 
 
ARTICLE DESCRIPTION 
2 General provisions 
5 Pharmaceutical  
 
6 Transit and contained use 
7 Application of the Advance Informed Agreement (AIA)  
Procedure 
8 Notification 
9 Acknowledgement of Receipt of Notification 
10 Decision Procedure 
11 Procedure for Living Modified Organisms Intended for 
Direct Use as Food or Feed, Or For Processing (LMOs-
FFP) 
12 Review of Decisions 
13 Simplified Procedure 
14 Bilateral, Regional and Multilateral Agreements and 
Arrangements 
15 Risk Assessment 
16 Risk Management 
17 Unintentional Transboundary Movements and 
Emergency Measures 
18 Handling, Transport, Packaging and Identification 
19 Competent National Authorities and National Focal 
Points 
20 Information Sharing and the Biosafety Clearing-House 
21 Confidential Information 
22 Capacity-Building 
23 Public Awareness and Participation 
24 Non-Parties 
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25 Illegal Transboundary Movements 
26 Socio-Economic Considerations 
27 Liability and Redress 
28 Financial Mechanism and Resources 
33 Monitoring and Reporting 
Table 2: Relevant Articles in Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety for implementation 
 
Thus these 26 articles need to be complied with by the parties as 
required by the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. The parties then need to 
report back to The Secretariat of the Protocol, to what extent did they indeed 
comply in accordance with the reporting format.  
 
The important implementation measures that are required can be 
summarised as follows: 
 
i) the necessary legal, administrative and other measures for the 
implementation of the Protocol (Article 2) 
ii) the details of the regulation of pharmaceutical LMOs (Article 5) 
iii) the implementation of transit and contained use of LMOs (Article 6) 
iv) the relevant law(s) / regulations / administrative measures for the 
operation of the AIA for the transboundary movement for  
intentional introduction of LMOS into the environment, also 
measures in case of lack of scientific certainty (Article 7,8,9 and 
10) 
v) the specific law(s) or regulation(s) for decision-making regarding 
domestic use, including placing on the market, of LMOs-FFP, also 
measures for lack of scientific certainty (Article 11) 
vi) a mechanism for the review and change of a decision regarding an 
intentional transboundary movement of LMOs (Article 12) 
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vii) a system for the application of the simplified procedure regarding 
an intentional transboundary movement of LMOs (Article 13) 
viii) any bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements and 
arrangements entered by countries (Article 14) 
ix) a national framework for conducting risk assessments and 
management prior to taking decisions regarding LMOs, 
infrastructure and  the use "Guidance on Risk Assessment of 
LMOs"  (Article 15 and 16) 
x) the appropriate measures to prevent unintentional transboundary 
movements of LMOs (Article 17) 
xi) the measures to require that LMOs that are subject to 
transboundary movement are handled, packaged and transported 
under conditions of safety, taking into account relevant 
international rules and standards (Article 18) 
xii) a competent national authority and a mechanism for the 
coordination of their actions prior to taking decisions regarding 
LMOs (Article 19) 
xiii) the status of the mandatory information provided by countries to 
the Biosafety Clearing House (BCH) (Article 20)  
xiv) the procedures to protect confidential information received under 
the Protocol (Article 21) 
xv) reliable funding for building capacity for the effective 
implementation of the Protocol  also identification areas of 
improvement (Article 22) 
xvi) a strategy or put in place legislation for promoting and facilitating 
public awareness, education and participation concerning the safe 
transfer, handling and use of LMOs (Article 23) 
xvii) any bilateral, regional, or multilateral agreement with non-Parties 
regarding transboundary movements of LMOs (Article 24) 
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xviii) domestic measures aimed at preventing and/or penalizing 
transboundary movements of LMOs carried out in contravention of 
its domestic measures to implement this Protocol (Article 25) 
xix) specific approaches or requirements that facilitate how socio-
economic considerations should be taken into account in LMO 
decision making (Article 26) 
xx) liability and redress (Article 27) 
xxi) funding mobilised beyond the regular national budgetary 
allocation(Article 28) 
xxii) monitoring and/or an enforcement system for the implementation of 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety(Article 33) 
 
Compliance to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: An effective 
framework? 
 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety Protocol is said to provide the 
minimum requirement for the establishment of a national biosafety 
framework335 for all countries that signed and ratified the Protocol. Jaffe336 is 
correct in questioning whether compliance to this Protocol will result in a 
transparent, predictable, efficient and effective national biosafety framework. 
Or will it provide national biosafety systems that are harmonious with each 
other? Furthermore, does the Protocol answer the key questions surrounding 
the national biosafety regulation? Whilst these issues are not easy to answer, 
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it is then important to unveil the essence of these issues so that they can 
guide biosafety governance. 
  
Environmental governance in regulating biosafety complexity 
 
Another important issue with the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is 
that this Protocol covers environmental aspect of biosafety but not other 
types of biosafety. Perhaps a more comprehensive biosafety regulation that 
stands on its own combined with biosecurity might provide better governance 
of modern biotechnology and its products. Additionally, environmental 
governance from the Protocol in regulating biosafety, and LMOs specifically 
should be broadened in the future to govern human health as well. 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, it is hoped that this chapter provides a useful insight into 
regulatory theory of the biosafety risk regulation. These theories will be 
discussed in further detail during the discussion of Malaysian biosafety law in 
Chapter 3 and 4 also when comparing to Singapore biosafety law (Chapter 
5). The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is seen as the realisation of the 
scientific and social risks, next Chapter 3 will examine Malaysian compliance 
towards this Protocol. Even though Singapore is not a signatory country to 
the said Protocol, the vital biosafety issues outlined will be the used as the 
parameters of discussion. 
 There are some common problems of modern biotechnology in the 
developing countries, such as capacity building from the legal and 
institutional aspects. Different countries’ interests and national priorities 
reflect their biosafety regulations. It is hoped that a comparative law study 
between Malaysia and Singapore biosafety regulation will provide useful 
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insights and lessons for both countries. The Malaysian legal aspect of 
implementation of biosafety law will be examined in the next Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF MALAYSIAN POLICIES AND LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK ON BIOSAFETY 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The regulatory theory in Chapter 2 provides the underlying 
understanding of biosafety regulation, also analyses the vital issues of 
compliance with Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. This Chapter 3 essentially 
addresses the critical legal aspects of biosafety implementation in Malaysia 
in compliance with the Protocol. Chapter 4 later complements this Chapter as 
it addresses the institutional aspects of biosafety regulation in Malaysia. Both 
Chapter 3 and 4 are connected with each other as the legal and institutional 
aspects are essential features for an efficient biosafety framework. 
 
Since Malaysia is still in the phase of building and empowering its 
biosafety framework, there are many issues on the implementation of its laws 
and regulations. The purpose of this chapter is to review the Malaysian 
existing laws and regulations and analyse the framework for implementing 
biosafety. This chapter also critically analyses the crucial biosafety issues 
notably risk assessment and management, precautionary principle, public 
awareness and participation, socio-economic considerations, labelling, 
liability and redress of the living modified organisms (LMO).  
 
The study is organised to analyse the compatibility of the existing 
Malaysian biosafety framework with Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, with 
suggestions and recommendations for future improvement in the following 
conclusion in Chapter 6. This chapter examines to what extent Malaysia 
applies the fundamental Articles contained in the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety, towards complying and strengthening its national biosafety laws 
and institutions. The Protocol provides a basic framework of implementation 
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to the ratifying and signing countries, which outlines the essential features in 
biosafety regulation. Before engaging in a more in-depth analysis of 
compliance, the background of Malaysia national policies that led to biosafety 
implementation will be examined.  
  
2. Background on Malaysia’s development of biosafety policy  
 
Malaysia’s development in biosafety policy and laws is closely 
associated with its national aspiration and priorities that shaped its national 
policies on biodiversity, environment, biotechnology and biosafety. The 
Malaysian’s interest in biotechnology started from Vision 2020337  led to the 
formulation of the National Biological Diversity Policy 1998.  
 
Vision 2020 
 
Vision 2020338 is a Malaysian ideal introduced by the fourth most 
famous and aspirational Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tun Mahathir Mohamad 
to lead Malaysia to be a developed country by the year 2020. Vision 2020 
was announced during the tabling of the Sixth Malaysia Plan in 1991. 
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The introduction to Vision 2020 can be read as follows: 
 
`By the year 2020, Malaysia can be a united nation, with a confident 
Malaysian society, infused by strong moral and ethical values, living in 
a society that is democratic, liberal and tolerant, caring, economically 
just and equitable, progressive and prosperous, and in full possession 
of an economy that is competitive, dynamic, robust and resilient.’ 
 
There are nine challenges towards achieving Vision 2020 which are 
outlined as follows: 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Nine challenges towards achieving Vision 2020 
 
From the above Vision 2020, Challenge 4 is establishing an entirely 
moral and ethical society reflects Malaysian awareness on these issues also 
identified as an essential element towards a developed nation. Challenge 6 is 
establishing a scientific and progressive society shows the aggressive 
Malaysian venture into biotechnology. One of the engines of growth for the 
economy is the use of science and technology and the local natural 
resources for further utilisation of biotechnology development and products. 
 
Challenge 1: Establishing a united Malaysian nation made up of one Bangsa Malaysia 
(Malaysian Race). 
Challenge 2: Creating a psychologically liberated, secure and developed Malaysian society. 
Challenge 3: Fostering and developing a mature democratic society. 
Challenge 4: Establishing a fully moral and ethical society. 
Challenge 5: Establishing a matured liberal and tolerant society. 
Challenge 6: Establishing a scientific and progressive society. 
Challenge 7: Establishing a fully caring society. 
Challenge 8: Ensuring an economically just society, in which there is a fair and equitable 
distribution of the wealth of the nation. 
Challenge 9: Establishing a prosperous society with an economy that is fully competitive, 
dynamic, robust and resilient. 
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Therefore inventions and innovations in modern biotechnology 
innovations in both agricultural products mainly will generate more revenue 
for the country. Malaysia is undertaking research and development to 
cultivate better genes and quality of rubber343 and palm oil fruits.344 
 
Malaysia is one of the world’s mega bio-diverse countries as Malaysia 
ranked the 12th in the world, according to the National Biodiversity Index, 
which is based on estimates of country richness and endemism in four 
terrestrial vertebrate classes and vascular plants.345 Malaysia has a mega-
biodiversity that offers much potential for economic growth. Malaysia then is 
making steps to venture the need to fully utilise the available natural 
resources to realise its Vision 2020.  
 
Malaysia earlier ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity on 22nd 
September 2009346347 due to the biodiversity threats. Threats to biodiversity 
in Malaysia include threats to ecosystems and species, such as land 
development, pollution, poaching and collection, encroachment, climate 
change and invasive alien species. The primary drivers of these threats 
consist of economic growth, increased demand for food, agricultural 
                                   
 
 
343
 USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, Malaysia:GE Rubber tress (Global Agriculture 
Information Network (GAIN) MY5001, 2015) 1. 
344
 Singh R and others (2013), ‘Oil Palm Genome Sequence Reveals Divergence Of 
Interfertile Species In Old And New Worlds’ (2013) Nature 500: 335-339. 
345
 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 'Malaysia - Country Profile: Biodiversity Facts ' 
(2016). <https://www.cbd.int/countries/profile/default.shtml?country=my#facts> accessed on 
30 December 2015. 
346Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). 'List of Parties' (2018) 
<https://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtm> accessed on 29 December 2017. 
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products, goods and services, exotic wild meat, traditional and herbal 
remedies, wild animals for pets and wild ornamental plants. Therefore as part 
of the compliance towards Convention on Biological Diversity, Malaysia then 
formulated National Biological Diversity Policy 1998.  
 
National Biological Diversity Policy 1998 
 
The vision of the National Biological Diversity Policy 1998 is to 
transform Malaysia into a world centre of excellence in conservation, 
research and utilisation of tropical biological diversity by the year 2020. This 
policy is in line with the Vision 2020. The policy is to conserve Malaysia's 
biological diversity and to ensure that its components are utilised sustainably 
for the continued progress and socio-economic development of the nation.  
 
The objectives of the policy are as follows: 
 
Figure 6: Objectives of the National Biological Diversity Policy 1998 
 
From the above list of objectives, it can be seen that objective (vi) of 
biosafety should be considered in the utilisation of biodiversity in the 
development of biotechnology. 
 
(i) To optimise economic benefits from sustainable utilisation of the components of 
biological diversity;  
(ii) To ensure long-term food security for the nation;  
(iii) To maintain and improve environmental stability for proper functioning of 
ecological systems;  
(iv) To ensure preservation of the unique biological heritage of the nation for the 
benefit of present and future generations;  
(v) To enhance scientific and technological knowledge, and educational, social, 
cultural and aesthetic values of biological diversity;  
(vi) To emphasize biosafety considerations in the development and application of 
biotechnology.  
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In relation to the thesis topic, objectives (v) and (vi) to enhance 
scientific and technological knowledge, educational, social, cultural and 
aesthetic values of biodiversity and the consideration of biosafety 
considerations in the development and application of biotechnology are of 
relevance here. As much of the Malaysian biodiversity needs scientific 
investigation, research and development primarily in genetics, biotechnology, 
pharmaceuticals, agriculture and fisheries could be fully explored.  
 
As for biosafety risk is acknowledged however the creation, 
transportation, handling and release of genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs) carry specific environmental, safety and health risks that are still 
inadequately understood. Starting from this policy, Malaysia has realised the 
biosafety risk and has therefore made biosafety concerns a high priority. In 
the development of biotechnology, especially genetic engineering, there must 
be a corresponding development of an adequate regulatory framework for 
biosafety. This is the earlier development of biosafety concern in Malaysia.  
 
As part of the strategies for effective management of biological 
diversity management, Malaysia develops policies, regulations, laws and 
capacity building on biosafety. Malaysia introduced measures for the 
incorporation of biosafety principles and concerns, especially about genetic 
engineering, and the importation, creation and release of genetically modified 
organisms.  
 
National Biotechnology Policy 2005 (NBP) 
 
Malaysia then formulated the National Biotechnology Policy 2005 to 
complement the biotechnology development. The Malaysian Government 
recognised biotechnology as one of the key strategic drivers to propel the 
country’s social and economic development in pursuit of the status of a 
developed nation which aims to turn the biotechnology sector into one of the 
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These are the critical national development goals for implementation 
of the NBP over the three phases. 
 
Figure 8: National Biotechnology Policy 2005 Phases of Implementation 
 
The NBP spells out nine key thrusts that underpin these aspirations, 
namely: 
 
 
Figure 9: Nine thrusts of National Biotechnology Policy 2005 
 
1) Capacity Building: Phase I, 2005-2010 
Establishment of the Malaysian Biotechnology Corporation, Advisory and 
Implementation Councils 
Development of knowledge workers and job supply 
Development of legal and Intellectual Property (IP)  framework 
Building of Malaysian branding within the biotechnology industry 
 
2) Science to Business: Phase II, 2011-2015 
Development of local expertise 
Development of new products 
Technology acquisition and develop capability in technology licensing 
Intensified investment promotion and branding 
Global Presence 
 
3) Phase III, 2016-2020 
Consolidation of strengths and capabilities 
Strengthen technology and innovation licensing 
Further develop expertise 
Promote global Malaysian companies 
 
1) Agriculture Biotechnology Development 
2) Healthcare Biotechnology Development 
3) Industrial Biotechnology Development 
4) R&D and Technology Acquisition 
5) Human Capital Development 
6) Financial Infrastructure Development 
7) Legislative and Regulatory Framework Development 
8) Strategic Positioning 
9) Government Commitment 
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Thus from the none key thrusts above, apart from the private local or 
foreign companies, research universities and government agencies that 
implemented research and development on biotechnology, the government 
of Malaysia also invested heavily through its government-linked companies 
(GLC) such as Bioeconomy Corporation.350 
     
Strategies for implementing the National Biotechnology Policy 2005 
(NBP) 
 
There are some essential strategies and activities done on 
implementing the NBP351 inter alia: 
 
 
Figure 10: Strategies and Activities of National Biotechnology Policy 2005 
 
As can be seen from Figure 10 above, the establishment of National 
Bioethics Council of Malaysia is part of the strategy and actions of the 
government about biotechnology business which is timely and in line with 
                                   
 
 
350
 Bioeconomy Corporation, 'About Bioeconomy Corporation' (2017) 
<http://www.bioeconomycorporation.my/corporate-profile/about-bioeconomycorporation/> 
accessed on 30 December 2017. 
351
 Malaysian Biotechnology Information Centre, 'Strategies' (2016) 
<http://www.bic.org.my/biotech-in-malaysia/strategies> accessed on 20 October 2015. 
a) Bio Nexus status 
b) Bio Nexus partner 
c) Bio Economy roadmap 
d) National Biomass Strategy 
e) Malaysia Bio-Industry Organization (MBIO) 
f) Year of Science and National Innovation Movement 2012 
g) National Bioethics Council of Malaysia 
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biosafety considerations. However to what extent the National Bioethics 
Council’s involvement in the biosafety decision-making process is yet to be 
examined in the next Chapter 4. 
 
Malaysia’s signing in Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 2000 
 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 2000 as mentioned in the 
Introductory Chapter is the supplementary agreement to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity which aims to ensure the safe handling, transport and 
use of living modified organisms (LMO) resulting from modern biotechnology 
that may have adverse effects on biological diversity, taking also into account 
risks to human health.352  
 
Malaysia was one of the parties during the negotiations, that later led 
to the signing of Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 2000.After several stages 
of negotiations together with other mostly developing countries, Malaysia 
then signed and ratified the Protocol. A year after ratifying the Protocol, 
Malaysia became the host for the First Meeting of the Conference of the 
Parties (COP) to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).353 This 
meeting served as the Meeting of the Parties (MOP) to the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety (COP/MOP-1).During that COP/MOP-1, Malaysia was 
only commencing the Projects on Implementation of National Biosafety 
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 United Nation Environment Programme (UNEP), 'The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety' 
(2016) <https://bch.cbd.int/protocol> accessed on 1 February 2015. 
353
 Ismail R, Mamat I and Anuar M, 'Malaysiya’s Response to International Biodi-Versity 
Policies of the United Nations: An Analysis of Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety Between 
2000 and 2010' (2013) 7(4 April-June 2013) J Environ Res Develop 1419. 
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Frameworks managed by United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP).354 It was during this occasion the Ministry of Science, Technology 
and Environment, under the leadership of Dato’ (now Tan Sri) Law Hieng 
Ding, acted as the critical referral institution in the negotiation process. 
Essentially, Malaysia made a significant reform in managing its biosafety 
issues by enacting the Biosafety Act 2007 and later Biosafety (Approval and 
Notification) Regulations 2010.  
 
This is the Malaysia historical background towards biosafety which is 
essential to understand Malaysia journey and progress in biotechnology 
innovation and movement towards biosafety framework. 
 
In summary, as biosafety is also closely associated with biodiversity 
coupled with a lot of controversial issues associated with LMO that have 
irreversible effects on the environment (which have been elaborated in the 
Introductory Chapter), Malaysia then signed the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety. As part of the capacity building to encourage biosafety in Malaysia, 
it has been given an incentive under Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
funding355 to fund biosafety activities in 2002 for three years. The total cost of 
$5.2 million projects was being allocated to Malaysia for capacity building 
activities are summarised as follows: 
 
                                   
 
 
354
 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 'UNEP/CBD/BS/COP-MOP/1/INF/19: GEF 
Support for Capacity-Building' (2012) <https://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/bs/mop-
01/information/mop-01-inf-19-en.pdf> accessed on 30 December 2017. 
355
 United Nations Development Program in co-ordination with UNEP and UNIDO 
implemented by Malaysia Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment (MoSTE). 
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i) risk assessment scientific and technical level 
ii) implement necessary activities for risk management 
iii) evaluate and strengthen legal and regulatory biosafety 
framework 
iv) development of a structure for exchange information 
v) public awareness and participation programmes 
 
Thus it can be seen that the GEF Funding is closely related with 
Chapter 4 whereby the institutional aspect of biosafety implementation being 
funded and trained by GEF funding such as the LMO detection lab for the 
Chemistry Department and legal expert to be trained on biosafety laws. 
 
Being a signatory to Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, Malaysia has 
several obligations to comply with the Protocol. However, like other countries, 
Malaysia faced many challenges to conform to the Protocol such as building 
capacity, finances, public awareness and participation and many others.  
 
 In September 2001, the Ministry of Science, Technology, and the 
Environment (MoSTE) organised a public consultation on the proposed 
National Biosafety Bill. The participants were from non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), government, agro-industry, scientific and academic 
communities and were invited to voice their views about the draft bill before it 
was sent to Parliament. It is rare in the Malaysian process of legislation to 
hold such public consultations with the scheme of the proposed law made 
available to the public in advance to allow for comments. It is recognition of 
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the importance of public consultation in the field of biosafety and shows the 
commitment of the Government in viewing the public as essential 
stakeholders in the field of biosafety.356 
 
3. Malaysia compliance of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
 
Biosafety in Malaysia, like most other countries, is implemented and 
enforced as part of environmental issues. Malaysia takes a role to balance 
protection of its rich biodiversity and developing biotechnology for 
commercialisation to generate economic growth. 
 
Malaysia is a party to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 2000 as it 
is signed on 24th May 2000 and ratified on 3rd September 2003.357358 The 
Protocol later came into force on 2nd December 2003. Being a party to the 
Protocol and as part of its compliance, Malaysia then enacted national 
Biosafety Act 2007359 which was in force on 1st December 2009.  
 
A supplementary Protocol then reinforced the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety is known as the Nagoya - Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol 
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 Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment Malaysia, Malaysia: Capacity-
building for Implementation of National Biosafety Framework (Project Brief PIMS 2182, 
2013) 6. 
357
 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
Ratification List (Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety , 2018) 1 
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 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 'Parties to the Protocol and signature and ratification of 
the Supplementary Protocol' (2017) <http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/parties/> accessed on 29 
December 2017. 
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 Act 678. 
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on Liability and Redress.360 The Supplementary Protocol specifies response 
measures to be taken in the event of damage to biodiversity resulting from 
LMO.361 Malaysia is not a party yet to this Supplementary Protocol even 
though has started the process of signing since 2011.Malaysia is still in the 
process of providing a detailed assessment of the biosafety law and identifies 
gaps in liability and redress to formulate the most practical approach to 
formulating the best approach.362 
 
Decision-making procedure 
Fourth National Report to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2009 
First Regular National Report on the Implementation of the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety, 2007 
Interim National Report on Implementation of the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety, 2005 
Third National Report to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2005 
Second National Report to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2005 
Report on Implementation of Global Taxonomy Initiatives (GTI) Work Programme, 
2004 
Table 3: Decision-making procedure used by Malaysian government from 2000-
2010363 
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 Signed in Nagoya, Japan, on 16th October 2010. 
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 United Nation Environment, 'The Nagoya – Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on 
Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety' (2017) 
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 Department of Biosafety, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment Malaysia, 'Third 
National Report on the implementation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety' (2017) 
<https://bch.cbd.int/database/record.shtml?documentid=109107> accessed on 20 January 
2017. 
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 Ismail R, Mamat I and Anuar M, 'Malaysiya’s Response to International Biodi-Versity 
Policies of the United Nations: An Analysis of Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety Between 
2000 and 2010' (2013) 7(4 April-June 2013) J Environ Res Develop 1419. 
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Malaysia’s status of compliance with Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
can be seen from the Biosafety Clearing House website.364 From this link, the 
essential documents in relation to compliance towards Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety can be seen and summarised as follows: 
 
a) Roster of the biosafety experts 
b) Capacity building needs 
c) Competent national authority 
d) Country’s decision 
e) Law, regulation and guidelines 
f) National database and focal points 
g) News 
h) Risk assessment 
i) Reports on the implementation of the Protocol 
 
The Biosafety Clearing-House detailed the relevant questions that 
countries need to answer to ensure compliance towards every article 
contained in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB). Thus from here, it 
can be analysed whether countries complied fully with the Protocol or not. As 
one of the countries that signed and ratified the CPB, Malaysia has produced 
its compliance report to CPB. Malaysia has made the widespread efforts at 
its domestic level and submitted various reports.  
 
                                   
 
 
364Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 'Biosafety Clearing House: Country Profile; 
Malaysia' (2017) <https://bch.cbd.int/about/countryprofile.shtml?country=my> accessed on 
20 January 2015. 
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Type of report 
Interim National Report 2005 
First National Report 2007 
Second National Report 2011 
Third National Report 2015 
 
Table 4: Compliance report by Malaysian government on the Implementation of the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety from 2005-2015                                                                                                                
 
4. Malaysian conceptual framework for implementing biosafety 
 
Having discussed the Malaysian background before signing the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, it is then vital to address the Malaysian 
conceptual framework in implementing biosafety. 
 
The International Service for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR) 
report by McClean MA et al.365 convened an expert consultation with ISNAR 
in July 2001 was initially to assist developing countries that ratified and 
signed Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.This Report is comprehensive and 
essential in analysing the framework of the Malaysian biosafety law even 
though it does not intend to provide a standard roadmap to be followed by all 
parties. The ISNAR Report intends to complement the UNEP/GEF Global 
Project on the Development of National Biosafety Frameworks (Briggs 2001) 
                                   
 
 
365McLean MA and others, ‘A Conceptual Framework for Implementing Biosafety: Linking 
Policy, Capacity, and Regulation’ (International Service for National Agricultural Research 
(ISNAR 2002). 
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by providing guidance on the design and implementation of regulatory 
frameworks and related capacity-building initiatives. The Report linking with 
the policy, capacity and regulation, as part of the analysis on the developing 
country consultation project.  
 
This thesis attempts to analyse the current development Malaysian 
situation by ISNAR Report framework for a better understanding of biosafety 
implementation from the legal and institutional aspects. 
 
According to ISNAR Report, there are five (5) essential elements for 
implementation of biosafety regulations which will be elaborated and 
discussed as follows: 
 
1. Element 1:National policy 
2. Element 2:National inventory and evaluation 
3. Element 3:Scientific Knowledge, Skills and Capacity Base 
4. Element 4:Development of Regulations 
5. Element 5:Implementation of Regulations 
 
 
Figure 11: Elements for Implementation of Biosafety Regulations 
 
Element 1: Malaysia National Policies on Biosafety 
 
The ISNAR report rightly opines that the national policy that relates to 
biosafety in most countries should ideally be closely associated with food, 
agriculture, environment and sustainable development. However, the more 
critical issue is perhaps to what extent the enforcement of the Malaysian 
biosafety regulation efficiently associated with those essential elements 
abovementioned and integrated with public health. 
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From the discussion of the above Malaysian national policies namely 
National Biological Diversity Policy 1998, National Biotechnology Policy 2005 
and Vision 2020 show that there are links between biodiversity, 
biotechnology thus biosafety development. In Malaysia, biodiversity and 
environmental issues are under the purview of Ministry of Natural Resources 
and Environment (NRE). The formulation of National Biological Diversity 
Policy 1998 is impressive as it includes sustainable development of utilisation 
of natural resources. The policy also stressed and recognised the importance 
of biosafety in the biotechnology development. This is in line with compliance 
towards Convention of Biological Diversity.  
 
The National Biotechnology Policy 2005 is also consistent with Vision 
2020 transforms the Malaysian aspiration to generate economic growth 
through biotechnology consequently as one of the strategies led to the 
establishment of National Bioethics Council. The involvement of this National 
Bioethics Council in biosafety decision-making process will be discussed in 
the next chapter 4. It is agreed that the importance of a national biosafety 
strategy cannot be overstated as it provides a set of principles to guide 
subsequent development and implementation of a biosafety system and 
regulations.366  
 
Biosafety policy articulates a national approach to biosafety regulation 
and the goals and objectives of the regulatory framework, and it may provide 
direction on many of the fundamental issues and public policy choices that 
must be considered during the development of regulations. Mclean et.al in 
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that ISNAR report also stressed that regardless whether the biosafety policy 
is developed before or after the biosafety regulations the importance of 
different goals such as economic and regional development, and 
environmental protection may be integrated and communicated as a single 
national vision. 
 
It is submitted that Malaysia perhaps still lacks the general national 
biosafety policy that should be comprehensive to include not just lab 
biosafety,367 environmental biosafety but also more advanced biosafety 
issues associated with biosecurity and bioterrorism. Perhaps this is because 
biosafety in Malaysia is inter-related with other ministries, for instance, public 
health issues that are under the purview of Ministry of Health, food safety 
under other agencies, biodiversity under Ministry of Natural Resources 
(NRE), etc. However, a comprehensive biosafety policy that integrates with 
food, agriculture, environment, sustainable development and health is hoped 
to be formulated in the future. This should be done to consistency and 
effectiveness of governmental actions through various agencies on biosafety, 
biotechnology and environment that would benefit the public, regulator and 
business as a whole. 
 
Element 2: National Inventory and Evaluation 
 
The inventory and evaluation of national priorities, agricultural policies, 
existing regulatory regimes, and national scientific and technical means are 
prerequisite to the development and implementation of biosafety-related 
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As previously mentioned, a country rarely reviews all of these items 
before actually managing/regulating LMO. More commonly, and perhaps 
more practically, countries evaluate their national capacities on a stepwise 
basis, as dictated by domestic needs: the capability to manage LMO in 
contained facilities, followed by confined small- and large-scale field trials, 
and finally, the unconfined release of an LMO. This part especially on (c), (d) 
and (g) while it is of not much detail in this thesis due to its limitations. This 
will be of interest for future research for Malaysia strengthening of its 
biosafety system as a whole. 
 
Element 3: Scientific Knowledge, Skills and Capacity Base 
 
Again this element in the Malaysian context has realised the 
importance of incorporating biosafety modules in the tertiary and secondary 
school curriculum.369 However, to date, there is no significant progress on the 
biosafety education in Malaysia. This is among the issues that should be in 
the suggestions and recommendations chapter whereby scope and quality of 
competency in the disciplines of biological science; expertise in information 
acquisition, communications, and management; and experience in critical 
thinking, analysis, and decision making are deemed essential thus calls for 
improvement. 
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There are two key decision points and related policies namely: 
 
a) Coordinating scientific expertise 
 
This aspect stressed the importance of the national scientific expertise 
and knowledge on risk assessment, management and regulation such as 
for biotechnology product evaluation. If local expertise is inadequate, 
they should get the sub-regional, regional, and international cooperation 
in performing risk assessments, on outside experts, and on the 
international academic community. 
 
b) Locating the science evaluation function 
 
This is related to the institutional biosafety framework whereby some 
countries rely on expert advisory committees, while others have relied 
primarily on scientists and professionals working within government 
agencies. There are also independent advisory committees.  
 
Thus it is crucial to observe the consequences highlighted by Mclean 
that a thin, weak, or limited knowledge and skills base tends to produce 
regulations that are highly protective, at the expense of innovation, poorly 
defined or inconsistent, comparatively rigid, and narrowly interpreted. On the 
other hand, a deep and broad knowledge, skills, and capacity base will foster 
more latitude in regulatory development and more flexibility in regulatory 
implementation. 
 
Therefore, it is undeniably true that the scientific knowledge, skills and 
capacity base need to be strengthened in Malaysia for the future of biosafety 
in Malaysia. 
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Malaysia faces several challenges in implementing the National Policy 
Biosafety Development, especially in the field of enforcement of 
environmental legislation. There is also a need to improve the scientific 
knowledge base. At the base of these two challenges lies the need for more 
trained personnel in the field of biodiversity and biotechnology.370 
 
a) Systemic level 
 
The proposed legal framework for biosafety is broad and not 
sufficiently well detailed to be completely operational. However, the 
legislation has evolved to be a general act, under which details for 
implementation will be mostly captured in the regulations, to allow MoSTE 
more flexibility should the need to adapt to changing needs arise.  
 
b) Institutional level 
 
At present, there is insufficient institutional capacity, in research 
capabilities as well as management systems. 
 
c) Individual level 
 
MoSTE and other government agencies remain ill-equipped to 
successfully implement the Biosafety Bill (before Biosafety Act 2007 was 
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 Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment Malaysia, Malaysia: Capacity-
building for Implementation of  National Biosafety Framework (Project Brief PIMS 2182, 
2013) 8 can be found online at 
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enacted) as there are insufficient capacities, regarding numbers and skills, in 
risk assessment and risk management, administrative systems, enforcement 
and legal implementation.  
 
Element 4: Development of Regulations 
 
There are some critical elements in the development of biosafety 
regulations which are listed as follows: 
 
(1) the legislative framework  
 
The biosafety framework can be either voluntary or mandatory. 
Voluntary biosafety guidelines so far have no proven evidence of 
compromising with environmental safety. Flexibility to adapt to new 
information of biosafety is another advantage. However, lack of public 
confidence may exist as there is no enforcement and monitoring from the 
government to ensure company’s compliance and redress for suspected 
negligence. 
 
Mandatory framework, on the other hand, lead countries to either to; 
 
i. develop new acts to address the LMO regulations either product or 
process specifically, 
ii. regulate the LMO under the auspices of the existing laws, rules 
and regulations and ministerial or presidential decrees 
  
The former leads to flexibility thus new technological advances can 
also be captured without significant regulatory amendment besides instilling 
public confidence on biosafety importance by the regulator. However, 
legislation process will take a long time so does regulation of LMO in 
perpetuity. For instance, some LMO might have a safe history for a long time 
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thus LMO with this element will still be singled out for exceptional regulatory 
oversight.   
      
In light of this discussion, it is important to highlight here that regarding 
biosafety framework, Malaysia imposed mandatory biosafety legislation, i.e. 
the Biosafety Act 2007. The detailed discussion on Biosafety Act 2007 is at 
section 3.5 below. While there are pros and cons of having national biosafety 
law, Malaysia chose to have a national biosafety law. This move is part of the 
effort to comply with Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. However, there are 
other areas of law related to biosafety namely food regulation, environment, 
agriculture and health. These laws are regulated by different Acts within their 
scope of jurisdictions that bind one another. Malaysia before enacted its 
national Biosafety Act 2007 has its national biosafety guidelines as a soft 
approach in biosafety.   
 
(2) regulatory “triggers.” 
 
This is a process versus product regulation which is not going to be 
discussed in detail here as the Malaysian biosafety law opted to have its very 
own process and product biosafety regulation. Even though Malaysia might 
be criticised as covering broader scope than Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety, this is justified as covering as what is required by the Protocol, i.e. 
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and the products thereof371 i.e. Malaysia is covering the products of the 
modern biotechnology as well. 
 
(3) transparency and public involvement in the policy-making and regulatory 
decision making processes 
 
These cross-cutting issues are going to be discussed in the next 
section. In particular, the regulatory decision-making process as it closely 
related with institutional biosafety framework will be discussed in the next 
chapter 4. 
 
(4) approaches to risk assessment and risk management. 
 
The approaches are closely associated with current scientific capacity 
and knowledge base. These building capacities are regarded as key to 
identifying hazards and assessing their impacts and likelihood. As for 
approaches to risk assessment and management, it is a reasonable 
international consensus that risk assessments should focus on scientific 
consideration of the evidence or potential for adverse impact. This consensus 
is reflected in Article 15 of the Protocol, which asserts: ‘Risk assessments 
undertaken under this Protocol shall be carried out in a scientifically sound 
manner [...].’Annex III to the Protocol provides further details on risk 
assessment principles and a suggested methodology. 
                                   
 
 
371Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment Malaysia, 'The Biosafety Act  of Malaysia: 
Dispelling the Myths' <http://www.nre.gov.my/Malay/Pusat-
Media/Penerbitan/Dispelling%20the%20Myths.pdf> 31. 
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Thus a separate discussion of the scientific risk assessment and 
regulatory decision-making processes is advisable. This tiered-approach is to 
avoid political interference or impinge on existing international trade 
agreements. However again this should be subject to adequate 
transparency, openness, and objectivity to the successful implementation of 
such an approach. Malaysia is applying a two-tier biosafety decision-making 
process whereby the National Biosafety Board is making the approval based 
on the risk assessment and management assessed by Genetic Modification 
Advisory Committee (GMAC). Thus this move should be seen as reducing 
the political interference but slightly depending expert opinion based on risk 
assessment and management.  
 
Another issue is the inclusion of the socio-economic considerations 
which is going to be discussed shortly as to how to include it in the biosafety 
decision-making process. 
 
It was argued however that it does not appear feasible, nor advisable, 
to include broader ethical and social considerations (excluding economic 
consequences) into the process for individual product approvals. These 
important considerations are best dealt with by establishing ethics 
committees or other expert bodies responsible for providing governments 
with policy advice on ethical, legal, or social issues related to the adoption of 
new technologies. The exploration of ethical issues can serve both to 
develop a public consensus on the acceptability of various technologies and 
to guide the evolution of a policy framework for regulation. It seems that no 
systematic approach integrates both scientific and socio-economic 
consideration. However, Malaysia like most countries depends on the risk 
assessment and management while including the socio-economic 
considerations in the risk assessment consideration.  
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It is the most important to harmonize with the existing risk assessment 
criteria and standards that have achieved international acceptance in either 
practice or principle like the various World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
agreements such as Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), General Agreement 
On Tariffs And Trade (GATT), Sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPSS) 
also the World Health Organisation (WHO) food standard of Codex 
Alimentarius , Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United 
Nations. However, a detailed discussion of this harmonisation with the WTO 
agreements is outside the coverage of this thesis. 
 
Element 5: Implementation of Regulations 
 
The critical issues in the implementation of biosafety regulation are the 
establishment of appropriate risk assessment, risk management, and risk 
communication mechanisms while managing within existing financial, 
technical, and human resource constraints.372  
 
Traynor373 listed down four elements that allow biosafety implementation 
namely as follows: 
a) regulation that defines the structure of the biosafety system 
b) knowledgeable and well-trained human resources 
c) the review process is up-to-date scientific information 
                                   
 
 
372McLean MA and others, A conceptual framework for implementing biosafety: linking 
policy, capacity, and regulation (International service for national agricultural research 
(ISNAR) 2002 citing Cohen JI, 'Harnessing biotechnology for the poor: challenges ahead for 
capacity, safety and public investment' (2001) 2(2) Journal of Human Development 239. 
373
 ibid citing Traynor PL, 'Biosafety managment: key to the environmentally responsible use 
of biotechnology' (1999) Biotechnology in Agriculture Series (Netherlands). 
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d) feedback mechanisms to review the system 
 
a) Harmonisation of the risk assessment, management at the sub 
regional, regional and international  
 
Harmonisation success can be attributed to these factors namely: 
 
a) agreed shared values and objectives 
b) similar interests and concerns, economic and other benefits 
c) overcome differences and disputes 
d) cooperate against other interests 
e) simplified procedures 
 
Harmonisation is said to occur on three fronts – which are an 
authority, risk analysis, and administration. Harmonisation of authority from 
sub regional, regional and international are difficult due to the diversity of 
laws and regulations. Thus Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is an example of 
a more reasonable model biosafety laws that list out the critical issues of 
biosafety that need to be incorporated in the parties biosafety law. This is 
done with a view that it is also harmonised with regional and international 
obligations and objectives. 
 
Harmonisation in risk analysis can be divided into two namely: 
 
a) conceptual framework and  
b) technical.  
 
The former refers to the agreement on general principles of risk 
assessment such as food safety standard and environmental risk 
assessment. The latter refers to an agreement on methodologies, information 
requirements, or criteria for determining unacceptable risks. This perhaps 
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would pose issues on countries that are lacking scientific human resources 
capacities and updated knowledge, such as Malaysia. 
 
Harmonisation of administration refers to the implementation of norms, 
rules, and standards. However, in this regard, the Biosafety Clearing House 
for parties is a suitable mechanism for sharing of information on scientific, 
technical, environmental, and legal information relating to the risk 
assessment and transboundary movement of LMO. 
 
 
b) Transparency of decision-making and public participation 
 
As biosafety is said to involve controversial issues, transparency in 
decision-making is a pre-requisite to gain the trusts of the stakeholders. The 
public engagement as part of the decision-making process before regulatory 
or policy-making contributes to the degree of transparency. The process and 
criteria for risk assessment and risk management should be widely published 
to gain trusts of the developers, stakeholders, and the public thus biosafety 
system to be both credible and predictable. At the Malaysian national 
biosafety level, this transparency aim is perhaps to be achieved in the future 
which seems to be in line with the aspiration of the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety. It is argued that while there is publication of the report from the 
National Biosafety Board and GMAC, there is no detail on the response from 
the public. Thus in this regard, the transparency topic is undermined. 
 
c) Monitoring and compliance 
 
At the international level, few countries implement systematic monitoring 
of post-market (post-approval) monitoring. Biosafety Clearing House (BCH) 
provides informative mechanisms of LMO transboundary movement. The 
practical, technical, and economic limitations to monitoring of LMO remains 
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to ensure that national and international rules and regulations are respected. 
In this post-market monitoring, Malaysia did not have a mechanism to 
address liability and redress at the national level yet.374   
 
5. A critical analysis of the legal framework on biosafety law in Malaysia 
An analysis of the existing legal framework on biosafety in Malaysia 
cannot be completed in isolation with the other laws related to biodiversity 
and biotechnology. Therefore the existing relevant laws, rules and 
regulations in Malaysia biosafety law from 2000 to 2015 is summarised as 
follows:375 
Local policy/rule and regulation 
The Biosafety Act 2007 (Act 678) 
Guidelines of Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC): Use of Living Modified 
Organism 
and Related Material, 2007 
National Biotechnology Policy, 2005 
Protection of New Plant Variety Act, 2004 
National Policy on the Environment, 2002 
Sabah Biodiversity Enactment, 2000 
Chapter 22, 9th Malaysia Plan, (2006-2010) 
Chapter 19, 8th Malaysia Plan, (2001-2005) 
Table 5: Local policy/rule and regulation adopted at domestic level in Malaysia 
between 2000-2010 
                                   
 
 
374
 Third National Report on the implementation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety can 
be found at <https://bch.cbd.int/database/record.shtml?documentid=109107>accessed on 1 
February 2017.  
375
 ibid. 
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Biosafety (Approval and Notification) Regulations 2010  
Food Regulation 1985 (amended 2010) by Ministry of Health 
  
Table 6: Local policy/rule and regulation adopted at domestic level in Malaysia 
between 2010-2015 
 
The primary acts and regulations related to biosafety are as follows: 
 
a) Biosafety Act 2007 
b) Biosafety (Approval and Notification) Regulations 2010 
 
a) Biosafety Act 2007 (Act 678) 
 
Malaysia as part of the compliance towards Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety passed its national biosafety law, the Biosafety Act 2007. The Act 
was passed by Parliament on 11th July 2007 and received the Royal Assent 
on 29th August 2007. It came into effect on 1st December 2009.376 The Act is 
with the aims to regulate the release, importation and contained use of living 
modified organisms (LMO) and the products of such organisms. 
 
Biosafety Act 2007 is divided into seven main parts namely as follows: 
 
                                   
 
 
376
 Department of Biosafety, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment Malaysia, 
User’s Guide to the Biosafety Act and Regulations (Department of Biosafety, Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Environment Malaysia 2012) 6. 
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a) Part I: Preliminary 
b) Part II: National Biosafety Board 
c) Part III: Approval for release and import 
d) Part IV: Notification for export, contained use and import for 
contained use 
e) Part V: Risk assessment and risk management report and 
emergency response plan 
f) Part VI: Enforcement 
g) Part VII: Miscellaneous 
 
Malaysian Biosafety Act 2007 is perhaps even more detailed as 
compared to Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 2000. This is because in the 
long title of the Act it regulates not just the living modified organisms (LMO) 
but also the products of such organisms, i.e. the genetically modified (GM) 
products such the GM corn, soy, flower and many others. The Biosafety Act 
2007 is to be read together with any other written law relating to import and 
export, human, plant and animal health, the environment and biological 
diversity and in addition to and not in derogation of such written laws.377  
 
Thus from different Parts in the Biosafety Act 2007, there are different 
procedures applied for Approval for release and import (Part III) and 
Notification for export, contained use and import for contained use (Part IV).  
 
Section 4 of the Biosafety Act 2007 established the National Biosafety 
Board (NBB), whereas Section 6 established the Genetic Modification 
                                   
 
 
377
 Biosafety Act 2007 [Act678] s2. 
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Advisory Committee (GMAC). NBB acts like a biosafety regulatory board378 
while GMAC is an advisory committee that gives scientific, technical and 
other relevant advice to the Minister of Natural Resources and Environment 
(NRE) and NBB.379      
 
b) Biosafety (Approval and Notification) Regulations 2010    
 
Biosafety Act 2007 established the National Biosafety Board.380 The 
Minister381 of Natural Resources and the Environment then upon consultation 
with the National Biosafety Board (NBB) has made this regulation.382 This 
Regulations 2010 came into operation on 1st November 2010. The 
Regulation gives the NBB to direct the Institutional Biosafety Committee 
(IBC) to be established to any organisation that undertakes modern 
biotechnology research and development. This regulation primarily detailed 
out the process and procedure for approval for any release activity and 
importation of living modified organisms. 
 
Criticism of Biosafety Act 2007 
 
While Biosafety Act 2007 was enacted that in line with Malaysia 
National Biodiversity Policy and National Biotechnology Policy, this Act is not 
free from criticism. This Biosafety Act 2007 is part of Malaysia compliance 
towards Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 
                                   
 
 
378
 ibid s5. 
379
 ibid s6(1).  
380
 ibid s4. 
381
 ibid s3. 
382
 By the power conferred by Biosafety Act 2007 s69(a), (b), (c), (g), (h) and (l). 
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However, there are some issues and criticisms related to Biosafety Act 
2007, as follows: 
 
Risk assessment and risk management of the GMOs 
 
The risk assessment done by Genetic Modification Advisory 
Committee (GMAC) is an issue in relation to Biosafety Act 2007. Risk 
assessment and management is provided for in Section 36 of the Biosafety 
Act 2007. It contains only the core provisions, details of the risk assessment 
and management procedures are to be developed by the Department of 
Biosafety, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (NRE). 
 
It is stated that the risk assessment and management report shall 
contain: 
 
a) an assessment of the risk and adverse effect of the LMO 
and products; and  
b) the proposed measures to prevent the risks and the adverse 
effect of such LMO and products that are likely to have to 
human, plant and animal health, the environment and the 
biological diversity.383 
 
                                   
 
 
383Biosafety Act 2007 s36(1)(a) and (b). 
  
 
214 
 
 
 
The issue of criticism here is that the relevant provision in the risk 
assessment is very brief, with no mention of the actual procedures taken.384 
This is true despite the fact that the risk assessment is one of the primary foci 
of the Act.385 The Biosafety Act 2007 also establishes emergency response 
plan that shall provide safety measures and procedures for the protection of 
human, plant and animal health, the environment and biological diversity 
against harm caused by LMO and the products of LMO.  
 
The Act is elementary with only a brief provision on risk assessment, 
and it is found to be science-based.386 It is criticised as there is no specific 
coverage on the socio-economic and ethical aspects as well as the 
precautionary approach.387The risk assessment of the LMO is mainly focused 
on the protection of human health and the environment.  
 
Two concepts have to be incorporated into the regulatory frameworks 
governing GMOs namely as follows:  
 
a) substantial equivalence, which is used to assess risks posed to 
human health388 
b) Familiarity, which is used in environmental risk assessment.389 
                                   
 
 
384
 Amin L and others, 'Risk assessment of genetically modified organisms (GMOs)' (30 
September, 2011) 10(58) African Journal of Biotechnology 12422. 
385
 ibid. 
386Chan K, ‘Malaysia Biosafety Act 2007 and Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: A critical 
comparative analysis’ (2016) 5. 
387
 Amin L and others, 'Risk assessment of genetically modified organisms (GMOs)' (30 
September, 2011) 10(58) African Journal of Biotechnology 12422. 
388
 OECD-Organisation of Economical and Development (1993a). Safety evaluation of foods 
derived by modern biotechnology, concepts and principles, France (as cited in ibid). 
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The underlying concept of the substantial equivalence is the 
requirement that any safety assessment should show that a genetically 
modified variety is as safe as its traditional counterparts, through a 
consideration of both intended and unintended effects.390 The primary 
comparing newly developed products or techniques to existing ones has long 
been applied in various fields, including agriculture, and science, and 
technology.391 
 
Global guidelines for risk analysis and risk assessment of GMOs have 
been developed by the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) in several 
documents. One of those documents, “The Principles Document”, advocates 
that a new GM food product should be assessed for its safety by comparing it 
with food that has an established history of safe consumption, to identify 
potential hazards requiring further considerations. As noted earlier on, this 
view is typically referred to as the “concept of substantial equivalence”. This 
document also stresses that risk managers should take into account 
uncertainties identified in the risk assessment and implement appropriate 
                                                                                                   
 
 
389OECD-Organisation of Economical and Development (1993b). Safety considerations for 
Biotechnology: Scale-up of crop plants, France (as cited in ibid). 
390
 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and World Health Organization, 
Joint FAO/WHO Expert Consultation on Foods Derived from Biotechnology: Topic 1: The 
Concept of Substantial Equivalence, its Historical Development and Current Use (FAO/WHO 
Biotech 00/03, 2000) 1 (as cited in ibid). 
391
 Latifah Amin and others, 'Risk assessment of genetically modified organisms (GMOs)' (30 
September, 2011) 10(58) African Journal of Biotechnology 12422 ibid citing Schauzu M. The 
concept of substantial equivalence in safety assessment of foods derived from genetically 
modified organisms.(2000) AgBiotechNet, 2: 1. 
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measures to manage them.392 Therefore, various countries adopt their 
different approach to biosafety risk assessment and management. 
 
As for risk management Section 36(1) states that the risk 
management shall be in a form prescribed by the Minister, and Section 36(2) 
of the Biosafety Act 2007 states the approved person shall comply with the 
minimum risk management measures as may be determined by the Board, 
after consultation with the Advisory Committee. Thus again the risk 
management is not detailed out in the Act 2007 but put together in the risk 
assessment form.  
 
Analysis of risk assessment and management from Biosafety Clearing 
House website 
 
However when an examination of the Malaysian GMAC report on Risk 
assessment and management,393 it can be seen that despite having perhaps 
its form of safety assessment, GMAC also takes the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety 2000,  Risk assessment and Codex Guidelines on Risk 
Assessment on GMOs into consideration and also relevant scientific 
research by other countries as reported in the risk assessment report. 
 
                                   
 
 
392
 ibid citing Codex Alimentarius Commission 2003 (ALINORM 03/34A). Guideline for the 
conduct of food safety assessment of foods derived from recombinant DNA plants. Annex on 
the assessment of possible allergenicity, Rome, Italy. Codex Alimentarius Commission, 
Yokohama. 
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 Department of Biosafety, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment Malaysia. 
'Approval for Release For Field Trial | Food, Feed and Processing | Product of LMO' (2016) 
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Since the Malaysian Biosafety Act 2007 and regulations follow the 
Australian Gene Technology Regulation (2001), it demonstrates some 
similarities with the regulations of the developed countries, such as those of 
the EU and the UK even though risk assessment and risk management are 
not detailed out in the Act. The procedures for actions to be taken in the 
release of GMOs can be seen in the forms supplied by the Department of 
Biosafety, NRE which is the government body that is responsible for 
management of the biosafety aspects of GMOs and GMO-related products, 
as well as all matters connected with the modern biotechnology process.394 
 
There are two situations that should be concerned when dealing with 
risk assessment of GMOs.395 The regulation of GMOs can be divided into two 
parts namely: 
 
1) contained use and  
2) deliberate environmental release (non-contained use). 
 
The contained use is for research and development mainly in the 
laboratories and physically contained facilities whereas non-contained use is 
for release into the environment. Malaysian Biosafety Act 2007 contained 
both provisions, but as mentioned earlier the detail is left to the Department 
of Biosafety and NRE. The Act only laid down the procedures for approval for 
release and import, and notification for export and import and contained use 
                                   
 
 
394Amin L and others, 'Risk assessment of genetically modified organisms (GMOs)' (30 
September, 2011) 10(58) African Journal of Biotechnology 12422. 
395
 ibid citing Sparrow PAC (2010). GM Risk assessment. Mol. Biotechnol. 44: 267-275 
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also the roles played by Department of Biosafety, Minister and Director 
General of NRE, National Biosafety Board and Genetic Modification Advisory 
Committee (GMAC). 
 
It was observed that while the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 2000 
does mention the subjects of risk assessment, its provisions on contained 
use are insufficient compared to the EC directives. The Protocol is more 
focused on the procedures for LMO intended for direct use as food or feed, 
or for processing. This is a sharp contrast from the Biosafety Act 2007 in 
which contained use is the primary point of concern.396 
 
Apart from the risk assessment, other tests are essential methods of 
testing meant to identify and improve the quality as well as the safety of 
GMOs that are developed by renowned scientists. These tests include the 
nutritional assessment test, the allergenicity test, the toxicity test and the 
compositional studies that are well-known tests that GMOs have to go 
through to ensure that the safety of the products is acceptable and raise 
confidence to all consumers and members of the general public.397  
 
Analysis of risk assessment and management from Malaysian 
compliance report 
 
As Malaysia was at its infancy stage of the risk assessment and 
management after signing Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety before enacting 
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its Biosafety Act 2007, the earlier two compliance Reports398399 did not show 
any significance Malaysian very own risk assessment and management 
system rather than relying on international standard and procedure as 
mentioned above. 
 
It was during the later Report of Second National Report, Malaysia 
using its local experts has established Environmental Risk Assessment 
Guideline on GM Plant and Risk Assessment Manual on GM Microorganism. 
In the Third National Report apart from the Protocol other documents as 
mentioned above, Malaysia also referred  Guidance on Risk Assessment of 
Living Modified Organisms (developed by the AHTEG on Risk Assessment 
and Risk Management400) when making their assessments of LMO mainly for 
food, feed and processing. Moreover, relevant biology documents produced 
by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) are 
also being referred as well. A detailed discussion of the risk assessment and 
management will be too technical and scientific as outside the purview of this 
thesis. 
 
However, apart from the lack of detail in Malaysian risk assessment of 
the LMO, the next issues are the precautionary principle, public awareness 
                                   
 
 
398Conservation and Environmental Management Division, Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment Malaysia., Malaysia Interim National Report on Implementation of the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (2005) 1. 
399Conservation and Environmental Management Division, Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment Malaysia., Malaysia First National Report on Implementation of the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety (2007) 1. 
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and participation, socio-economic considerations and bioethics issues 
according to Biosafety Act 2007.  
 
Precautionary principle 
 
The precautionary principle was being reaffirmed in the preamble to 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 2000 as contained in Principle 15 of the 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development401 to ensure the safe use 
of biotechnology. Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration states that precautionary 
approach shall be applied widely to protect the environment. Where there are 
threats of severe or reversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall 
not be used as a reason to postpone cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation. 
 
According to Article 10(1) of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 2000 
lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient scientific information and 
knowledge on the extent of the potential adverse effects of a LMO on the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity to the Party of import, 
where human health risks are taken into account as well, shall not prevent 
the party from taking decision as appropriate with regard to the import, in 
order to avoid or minimise potential adverse effects. 
 
The preamble to Biosafety Act 2007 contains the precautionary 
principle that reads: 
                                   
 
 
401United Nation Environment Programme (UNEP). 'The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety' 
(2016) <https://bch.cbd.int/protocol> accessed on 1 February 2015. 
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‘…with the objectives of protecting human, plant and animal health, 
the environment and biological diversity, and where there are threats 
of irreversible damage, lack of full scientific evidence may not be used 
as a reason not to take action to prevent such damage: and  to 
provide for matter connected therewith.’ 
 
Section 35 of the Biosafety Act 2007 reads; 
‘The Board or Minister shall not be prevented from taking a decision , 
as appropriate, under Part III or Part IV , where there is lack of 
scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information and 
knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of 
living modified organisms or products of such organisms on human, 
plant and animal health, the environment and biological diversity and 
may also take into account socio-economic considerations.’ 
 
Section 35 is criticised as cannot be termed as precautionary.402 
However, a positive perception of Section 35 is that it encourages a decision-
making process that takes account of the substantial social and economic 
cost to whose livelihood may be adversely affected by the intended 
precautionary principle.403These two provisions of the same Act are 
conflicting, the former (from the preamble) seems to accord with most 
formulations of the Precautionary principle whereas the latter404lacks the 
command approach as does not command the Board or the Minister to take 
                                   
 
 
402Kwan C, 'Malaysia's Biosafety Bill-Throwing Precaution to the Wind?' [2007] 5 CLJ i 6 . 
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 Hussain&Wan, Shaik Mohd Noor Alam SM and Talaat IW, 'Precautionary Principle in the 
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appropriate action to protect against adverse effects having regard to among 
others, socio-economic considerations.405 
 
Section 35 may be perceived as an ‘attempt’ to balance between 
conservation of the environment and the livelihood of the indigenous and 
local communities who depend on the biological resources.406 
 
Public awareness and participation 
 
In the previous Chapter 2, these were the issues on public 
participation, namely:  
a) the role of the public in biosafety decision making process 
b) the justification for public involvement in biosafety 
c) the institutionalisation of the public participation  
d) the influence of the public involvement in biosafety 
e) the improvements of public participation in biosafety 
 
It is hoped that this Chapter 3 and 4 and the Conclusion chapter will be able 
to enlighten these issues. 
 
Article 23(1)(a) of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety requires parties 
public awareness, education and participation concerning the safe transfer, 
handling and use of living modified organisms in relation to the conservation 
and sustainable use of biological diversity, also taking into account risks to 
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human health. Article 23(2) requires the parties to make a public consultation 
for the release of LMO except for confidential business information and such 
information to be published. 
 
One of the criticisms is on the issue to what extent do the public 
participate in the biosafety decision-making process. It can be seen that in 
Section 14(c) of the Malaysian Biosafety Act 2007   states that the Director 
General (DG) shall for purposes of public disclosure invite public participation 
for application under Section 13 for the approval of any release activity, or 
any importation of living modified organisms. The word ‘shall’ denotes 
mandatory public participation. Section 60 of the Biosafety Act 2007 provides 
for public disclosure whereby the public may have access to such information 
relating to any application for approval, approval granted or notification, 
which has not been granted confidentiality under subsection 59(2)407 in such 
manner as the Board thinks fit. It is rightly contended that his “manner” could 
be interpreted at best, to preserve the commercial interest, if sought by the 
applicant.408 
 
The decision made under Part III409 and IV410 shall be made available 
to the public in such manner as the NBB thinks fit. Therefore the public 
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408
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opportunity to participate is limited if the information contains confidential 
business information.411 
 
The Biosafety Act 2007 does not specify the types or categories of 
public participation, which will leave the issues to the broad discretion to the 
Department of Biosafety and its Director General, also the National Biosafety 
Board and the Minister of Natural Resources and Environment. The 
advertisement by the National Biosafety Board412 on inviting public comments 
or opinions without specifying what types comment/ opinion will be taken into 
consideration. For instance, if the public has a science background will their 
opinions be taken into consideration as opposed to the more structured 
scientific GMAC Risk Assessment. If the public even has other opinions such 
as bioethical, religious or cultural views, to what extent that their views will be 
heard is also questionable. 
 
The said Act is also silent on how to conduct public consultation or 
perhaps more importantly how to factor the results of the consultation into the 
decision-making process. Thus this needs more transparency. This is among 
the cross-cutting issues as discussed above. 
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However, it is important to note here that public consultation is just 
practised in Part III application for approval but not for Part IV notification of 
LMO and GMO products. However, decisions for both approval and 
notification are published on Malaysia Biosafety Clearing House 
website413414.  
 
The public is made known of the LMO activities through newspaper 
and the Malaysia Biosafety Clearing House website.415 Guidelines on the 
public announcement are available and shall be borne by the applicant. 
 
Therefore, next question is to what extent Malaysian public respond 
and participate in this biosafety decision-making process is yet to be 
analysed. It is not clear to why Malaysian did not comment on the approval 
application. This is perhaps due to a few reasons: 
 
a) lack of knowledge or information on LMO or merely an ignorant 
attitude 
b) lack of access to the application information since it was done 
through website and newspaper 
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 Department of Biosafety, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment Malaysia. 
'Approval' (2016) <http://www.biosafety.nre.gov.my/regulatory_process/approval.shtml> 
accessed on 20 January 2016. 
414
 Department of Biosafety, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment Malaysia. 
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accessed on 20 January 2016. 
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The public participation on LMO approval was asked by a Member of 
Parliament from Parit Sulung during a questioning time during Parliamentary 
Session as to what extent the Malaysian public participate towards it and 
what are the measures taken by the government to increase the Malaysian 
interest to participate. Dato Sri Dr Haji Wan Junaidi Tuanku Jaafar416 
answered that these issues even though important have few attendees and 
does not attract public interest to attend even efforts were made to implement 
public consultation.417 
 
In short public participation can be through any of these ways namely:418 
 
a) the advisory committee especially issues on social, ethical and  also 
economic considerations whereby any member of the public should 
participate 
b) public consultation for amendment of laws, regulations and guidelines 
c) risk assessment process 
 
It seems Malaysia has already practised all of the above only it is not 
clear as how much is the Malaysian public either a bioethics expert, religious 
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 Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Home Affairs. 
417
 Parliamentary House of Representative 13th Term First Meeting No.16,Thursday 31st 
March 2016 page 11 can be found at 
http://www.parlimen.gov.my/files/hindex/pdf/DR31032016.pdf#page=10&zoom=70&search=
biokeselamatan 
418McLean MA and others, ‘A Conceptual Framework for Implementing Biosafety: Linking 
Policy, Capacity, and Regulation’ (International Service for National Agricultural Research 
(ISNAR) 2002)10. 
  
 
227 
 
 
 
scholar, lawyer, scientists, non-governmental organisation or mere layman 
have participated in the biosafety process.  
 
Analysis of Malaysian public participation from Biosafety Clearing 
House website 
 
From the Malaysia Biosafety Clearing House website, the public can 
view the country’s decision419 starting from 2010 to 2015. It is important to 
note here that the Biosafety Act was enacted in 2007 and only came into 
force in 2009. In 2010, Malaysia, for the first time, made decisions on LMO 
based on a proper legal framework, processes and appropriate procedures in 
place.420 
i) Approval for Release: For field trial 
 
On the report of the approval for field trial from 2010 up to 2015 
onwards it can be seen that there were comments received from Consumer’s 
Association of Penang (CAP) and Third World Network (TWN) and also the 
public on some technical and scientific issues. However, it was mentioned 
that the GMAC had assessed those issues through the risk assessment. The 
details of the technical and scientific issues raised were not mentioned. 
 
                                   
 
 
419
 Department of Biosafety, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment Malaysia. 
'Approval for Release For Field Trial | Food, Feed and Processing | Product of LMO' (2016) 
<http://www.biosafety.nre.gov.my/country_decision/app_plmo.shtml> accessed on 20 
January 2016. 
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 Letchumanan R and Andrew J, 'Socio-economic aspects in decision-making in the 
context of the biosafety protocol: Malaysia’s experience and case studies' (2012) 14.3 Asian 
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For better understanding of the reactions of the public and the non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), the summary of the type of project and 
events is reproduced. 
The summary of the report on those projects is as follows: 
Date of decision Project title Applicant 
5 October 2010 Limited-Mark-Release-
Recapture of Aedes 
aegypti (L.) Wild-Type 
and OX513A(My1) 
Strains 
Institute of Medical 
Research 
29 May 2013 Confined Field 
Evaluation of Delayed 
Ripening Transgenic 
Eksotika Papaya 
Malaysian Agricultural 
Research and 
Development Institute 
(MARDI) 
28 July 2015 Release of Genetically 
Modified Rubber (Hevea 
brasiliensis) Trees for 
Confined Field Trial for 
Research and 
Development Purpose 
Malaysian Rubber 
Board 
 
Table 7: Malaysia’s decision: Approval for release for field trial 
From the table, it can be concluded that there were public inputs due 
to the severity and influence of the local socio-economic issues in Malaysia 
such as the GM mosquitoes release and rubber tree as the main agricultural 
export. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
229 
 
 
 
ii) Approval for Release: For food, feed and processing 
 
Next is on approval for release for food, feed and processing it can be 
seen that in the earlier 2010 up to 2012 there were applications made, but no 
comments were received from the public. However, from 2013 up to 2015 
onwards, there were comments received from Consumer’s Association of 
Penang (CAP) and Third World Network (TWN) and also the public on some 
technical and scientific issues. However, it was only mentioned that the 
GMAC had assessed those issues through the risk assessment. 
 
The summary of the report of the event is as follows: 
 
Date acknowledged 
by NBB 
Event Applicant 
25 May 2010 MON 4032 Roundup 
Ready™ Soybean 
MON 603 Roundup 
Ready™ Maize 
MON 810 YieldGard™ 
Maize against Corn-Borer 
MON 863 YieldGard® 
Rootworm Maize 
Monsanto 
28 March 2012 SYN-Bt11-1 - YieldGard™ 
Maize 
Syngenta Crop 
Protection Sdn. Bhd. 
 ACS-GM5-3 - Herbicide-
tolerant Soybean (A2704-
12) 
Bayer Co. (Malaysia) 
Sdn. Bhd. 
27 November 2012 MON 89788 Glyphosate-
Tolerant Soybean 
(RoundupReady2Yield™) 
Monsanto Malaysia 
Sdn Bhd 
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8 January 2013 T25 herbicide-tolerant corn 
(LibertyLink® corn) 
Bayer Co. (Malaysia) 
Sdn. Bhd 
 TC1507 insect-resistant 
and herbicide-tolerant corn 
Du Pont Malaysia Sdn 
Bhd 
2 October 2013 Imidazolinone-Tolerant 
CV127 Soybean 
BASF Malaysia 
Sdn.Bhd. 
11 February 2014 Glufosinate-tolerant A5547-
127 LibertyLink® Soybean 
Bayer Co. (Malaysia) 
Sdn Bhd 
19 December 2014 Glyphosate and Isoxaflutole 
Tolerant FG72 Soybean 
Bayer Co. (Malaysia) 
Sdn Bhd 
30 April 2015 Lepidopteran-protected 
Corn MON89034 
Corn Rootworm-Protected 
and Glyphosate-Tolerant 
Corn MON88017 
Monsanto Malaysia 
Sdn Bhd 
10 March 2016 Rootworm-resistant Event 
5307 corn 
Rootworm-resistant MIR604 
corn 
Lepidopteran-resistant 
MIR162 corN 
Glyphosate-tolerant GA21 
corn 
Thermostable Event 3272 
corn 
Syngenta Crop 
Protection Sdn. Bhd. 
23 June 2016 SYHT0H2 - Soy modified 
for tolerance to Mesotrione 
and Glufosinate 
 Syngenta Crop 
Protection Sdn. Bhd. 
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 DAS-59122-7 - Herculex™ 
RW Rootworm Protection 
maize 
DuPont Malaysia Sdn. 
Bhd. 
6 October 2016 MS8RF3 Oilseed Rape  Bayer Co. (Malaysia) 
Sdn Bhd 
17 January 2017 GHB614 cotton Bayer Co. (Malaysia) 
Sdn Bhd 
30 March 2017  T304-40 cotton Bayer Co. (Malaysia) 
Sdn Bhd 
30 March 2017  LLCotton25 cotton Bayer Co. (Malaysia) 
Sdn Bhd 
30 March 2017 GHB119 cotton Bayer Co. (Malaysia) 
Sdn Bhd 
01 August 2017 305423 soybean DuPont Malaysia Sdn. 
Bhd. 
 305423 soybean Dow AgroSciences 
(Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. 
  MZHG0JG corn Syngenta Crop 
Protection Sdn. Bhd 
19 October 2017 DAS-81419-2 soybean 
DAS-44406-6 soybean 
DAS-68416-4 soybean 
Dow AgroSciences 
(Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. 
Table 8: Approval for Release: For food, feed and processing 
 
From the above, it can be concluded that there were inputs from the 
public consultation on these type of LMO due to these reasons: 
 
a) there were known benefits and risks of these soybean, cotton, 
corns (which were already explained in the previous Introductory 
Chapter) 
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b) there were also herbicide and tolerant characteristics which 
benefits and risks were worrying the public  
 
This is arguably due to science publications of this LMO; the public is 
being educated on the risks and benefits thus they are raising the concerns 
for the regulator to take the necessary precautions. It can be seen from the 
reports that the government is taking the necessary steps in addressing the 
concerns such as labelling requirement, the authority to be informed of any 
spillage also the transportation required to be in secured and closed 
condition. 
 
iii) Approval for Release: For Products of LMO 
 
The earlier 2010 report was reasonably simple that it did not mention 
any public participation. The same goes for 2011 National Biosafety Board 
(NBB) report. However, this time the report was far more comprehensive 
than before. In 2012, there was public consultation on GM Carnation done, 
but no comments were received from the public. The same happened for 
2014 report whereby there was again no comment received from the public. 
Interestingly enough in 2015, there were some feedbacks received from the 
public on some technical and scientific issues. However, it was mentioned 
that those issues had been assessed by the GMAC through the risk 
assessment. It seems that from the website only one (1) application for GM 
products is received each year since its establishment. Moreover, there was 
no such application in 2013.  
The summary is as follows: 
Date decision 
acknowledged by NBB 
Product name Applicant 
25 May 2010 ISP type III HPLC 12 
Glacein™ 
Unilever Malaysia 
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26 July 2011 MOUSTICIDE™ 
Wettable Powder (WP) 
and MOUSTICIDE™ 
Rice Husk (RH) 
EntoGenex Industries 
Sdn. Bhd. 
27 November 2012 Cut flowers of 
genetically modified 
carnation, Dianthus 
caryophyllus L. 
Suntory Holdings Ltd. 
29 April 2014 Single Cell Protein 
(SCP), Liquid Fertilizer 
and Solid Fertilizers 
 
 
 
CJ Bio Malaysia Sdn 
Bhd 
17 February 2015 TMOF_Yeast (to 
produce Mousticide RH 
& Mousticide WP) and 
Mousticide WP (for 
Release) 
Entogenex Industries 
Sdn Bhd 
Table 9: Approval for Release: For Products of LMO 
However, it interesting to note here on the particular case of field trial 
on the GM mosquitoes in 2010421 in Bentong and Alor Gajah, Malaysia. From 
the NBB report, it was mentioned that concerns raised by the public were 
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 National Biosafety Board, Application for Approval for Limited Mark-Release Recapture of 
Aedes Aegypti Wild Type and Aedes Aegypti Genetically Modified Mosquitoes Ox513a(My1) 
(, 5 October 2010) 1. 
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addressed and taken into consideration when making the decision. It is noted 
that residents from the field trial site were engaged in public awareness 
activities and information about the field trial was made available. Besides, 
socioeconomic consideration was included such as the number of deaths 
moreover the cost of medication due to dengue fever. 
 
The first release was conducted in January 2011 at an uninhabited 
site in Bentong. However, concerns have been raised by numerous bodies of 
NGO as the announcements to the public were posted on Malaysian 
Biosafety Clearing House website and published twice in a small section of 
two leading local newspapers.422 Not all the public especially those who were 
living nearby have limited access to the information on the website and the 
newspaper. The local communities in Bentong and Alor Gajah were not part 
of the mandatory consultations before the approval was made by the Board 
and this suggests lack of transparency of the NBB and attracted considerable 
criticisms from the consumer association, the environmentalists and the 
public.423 
 
Despite these criticisms, in fact, there were efforts made by the 
Director-General of the Department of Biosafety whereby a survey carried 
out by the Department of Biosafety in 2011 with about 1500 target 
participants indicated that more than 50 percent supported the release of GM 
mosquitoes. Though it was a small survey, the result was useful to reflect 
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 Idris SH, Majeed ABA and Hamin Z, 'Public engagement in biosafety decision-making 
process: Appraising the law in Malaysia' (ICIMTR 2012 - 2012 International Conference on 
Innovation, Management and Technology Research 2012) 375. 
423
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that people are not entirely against GM mosquitoes. This can be easily 
rationalised as those affected by death cases arising from Dengue would 
surely like the problems solved.424 
 
On the other hand, it is important to note here the eagerness to 
accommodate for public participation must be balanced with the fact that 
socio-economic considerations in the decision making based on detailed 
analysis is indeed tricky, time-consuming and an expensive job. Parties have 
their sovereign right to decide what is appropriate to their society based on 
facts in hand.425  
 
This is quite a debatable issue in Malaysia and needs to be rectified 
by learning what has been done by other countries to get public confidence 
especially in cases of release of LMO involving the local community. 
 
Again the issue is to what extent a public dialogue even being held in 
the first place and how productive is the public dialogue and how useful is the 
public dialogue as the medium taking into account that the dialogues will 
range from concerns, worries and informed information on the effects of LMO 
and GM technologies. Another issue is how much issues of ethical, legal and 
social implications have been discussed in the Malaysian context of the 
biosafety either in general or in relation to specific GM or LMO products as 
discussed above. 
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The right of confidentiality of the applicant is balanced by the right of 
public disclosure as stipulated in section 59 of the Biosafety Act 2007. Failure 
to comply with this may result in a fine not exceeding RM10, 000 or to 
imprisonment under section 59(5) for a term not exceeding one month or to 
both. 
 
In the general discussion of ethical, legal and social implications of 
LMO much have been written by the academics as have been discussed 
previously, however there is still little discussion in the Malaysian context. 
While an academic should be increased to educate people awareness on 
biosafety; this should be balanced with the upcoming campaign against LMO, 
GM and GM technology which can hamper the growth of modern 
biotechnology research and development in Malaysia thus failing the 
Malaysian ambition to generate economic growth based on modern 
biotechnology products. 
 
Analysis of public awareness and participation in Malaysian 
compliance report 
 
From the recent Malaysian compliance report426 towards Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety,427 it is shown that Malaysia has established the 
                                   
 
 
426Department of Biosafety, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment Malaysia, 'Third 
National Report on the implementation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety' (2017) 
<https://bch.cbd.int/database/record.shtml?documentid=109107> accessed on 20 January 
2017. 
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mechanism for public consultation in the biosafety decision-making 
process.428 For release activities, public consultation is mandatory as it is 
advertised in major local newspapers.429 The summary of the results taken 
on LMO is published430 in national websites such as Malaysia Biosafety 
Clearing House, newspaper, mailing lists and social media.431 Malaysia has 
also made the efforts either offline or online to educate the public on LMO. 
The Department of Biosafety for instance published education kits, flyers, 
newsletter, posters and booklet in different languages for different target 
groups on issues of biosafety.432 
 
While a lot could be done to address on the inadequacies of public 
awareness and participation, it is important to note here that a lot has been 
achieved since the Biosafety Act 2007. In the Report,433 Malaysia did not 
even consult the public and made the biosafety information available to the 
public as there is no legal requirement to do so at that time. The 
establishment of Biosafety Act 2007 had changed that Malaysian public 
participation position. 
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 The absence of a domestic law makes the participation of the public 
very much limited before 2007.434 As one of the members of GMAC during 
that time was a member of an NGO, it was said that in a way Malaysia took 
public participation into account. However, in those issues, it was admitted by 
Malaysia that it is not a total substitution for public participation.435 The mass 
media at that time played a role in raising the Malaysian public awareness on 
biosafety issues which can be further enhanced with the participation of more 
stakeholders.436 
 
The socio economic considerations, ethics, bioethics, religious and 
cultural 
 
Socio-economic considerations 
 
The socio-economic considerations as have been discussed in the 
earlier chapter was from Article 26 of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
2000. Hence it raises the issues as to what extent Malaysian biosafety laws 
recognised the inclusion of cultural issues. 
 
Socio-economic considerations is contained in Section 35 of the 
Biosafety Act 2007 whereby the Board or Minister may also take into account 
socio-economic considerations. However, the definition of socio-economic 
considerations is not mentioned anywhere in the Act. 
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Nevertheless, in Biosafety (Approval and Notification) Regulations 2010 
lays down general guideline on the socio-economic considerations. 
According to Regulation 25, the Minister or the Board may consider – 
 
a) the changes in the existing social and economic patterns and means 
of livelihood of the communities that are likely to be affected by the 
introduction of the living modified organisms or products of such 
organisms; 
b) the effects of the religion, social, cultural and ethical values of 
communities arising from the use or release of the living modified 
organisms or products of such organisms. 
 
Therefore we can see here that there are two (2) significant aspects of 
socio-economic considerations that are taken into account namely: 
a) social and economic patterns and means of livelihood of the 
communities 
b) religion, social, cultural and ethical values of communities. 
 
From the above discussion, it seems that the Biosafety (Approval and 
Notification) Regulations 2010 recognises the inclusion of religion and culture 
also ethical values of communities. 
 
However, it seems that it further Guidelines are needed either by the 
National Bioethics Council and Department of Islamic Advancement of 
Malaysia (JAKIM) on the religion, social, cultural and ethical issues. The 
National Bioethics Council should, for instance, be represented by the views 
of other religions as well such as Christian, Buddhists, Hindus including the 
Bumiputeras (native tribes) of Sabah and Sarawak.   
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Although the Regulations 2010 has expended this consideration 
further, it seems it is still insufficient to create a framework of parameters for 
comprehensive socio-economic analysis. This provision could be of use later 
especially about the native of Sabah, Sarawak and the jungle which are 
inhabited by the ‘orang asli’ (aborigine in Malaysia) when products from the 
jungle that have commercial value but have to compete for the GM products. 
The same can happen to the small-scale farmer that produce domestic or 
export agriculture products in various parts of Malaysia. Therefore this socio-
economic considerations has to be taken into consideration by the biosafety 
decision-maker.     
 
As mentioned earlier, Malaysia is rich in biodiversity, and its economy 
is very much dependant on agriculture product mainly palm oil and rubber. 
Therefore any introduction of LMO and GMOs that are specifically related to 
products that are produced in Malaysia are subjected to rigorous biosafety 
decision-making process. 
In Malaysia, socio-economic considerations may become very 
important if the plantation industry of the primary commodities like oil palm, 
rubber, cocoa and others migrate into LMO options of high productivity or 
high value-added products at some stage. The smallholders will then face 
problems of having to compete with plantations owners in selling their non-
LMO products. However, such problems may be resolved based on current 
experiences in related sectors.437 
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the biosafety protocol: Malaysia’s experience and case studies' (2012) 14(3) Asian 
Biotechnol Dev Rev 19. 
  
 
241 
 
 
 
 
Thus it raises the further issue in the future if the LMO affect the social 
and economic livelihood of the local and indigenous people; the option not to 
include socio-economic considerations will stir up problems. Thus the 
decision-makers will have to be more cautious as in that case as it might be 
injurious to the country’s economy in the illustrated case mentioned above. 
 
However in the case of importing of grains whereby Malaysia so far 
approved the importing of 6 types of grains. As these grains are not able to 
grow in Malaysia, the socio-economic considerations are said to be remote 
whereby they are only for food, feed and processing and is not to be used as 
planting material. As corn is grown in some parts of Malaysia, the growth of 
spilt GM grains during transportation may pose contamination though the 
probability is very low. These grains are subjected to Malaysian rules and 
regulation such as labelling, regular reports of spillage etc. As the country is 
still at the infancy level of modern biotechnology development, so far 
Malaysia has not come across any socio-economic situations in the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity as highlighted by MacKenzie 
and others (2003).438 
 
The most controversial perhaps on these socio-economic issues 
related to public participation was in the case of the release of GM-type 
Aedes mosquitoes in Pahang. In that case in the National Biosafety Board 
report it was stated that the consistently growing socio-economic problems 
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arising from the increasing death cases caused by dengue fever from Yellow 
Fever Mosquito (Aedes aegypti) in Malaysia and many parts of the world and 
the fact that country may partly own the intellectual property right of the 
innovations support the release of GM mosquitoes into the wild jungle in 
Pahang.439 
 
It is interesting to note here that like the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety, the Biosafety Act 2007 also used the term ‘may’ in considering 
socio-economic issues. Thus this show options available in socio-economic 
considerations as opposed to mandatory scientific risk assessment and 
management.  
 
 
Ethics and bioethics issues 
 
Ethics, as defined earlier in the Introductory Chapter, is the way how 
people make decisions and lead their lives usually derived from religious 
belief, philosophies and cultures.440 Bioethics is the more specific, relevant 
and direct moral issues associated with life science, especially modern 
biotechnology.441 
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 Bioethics consideration is closely related with socio-economic 
considerations as it is one of the factors considered according to Regulation 
25 of the Biosafety (Approval and Notification) Regulations 2010 as it 
touches on the religion, social, cultural and ethical values of communities as 
mentioned above. Bioethical concerns should be part of the Act to assist 
decision-making process to formulate more informed policy and to improve 
stakeholders’ abilities to make a judgement about what is right and wrong 
with biotechnology.442 The term bioethics must be defined to avoid 
uncertainty.443 The term ‘ethics’ according to Biosafety Act 2007 is not 
defined by scope thus caused vagueness.444 According to Malaysia Biosafety 
Act 2007 the National Biosafety Board after having considered the 
recommendations of Genetic Modification Advisory Committee (GMAC), the 
comments of the relevant department or agency referred to, views of a 
member of the public, the Board may approve release and import.445 It 
seems here there is no room for bioethics consideration as the GMAC report 
is purely scientific. Thus this is inconsistent with the 2007 Act and in some 
ways do not promote the objectives of the protectionist principles of this 
law.446  
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Bioethics issues even still at the development stage in Malaysia 
gained prominence as mentioned in the earlier part of this chapter after the 
National Biotechnology Policy 2005 (NBP). The establishment of National 
Bioethics Council lays out government strategies and plans for the 
biotechnology industry. Later it is to be seen that bioethics apart from 
biotechnology industry ethical issues is also part of medical ethics concerns. 
The bioethics issue in biosafety decision-making process is yet perhaps other 
relevant advice447 to be given to NBB other than scientific and technical 
issues. 
 
However, if the relevant department or agency such as National 
Bioethics Council and Department of Islamic Advancement of Malaysia 
(JAKIM) referred to and the public gives bioethics input only then bioethics 
consideration will be taken into account. Nevertheless, it is also unclear 
whether the public could raise any bioethical concerns in their involvement in 
public participation under section 149 (c) as there is no precise definition of 
public participation in the said Act.448 
 
Other countries such as the European Union,449 Korea450 and 
Norway451  have provisions specifically include bioethics whereby GM 
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assessments must be based on scientific evidence as well as ethical 
consideration. For example in Norway even though the law does not explicitly 
define the scope of bioethics, nevertheless the law has a clear stance on 
ethics.452 
 
The bioethical issue even though is relatively new in Malaysia is 
pertinent in the biosafety legal framework. If litigation ensues due to claims of 
actions against bioethical principles, this is going to be a weak method of 
resolution453 because “judicial decisions, once made, become precedent and 
thus have a normative effect on the actions and conduct of citizens other 
than those before the court in the present controversy”.454 Thus, scope and 
role of bioethics need to be spelt out in the legal framework to prevent future 
litigation suit.455 
 
Perhaps to the biotechnology industry, the inclusion of bioethical 
consideration will provide hurdles to the business as it might delay production 
of beneficial products. However, it is agreed that this consideration must be 
balanced with biotechnology development. It is rightly argued that the 
bioethical consideration must be transparent, well-defined and understood by 
all stakeholders and actors in the biotechnology industry. However, the writer 
                                                                                                   
 
 
451Idris SH, Wei Chang L and Baharuddin A, 'Biosafety Act 2007: Does It Really Protect 
Bioethical Issues Relating To GMOS' (2013)(S26.4) Journal of agricultural and 
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further argues that the Biosafety Act 2007 must adequately accommodate 
safety issues raised by GMOs and in doing so restore public confidence 
through bioethical consideration.456 Conversely, it is submitted that perhaps 
‘safety’ issues is not the right word to use but ‘perception of safety’ to the 
public as safety can be scientifically proven. Therefore it is rightly contended 
that Biosafety Act 2007 in this respect the ambiguity of bioethical aspect in 
some ways might defeat its role which was initially intended to achieve.457 
 
It should be agreed that approval in adherence to biosafety law does 
not mean that it is free from risks. GM approval worryingly could lead to 
further bioethical issues on rights of farmers to farm conventional food and 
consumers’ right to choose non-GM products.458 Therefore the issues of 
labelling of GM products are of importance in Malaysia for consumers should 
resolve that particular issue. Thus scientific and ethical consideration should 
be assessed collectively in any LMO application.459 
 
Religious and cultural issues on LMO in Malaysia  
 
Apart from the general bioethical issues discussed worldwide, the 
same issues apply to Malaysia. The composition of Malaysian ethnics has 
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been elaborated in Chapter 1. While the Islamic law ruling only affects the 
Muslims, the Buddhists and Hindus, some who are vegetarians or vegans 
with the strict dietary requirement should be considered as well. Therefore 
the non-consumption of animal origins in their food will also be observed just 
as the Muslims non-consumption of pork and liquor also non-slaughtered 
animals. Furthermore, Malaysians are cautious and sensitive in food 
consumption related to religious, cultural and dietary requirement. 
 
As the majority of the population in Malaysia are Muslims, therefore, 
bioethical issues in relation to genetically modified organisms are mainly 
related to the rulings in the Islamic law. However, the application and the 
enforcement of Islamic Law is not uniform throughout the country due to its 
unique Islamic legal history. Historically the states in Malaysia before 
Malaysia under various colonialisms were ruled by their Sultan (Islamic ruler) 
following Shafie Mazhab (Shafie School of thoughts).  Islamic law in Malaysia 
after 1963 is under List II460 i.e. the jurisdiction of the state rather than the 
federal government. Therefore, any Islamic rulings (‘fatwa’) of the Islamic 
scholar (Mufti or ‘fatwa council’) legally is only applicable to that particular 
state. The ruling of the  National Fatwa Committee has no legal force to all 
Muslims in Malaysia only unless each state gazettes it. However as good 
practising Muslims, regardless the fatwa comes from the National Fatwa 
Committee or the State Fatwa Authority, they just need to follow their faith 
and conscience.  
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Apart from the local Malaysian fatwa, a Muslim also observes 
international fatwa discussed by international contemporary Muslim scholars 
and the old school scholars as the consumption of genetically modified 
products is a new issue, not a traditional issue affecting Muslim consumers. 
Therefore the Islamic ruling on this GM products is not directly based on the 
two main sources of Islamic law, i.e. the Quran and Al-Hadith (Prophet 
Muhammad’s sayings), but more on the Islamic scholar opinions but still 
based on the Quran and Al-Hadith subject to some Islamic rulings and 
methodology and in-depth study. 
 
According to the National Fatwa Committee,461 they take note that the 
genetically modified goods are sources from ‘halal’ (permissible to consume) 
and ‘non-halal’ (non-permissible to consume) origins either from animals or 
plants that provide the required characteristics of food or medicine. On this 
issue, Islam takes the view that Muslim ummah (people) should consume 
toiyyibah (good) food that is halal, pure and not harmful to human spirit and 
mind and the production process should not be detrimental to human health 
and the environment. Thus the genetically modified products that are not 
permissible according to Islamic law, and the production process that will 
cause harm to human health and environment is not permissible. On the 
other hand, the use of halal livestock is permissible if it is slaughtered by the 
methods allowed under the Shari’ah (Islamic law). Therefore, the GM 
products that contain pork or alcohol will not be permissible to consume. The 
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same is the case if the product of cow or goat that is not slaughtered 
according to Shari’ah is not permissible to be consumed. The same happens 
if the process of GM will cause environmental damage or destroy human life. 
Thus this is also not permissible in Islam. 
 
Thus we can see that the Islamic ruling on GM food towards the 
Muslims is quite strict as they concern on the effect of non-halal ingredients 
and non-permissible GM process. Apart from this ruling, JAKIM has the 
power to issue a certificate of ‘halal’ (permissible to consume) throughout 
Malaysia. Although there is no mandatory ‘halal’ labelling on all food products 
in Malaysia as it is a multiracial country, the companies knowing the majority 
of consumers in Malaysia are Muslims usually seeks for this ‘halal’ certificate 
even multinational companies such as McDonald, Pizza Hut, and KFC etc. 
This is obviously for business strategy and profit. For them to obtain the 
‘halal’ certificate, they have to fulfil specific requirements such as the non-
halal ingredients are not allowed, the slaughtering according to Islamic 
principles etc. Thus, apart from halal labelling that is usually observed by 
food producers, the GM labelling perhaps put a bit more burden on them. 
However, it is believed that regardless whether they like it or not, they have 
to abide or else they will lose their profitable chance of business. 
 
If the LMO affects the religion, social, cultural and ethical values of 
communities thus it calls for the empowerment of the National Bioethics 
Council and other related institutions. Malaysia by the Federal Constitution 
(as the highest law of the land) is a religious state. The religious issues could 
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not just be ignored even in biosafety and related issues. As stated earlier, 
Malaysia is multiracial thus multi-religious and multicultural country. Hence, 
government must take racial and religious sensitiveness into account.  
Therefore, this step is regarded as ‘highly desirable’462 to include those 
sentiments. 
 
It then provokes another issue, if Malaysia were to include socio-
economic considerations such as cultural factors and broader issues than the 
Protocol, will it contradict Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety as being too 
protective of its national law. It is argued that consistent with Article 2(1) of 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety that ‘Each Party shall take necessary 
and appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement its 
obligations under this Protocol.’ If the measures of the Malaysian government 
are to include cultural factor is a necessary measure, this should be justified. 
Article 2(2) also provides Malaysia shall ensure the manner of handling of 
LMO is to prevent or reduce the risks to biological diversity, also taking into 
account risks to human health, in the Malaysian context and unique to 
Malaysia. If it affects the Malaysian biodiversity and human health again, this 
could be another good reason for inclusion.  
 
Article 2(4) of the CPB - that expressly allows countries to ‘take action 
that is more protective … than that called for in this Protocol, provided that 
such action is consistent with the objective and the provisions of this Protocol 
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and is by that Party‘s obligations under international law’.463 Thus it is rightly 
argued that the questions not be whether the law is broader whether it 
adequately protects the biodiversity and human health.464 Section 35 
however, states that in case of scientific uncertainty ‘due to insufficient 
relevant scientific information and knowledge regarding the extent of the 
potential adverse effects of LMO or products of such organisms on human, 
plant and animal health, the environment and biological diversity and may 
also take into account socio-economic considerations’. This seems to allow 
the 2007 Act to deal with potential adverse effects of LMO or its products on 
human, plant and animal health and biological diversity as well. This is in 
sharp contrast to the Article 26 which seems to limit consideration of socio-
economic directly linked to an impact on biodiversity only.465 Thus this 
explains the other indirectly related to biosafety laws, regulations and 
guidelines which seem to integrate all these connecting essential elements in 
Malaysian biosafety regulations. Thus socio-economic considerations in 
Biosafety in Malaysia is of broader application and may be considered in 
case of scientific uncertainty. 
 
Handling, Transport, Packaging and Identification of GM products 
 
Malaysia is to handle, transport,466 package and identify the LMO 
according to international standard and procedures as required by Article 18, 
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but nothing similar is found in Biosafety Act 2007.467 Due to the bioethical 
issues that are closely related to the consumers’ belief, religious, cultural and 
perception, there were calls for mandatory labelling of GM products. In 
Malaysia there is provision for mandatory food labelling for GM product 
perhaps after several calls from non-governmental organisation468 and 
consumer groups on the safety and effects of those LMO on human health, 
animals and environment. US government for instance when negotiating the 
Federal Trade Agreements (FTA) with Malaysia, opposed the measure, 
fearing that it would hinder US imports.469  
 
While there are arguments for pro mandatory and voluntary labelling 
such the EU and the US respectively, Malaysia opted for mandatory labelling. 
The mandatory labelling is provided by section 61 of the Biosafety Act 2007 
that states all LMO and GM products ‘…shall be identified and labelled in a 
manner to be prescribed’ also in addition to any other written law. This will 
not just reflect consumers’ choice also the consumers’ right to know whatever 
they are consuming regardless of what their belief or stance on GM food 
consumption. This is strictly related to ethics towards the consumers. 
However, perhaps, more importantly, there are significant scientific 
uncertainties on the safety of those GM products.470 
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Malaysia is one of the 64 countries that provides for mandatory 
labelling of GM products.471472 However the mandatory labelling threshold 
higher than 3%.473 The labelling requirement can be seen in Food 
Regulations 1985, amended in 2010 (Ministry of Health, MOH).474  
 
a) Approval (regulation 3A) 
b) Labelling [ regulation 11(3A), 11(6), 11(7a-e) 
 
These regulations were enforced in July 2014.  
 
Regulation 11(3A) states that the origin of food and food ingredients 
obtained through modern biotechnology shall be stated as follows:’…gene 
derived from (common name of such animal). ’Thus this Regulation is of 
useful information for those who are Muslim, Hindus or vegetarian who is 
forbidden from consuming any relevant types of animals.  
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Regulation 11(6) state that the origin of food and food ingredients 
obtained through modern biotechnology shall be stated as follows: ‘…gene 
derived from (origin)’ also a statement indicating that the food may cause 
hypersensitivity;475also (5) listing out them as cereal, nut, fish, egg and milk. 
This is particularly useful to those who have allergies to that food. 
 
Regulation 11(7) states that for food and food ingredients obtained 
through modern biotechnology shall be labelled as follows: 
 
a. in the case of food and food ingredients are composed of or 
contains genetically modified organisms, the words “genetically 
modified (name of the ingredient)” shall appear on the label; 
b. in the case of food and food ingredients are produced from, but 
does not contain genetically modified organisms, the words 
“produced from genetically modified (name of the ingredient)” 
shall appear on the label; 
 
In short, the product needs to be labelled as contains ‘Genetically 
Modification’ and specifying the name of the ingredient for composed or 
contained also produced from. 
 
Labelling is also related to precautionary principle whereby the 
consumer is taking precaution in choosing whether or not to consume the 
GM products.476Thus is agreed that the mandatory labelling requirement by 
Malaysia is justified.477 Labelling perhaps argued as a non- scientific 
biosafety measure, however, should be justified due to respecting public 
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choices exercises due to ethical, bioethics, religious and cultural views. This 
is done partly perhaps for public acceptance of the LMO. Again another issue 
is that labelling of LMO is only for food but not LMO for FPP.478 Thus, 
whether Malaysian like it or not, or more precisely whether they realise it or 
not, they have already consumed them, since less than 3% GM ingredient 
does not need labelling also LMO for FPP. 
 
Labelling also raises issues of compliance, monitoring and public 
education. The Malaysian public level of awareness it seems according to the 
previous study varied directly with the level of specialised education. 
Scientists, biologists, students, and others involved in the modern 
biotechnology field tended to be more acquainted with GM foods than other 
members of the society479480. 
 
Liability and redress 
 
Liability and redress is stated in Article 27 mentions that the 
Conference of Parties (COP) serves as Meeting of Parties (MOP) adopt a 
process of appropriate elaboration of international rules and procedures in 
the field of liability and redress for damage resulting from transboundary 
movements of living modified organisms, analysing and taking due account 
of the ongoing processes in international law on these matters, and shall 
                                   
 
 
478
 Chan K, (2016) Malaysia Biosafety Act 2007 and Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: A 
critical comparative analysis 8. 
479Latifah Amin and others, ‘Public attitude towards modern biotechnology’ (2011a) African 
Journal of Biotechnology, 10(58), 12409. 
480
 ibid. 
  
 
256 
 
 
 
endeavour to complete this process within four years. In its decision BS-V/11, 
the COP-MOP adopted The Nagoya – Kuala Lumpur Supplementary 
Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety by 
providing international rules and procedures in the field of liability and redress 
relating to living modified organisms.481 
 
In the event of damage, Parties shall require the appropriate operators 
to: 
 
(a) Immediately inform the competent authority; 
(b) Evaluate the damage; and 
(c) Take appropriate response measures.482 
 
Thus the competent authority shall: 
 
(a) Identify the operator which has caused the damage; 
(b) Evaluate the damage; and 
(c) Determine which response measures should be taken by the 
operator.483 
 The parties in developing civil liability shall address inter alia  
(a) Damage; 
(b) Standard of liability, including strict or fault-based liability; 
(c) Channeling of liability, where appropriate; 
                                   
 
 
481Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety art 2. 
482ibid art 5(1). 
483ibid art 5(2). 
  
 
257 
 
 
 
(d) Right to bring claims.484 
 
However, to date, Malaysia has not yet regulated nor implemented the 
liability and redress provision as Malaysia has not signed and ratified The 
Nagoya – Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. In the standard of liability, Malaysia 
advocates adopting strict liability.485Strict liability may also be one way of 
operationalising the Precautionary Principle which governs the critical 
elements of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.486 
 
Other biosafety related laws, regulations and guidelines and indirectly 
related to biosafety 
 
Apart from the primary biosafety laws and regulations namely the 
Biosafety Act 2007 and the Biosafety Regulation 2010, there are other 
biosafety and indirectly related laws, regulations and guidelines. As the 
names suggested, these regulations are the regulating of their respective 
areas which are shown as follows:  
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Table 10: Malaysian Rules and Regulations on Biosafety 
 
The Biosafety Act is the enabling Act that gives the power to make the 
later Biosafety Approval Regulation 2010. The latter derived its jurisdiction 
from the parent Biosafety Act 2007. The Acts and Regulation (either related 
or indirectly related to biosafety) are hard laws that have binding legal force. 
The Guidelines, on the other hand, are soft laws that are not legally binding 
only guidance on practices.487 It is essential for LMO from research and 
development to product commercialisation to follow regulatory compliant 
practices.488 This is pertinent to gain public confidence for the safety benefits 
of human health and the environment. Even though termed as ‘Guidelines’, 
these instruments are regulatory compliant practices whereby it detailed out 
an acceptable standard that should be followed in that field of practice. 
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i. Protection of New Plant Varieties Act 2004 (PNPVA) 
ii. Guidelines of Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC): Use of Living Modified Organism
and Related Material, 2007 
iii. Guidelines for Contained Use Activity of Living Modified Organism 
iv. Exemption under S68 of Biosafety Act 
v. User's Guide to the Malaysian Biosafety Act and Regulations 
vi. Biosafety Guidelines: Confined Field Trial of Living Modified Plants in Malaysia 
vii. Biosafety Guidelines: Environmental Risk Assessment of Genetically Modified Plants in 
Malaysia 
viii. Biosafety Guidelines: Risk Assessment of Genetically Modified Microorganisms 
ix. Control of Drugs and Cosmetics Regulations 1984 (Amendment 2009) 
x. Animals Act 1953 
xi. Guidelines on Labelling Of Foods And Food Ingredients Obtained Through Modern 
Biotechnology (Regulations 11(3a), 11(6) And 11(7), Food Regulations 1985) 
xii. Malaysia Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity Policy and Guideline 2015 
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The Biosafety Guidelines: Environmental Risk Assessment of 
Genetically Modified Plants in Malaysia (ERA Guidelines) as mentioned 
above is essential for release into the environment for trial purpose. For 
contained use, however, is used as a framework which helps in the decision-
making as to whether such an application should be approved or rejected.489 
  
Some Guidance Note is to guide and support the Regulations. For 
instance Guidance on Classification is to guide for Control of Drugs and 
Cosmetics Regulations 1984 (Amendment 2009) and Guidelines on Labelling 
of Foods and Food Ingredients Obtained Through Modern Biotechnology is 
to support the Food Regulations 1985 for food labelling.  
 
The indirect acts to biosafety laws, regulations and guidelines such as 
Animal Act 1953, Protection of New Plant Varieties Act 2004  (PNPVA), 
Control of Drugs and Cosmetics Regulations 1984 (Amendment 2009) for 
example, beside regulating the conventional  animals, pharmaceutical 
products and new plants are regulating the jurisdiction respectively if they 
contain LMO as well. These laws are consistent with Section 2 of the national 
Biosafety Act 2007 that states that it is to be read together with other laws. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, as matter compliance towards Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety Malaysia has enacted the relevant Biosafety Act 2007 and later 
formulated the Biosafety Regulations 2010 as the primary laws and 
regulations on biosafety. It can be concluded that overall perspective that 
Malaysia Biosafety Act 2007 is consistent with the Protocol.490 Apart from 
these laws, there were other related or indirectly related to biosafety laws 
such as biodiversity, food safety, animals, etc. From the long title of the 
Biosafety Act 2007, it can be seen that the ‘objectives of protecting human, 
plant and animal health, the environment and biological diversity.’ Thus this 
could provide a basis for future amendments for a more comprehensive 
biosafety laws not just on environmental biosafety but other aspects of 
biosafety as stated above. The position of the Malaysian biosafety law as of 
today is that the laws on human, plant and animal health even though relates 
on LMO are on the existing Acts and Regulations respectively with 
amendments to include LMO as well.  
 
The present research aims to examine the Malaysian   background in 
signing Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety by analysing the relevant policies. 
This study also scrutinises the crucial elements of the biosafety conceptual 
framework. The primary goal of the current study is to analyse Malaysian 
legal framework in compliance towards the most critical Key Protocol issues. 
This study has found that Malaysia has complied with those Key Protocol 
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issues and the only issue is the breadth and depth of its laws. Thus critics 
that said Malaysia biosafety exceeds its minimum requirement as compared 
to Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety491 are unjustified. At this juncture it can 
be safely concluded that the existing Malaysian current legal framework on 
biosafety laws lack cohesion and have a lot of rooms for improvement. There 
are still some key issues that need to be further developed for the future 
capacity building of biosafety law in Malaysia. This is the first study to 
compile the overall most crucial biosafety issues in Malaysia. 
Notwithstanding the relatively limited data sample, this work offers valuable 
insights into the existing biosafety legal framework. These findings suggest 
several courses of action for recommendations of future stronger biosafety 
law.  
 
As this chapter focus on the legal framework, next chapter will discuss 
the institutional framework that implements the existing laws, regulations and 
guidelines. The next Chapter 4 will complement the analysis in Chapter 3 in 
line with the aim of the study to examine the vital institutional aspects of 
Malaysia’s biosafety implementation for future improvements. 
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CHAPTER 4 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE MALAYSIAN INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
BIOSAFETY REGULATION 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The previous Chapter 3 analyses the Malaysian legal biosafety 
framework towards compliance to Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 
Countries that signed the Protocol applied various strategies for 
implementing its legal and institutional framework such as having an expert 
advisory committee, independent risk assessment committee, the inclusion of 
ethics committee and many more.  
 
This chapter is focusing on the Malaysian approach on institutional 
biosafety framework to complement the legal framework with references to 
the existing rules and regulations as stated in Chapter 3. It is important to 
analyse the various biosafety institutions that are involved directly or 
indirectly and practically on the biosafety decision-making process. The 
chapter also tries to examine the Malaysia regulatory strategy in the biosafety 
decision-making process which enables to find loopholes in its 
implementation with a view to improve on its institutional structure. This 
chapter is closely related to Chapter 3 that provides the legal basis for the 
institutional biosafety framework in Malaysia.    
 
2. Malaysian institutional framework to implement Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety 
 
Malaysia’s policy on biodiversity and biotechnology as part of the 
action plans had led Malaysia established a committee on biosafety that 
includes representatives from the environment, health and research fields, 
and keep abreast of developments in this field in the international arena. 
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Malaysia then apart from that, established enforcement unit on biosafety 
within an appropriate government department. Training programs in biosafety 
management and practice were developed. 
 
Malaysia institutional framework on biosafety 
In Malaysia the institutions responsible for land biodiversity issues and 
related to biosafety is illustrated in Table 11 below: 492
 Referral institution 
Key referral agency 
Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment (until 2004) 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (from 2004 
onwards) 
Subsidiary referral agency 
Institute of Biodiversity 
National Council for Biodiversity and Biotechnology 
Genetic Modification Advisory Committee 
Sabah Biodiversity Centre 
Sabah Biodiversity Council 
National Biosafety Board 
 
Table 11: Referral institutions responsible for land biodiversity issues in Malaysia 
between 2000-2010 
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Department of Biosafety 
National Biosafety Board        
Genetic Modification Advisory Committee (GMAC) 
Table 12: Leading institutions responsible for biosafety issues in Malaysia  
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment Malaysia 
Malaysian Department of Biosafety 
Department of Veterinary Services 
National Pharmaceutical Control Bureau 
Food Safety and Quality Division, Ministry of Health 
Table 13: Competent national authority on biosafety493 
The Malaysian institution on biosafety has been established to 
accommodate the biosafety laws, regulations and guidelines that were 
established dated from the national Biosafety Act 2007. 
The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOSTE) was the earlier 
ministry that was involved in the drafting of Biosafety Act 2007. However, 
later it was the Ministry of Natural Resources (NRE) that took the lead in the 
biosafety decision making process after the Biosafety Act 2007 came into 
force. 
The three (3) leading institutions in biosafety, namely as follows: 
 
a) National Biosafety Board (NBB)  
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265 
 
 
 
b) Genetic Modification Advisory Committee (GMAC)  
c) Department of Biosafety 
The Malaysian institutional biosafety framework is illustrated as follows;
 
Figure 13: Malaysian institutional biosafety framework 
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From the biosafety organisation chart, it can be seen that Minister of 
Natural Resources and Environment (NRE)494 is taking the lead in biosafety 
decision making starting from the approval for the import, export and release 
of the living modified organism (LMO) as acted upon by the National 
Biosafety Board (NBB). The Minister has the power to hear any appeals.495  
 
Mclean’s observation496 reveals that some countries have 
implemented a system of expert advisory committees, while others have 
relied primarily on scientists and professionals working within government 
agencies. In the latter approach, the mandate for risk assessment may be 
vested within a single agency exclusively tasked with regulating products of 
biotechnology (e.g., a gene technology regulator) or it may be distributed 
between agencies by their existing responsibilities (e.g., departments of 
health, agriculture and/ or environment). 
 
In general, independent advisory committees have more transparent 
accountability frameworks than government departments and agencies, 
where the range of expertise and academic credentials of risk assessors is 
rarely published. However, advisory bodies may suffer from the fact that 
committee members are part-time volunteers who cannot devote their full 
energies to risk assessments. An approach to LMO regulation whereby 
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product evaluations performed by competent scientists within a regulatory 
agency is supplemented by the results of the issue. A specific expert panel of 
consultations may combine the best of both approaches described above. 
 
i) National Biosafety Board (NBB) 
National Biosafety Board497 is the main board that is responsible for 
accepting or rejecting the living modified organism either in the research or 
importing or exporting of the living modified organism in Malaysia. NBB was 
established on 15 March 2010 after the enforcement of Biosafety Act 2007. 
The secretariat for the National Biosafety Board is the Department of 
Biosafety498 under the Ministry of Natural Resources (NRE).The Secretary-
General of Ministry NRE is the Chairman of the NBB.499  
 
The composition of the members of the NBB500 requires a 
representative from the: 
 
Figure 14: Members of the National Biosafety Board (NBB) 
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499
 Biosafety Act 2007 s4(2)(a). 
500
 ibid s(4)(2)(a). 
a) Ministry of Agriculture and Agro-based Industry; 
b) Ministry of Health; 
c) Ministry of Plantation Industry and Commodities 
d) Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs; 
e) Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
f) Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation; 
g) and not more than four other persons who have the 
knowledge or experience or both in any of the disciplines or matters relevant to 
this Act. 
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According to the existing organisation chart,501 the four other persons 
were appointed from these bodies as of today namely as follows: 
 
a) Sabah Biodiversity Centre 
b) Sarawak Biodiversity Centre 
c) University Malaya 
d) Academy of Science Malaysia 
 
These four other persons are presumably from the science discipline 
and have the relevant experience in biodiversity, also from the academic 
background. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                   
 
 
501National Biosafety Board (NBB), 'National Biosafety Board (NBB)' (2017) 
<http://www.biosafety.nre.gov.my/about/nbb.shtml> accessed on 20 January 2017. 
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Functions of NBB:502 
 
a) To decide on all applications and matters under Part III (Approval for 
Release and Import) and Part IV (Notification for export, contained use and 
import for contained use) 
b) To monitor activities relating to LMOs and products of LMOs 
c) To promote research, development, educational and training activities 
relating to biosafety 
d) To establish mechanisms to facilitate the collection, storage and 
dissemination of data relating to living modified organisms and products of such 
organisms and biosafety 
e) Where so directed by the Minister, to perform or provide for the 
performance of the obligations arising from agreements, conventions or treaties 
relating to biosafety to which Malaysia is a party where such agreements, 
conventions or treaties relate to the purposes of this Act 
Figure 15: National Biosafety Board (NBB) and its functions 
 
It was suggested that the roles and functions of NBB should be 
expanded to provide advice, resolve and manage bioethical issues in GMOs 
issues.503 This will be only effective if NBB works together with National 
Bioethics Council by legalising that Bioethics Council in the biosafety 
institutional framework. That can be achieved by amendments to the existing 
laws or regulations by having a new regulations or guidelines on bioethics. 
                                   
 
 
502
 Biosafety Act 2007 s5. 
503
 Hamin APDZ and Idris SH, 'Bioethical Issues on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) 
In Malaysia: Biting Into the Legal Protection under the Biosafety Act 2007' (2nd International 
Conference on Biotechnology and Food Science IPCBE IACSIT Press, Singapore 2011).    
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This should start by having a stance or national policy on bioethics in 
biosafety regulation.  
 
ii) Genetic Modification Advisory Committee (GMAC) 
 
The Genetic Modification Advisory Committee (GMAC)504 is the body 
that advises the NBB on the scientific risk assessment performed on the 
living modified organisms before making the decision either to accept or to 
reject the LMOs. GMAC members505 were appointed on 25th May 2010. 
GMAC is to provide scientific, technical and other relevant advice to the 
Minister or the National Biosafety Board (NBB).506 Hence primarily the 
composition of the GMAC is consists of the experts various science-based 
and other relevant disciplines. As most members of the GMAC are from the 
science background thus the scientific risk assessment is being used in 
advising the NBB. 
 
The Third World Network (TWN) as representatives from civil society 
are also included in the GMAC.507 In 1996, the GMAC published the National 
Guidelines for the Release of GMOs into the environment, which was 
developed from existing principles and documents including the UNDP 
International Technical Guidelines on Safety in Biotechnology, 1996 and the 
                                   
 
 
504
 Biosafety Act 2007 s6. 
505
 Department of Biosafety, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment Malaysia, 
'Genetic Modification Advisory Committee (GMAC)' (2016) 
<http://www.biosafety.nre.gov.my/about/gmac.shtml> accessed on 20 November 2015. 
506
 ibid. 
507Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment Malaysia, Malaysia: Capacity-
building for Implementation of  National Biosafety Framework (Project Brief PIMS 2182, 
2013) 2. 
  
 
271 
 
 
 
UNIDO Voluntary Code of Conduct for Release of Organisms into the 
Environment 1991.508  
 
 MoSTE is making the budget to implement the hiring of personnel 
within their overall institutional framework. However, training will still be 
needed, particularly for risk assessment and risk management as mentioned 
earlier in Chapter 3. 
 
It is also likely that under the previous proposed Biosafety Bill, the 
GMAC membership to include representatives of other ministries. While this 
will hopefully result in broader involvement, it also means that the need for 
capacity building will be increased at least for raising awareness among 
participating government officers.509  
 
iii) Department of Biosafety (DOB)  
 
From the organisation chart (Figure 13 above), it can be seen that 
DOB plays an essential role in the administration of biosafety in Malaysia. 
DOB was established on 24th May 2010. 
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The objective of DOB is to act as a One Stop Centre for all activities 
relating to biosafety. 
a) To implement and enforce the Biosafety Act; 
b) To be the secretariat and the operational arm of the National Biosafety 
Board (NBB); 
c) To be the secretariat of the Genetic Modification Advisory Committee 
(GMAC) and committees/sub-committees established under the NBB 
and GMAC; 
d) To monitor all activities relating to living modified organism (LMO) and 
products of such organism; 
e) To provide a platform for consultation with various parties in order to 
formulate and update policies, laws and guidelines related to biosafety; 
f) Coordinate and integrate the efforts taken by Federal Government 
agencies and State and Non-Government Organizations and the Modern 
Biotechnology Industries related to biosafety issues; 
g) Build strategic partnerships with relevant agencies within and outside 
the country in the field of biosafety;  
h) Establish mechanisms to facilitate the collection, storage and 
dissemination of data related to biosafety; 
i) Help the Government to formulate the country’s stand on the issues of 
biosafety at international forums; and 
j) Increasing public awareness on biosafety. 
 
Figure 16: Functions of the Department of Biosafety  
 
Apart from these three (3) primary bodies, there are other essential 
bodies in biosafety which are discussed as follows; 
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a) Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) 
 
The NBB may direct that any organisation that undertakes modern 
biotechnology research and development to establish an Institutional 
Biosafety Committee (IBC). 
The purposes of the establishment of IBC are as follows:510 
 
Figure 17: IBC purposes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                   
 
 
510
 Biosafety (Approval and Notification) Regulations 2010 reg 5(1). 
(a) to provide guidance for safe use of modern biotechnology;  
(b) to monitor activities dealing with modern biotechnology; 
(c) establishing and monitoring the implementation of policies and procedures 
for the purpose of handling living modified organisms; and 
(d) determining the classes of Biosafety Levels for contained use activity for 
the purpose of modern biotechnology research and development undertaken within a  
facility where the institutional biosafety committee is established 
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The IBC is required to, among others:511 
 
Figure 18: IBC tasks 
 
b) National Bioethics Council of Malaysia 
 
National Bioethics Council of Malaysia was established on 9th July 
2010 with its secretariat administered by the Ministry of Science, Technology 
and Innovation of Malaysia (MOSTI). The establishment of the National 
Bioethics Council is one of the strategies in implementing National 
                                   
 
 
511
 Department of Biosafety, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment Malaysia, 
User’s Guide to the Biosafety Act and Regulations (Department of Biosafety, Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Environment Malaysia ) 20. 
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Biotechnology Policy 2005 as stated previously in Chapter 3. The National 
Bioethics Council plays a role as an advisory panel that discusses and 
resolves bioethical issues that may have an impact concerning the 
environment, social, health, culture, laws and religions and Malaysian society 
in general.512  
 
Earlier a Socio-Economic Committee was suggested, but as socio-
economic issues can be susceptible at times, and based on experiences in 
other areas such as environment, the National Biosafety Board decided to 
set up just an informal advisory group. This can be referred back to the 
incident of the release of GM mosquitoes that stirred up controversial issues 
of consent besides the impact on local people in the nearby release area 
namely Bentong in Pahang and Melaka. 
  
Later National Bioethics Council (NBC) was established that opens a 
window for consultation by NBB thus complementing its effort. As this is a 
new set up, the working mechanism between the NBC and the NBB will have 
to be periodically reviewed to ensure effectiveness.513 
 
  
                                   
 
 
512
 Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, Malaysia. 'Terms of Reference' 
<http://www.bioetika.gov.my/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3&Itemid=155
> accessed on 20 November 2015. 
513
 Ramatha Letchumanan and Johnny Andrew, 'Socio-Economic Aspects in Decision-
Making in the Context of the Biosafety Protocol: Malaysia’s Experience and Case Studies' , 
Vol 14.3 (2012) 
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Roles and Purposes of the Council 
 
i.   Provide direction towards awareness on bioethical issues to the researchers, 
educators, policymakers, and industries on the recent or novel and opinions or 
perspectives regarding the current practice in life sciences including health and 
medical sciences, biotechnology, genetics, biology and other related fields. 
ii.   Advise and assist in mainstreaming bioethics among policymakers, 
researchers, industries, educators, practitioners and the public. 
iii. Disseminate information and nurture awareness as well as encourage 
bioethics in every aspect of life, promote dialogues and networking between 
stakeholders in issues of bioethics. 
iv. Establish a committee from time to time to execute the proposed and 
planned activities. 
 
Figure 19: National Bioethics Council purposes 
 
While it can be seen from the organisation chart the National Bioethics 
Committee is not being seen as part of the decision-maker, prima facie it is 
safely presumed that the ethical, bioethical issues do not play an influential 
role in the biosafety decision-making process in Malaysia. From their 
website, it can be seen that members of the National Bioethics Council have 
been publishing literature on creating bioethics awareness among 
Malaysians.514 Even though the council and the government have links in an 
official advisory capacity, it can only be implemented efficiently if the society 
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 See 
http://www.bioetika.gov.my/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15&Itemid=103 
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as a whole is included in the construction of the proposal and represented on 
the Council to have the benefit of specialist advice when that is needed.515 
 
Other essential government departments in biosafety implementation 
and enforcement  
 
i) Chemistry Department 
 
The Chemistry Department provides scientific services (analysis, 
investigation, and consultation) to MoSTE as well as to other ministries. The 
GMO laboratory is one of the laboratories in the Environmental Health 
Division. The establishment of the GMO laboratory is to fulfil the needs 
arising from the proposed amendments to the Food Regulations 1985, which 
plan to make mandatory labelling of GMOs found in food. 
 
The Chemistry Department will also hire two scientific officers and 
three assistant scientific officers to be competent to carry out risk 
assessment tests for LMOs. In future, MoSTE would like to set up a 
laboratory for NBB, but it realises that first, more capacity among local 
scientists has to be developed. 
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 Idris SH, Majeed ABA and Hamin Z, 'Public engagement in biosafety decision-making 
process: Appraising the law in Malaysia' (ICIMTR 2012 - 2012 International Conference on 
Innovation, Management and Technology Research 2012)17. 
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ii) The Malaysian Biotechnology Information Centre (MABIC) 
 
MABIC was set up to fill the gap between information available from 
research institutions needs of the public for non-technical information about 
biotechnology and biosafety. It has three-year funding from the International 
Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications (ISAAA). Its mission is 
to develop a biotechnology information centre that is recognised to be a 
resource based on sound science to the public and policymakers and by 
doing so, to support the government of Malaysia’s efforts to develop 
biotechnology as a tool for national development. MABIC is also a country 
node of ISAAA’s Global Knowledge Centre and depends on a scientific 
advisory committee that consists of local biotechnology scientists. One of 
their three advisors is also a member of GMAC. Activities of MABIC include 
the organisation of seminars to create public awareness on issues 
concerning biotechnology (an example being a public forum on “Assuring the 
safety of Biotechnologically-produced foods” in September 2001) and 
workshops on risk communication targeted at biotechnology researchers 
(November 2001), so they can present their research work in a more efficient 
way to the media and the public to enhance the understanding of 
biotechnology and GMOs in general. 
 
iii) Bioeconomy Corporation  
 
It was previously known as Malaysian Biotechnology Corporation was 
created as the lead agency responsible for the coordinated implementation of 
the NBP. It is also the leading development agency for the bio-based industry 
in Malaysia, under the purview of Ministry of Science, Technology, and 
Innovation (MOSTI). Bieconomy Corporation is owned by the Minister of 
Finance Incorporated & Federal Lands Commissioner (a government-linked 
company (GLC) and acts to identify value propositions in both R&D and 
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commerce and to support these ventures via financial assistance and 
developmental services.516 
 
Various Islamic institutions 
 
Various Islamic institutions are relevant in the Islamic discussion and 
jurisprudence on biosafety and bioethics issues. This is discussed as follows:  
 
i) National Fatwa Council 
 
The National Fatwa Council is comprised of all the Muftis (Head of 
Islamic Scholar) from every Malaysian state. Even though it is criticised as 
misnomer and non-existence,517 it is a meeting of those muftis on the 
contemporary issues that relate to Muslims in Malaysia known as Conference 
(Muzakarah) of the Fatwa Committee National Council for Islamic Religious 
Affairs. They provide Islamic rulings based on Quran, Hadith and other 
Islamic jurisprudence. However, they have no legal force only significantly 
influence the Muslims in Malaysia. The Conference (Muzakarah) of the 
Fatwa Committee National Council for Islamic Religious Affairs gave the 
rulings on the consumption of LMO as previously discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
 
                                   
 
 
516
 Bioeconomy Corporation. 'About us' <http://www.bioeconomycorporation.my/corporate-
profile/about-bioeconomycorporation/> accessed on 1 December 2016. 
517Editors, 'Asyraf Wajdi: ‘Majlis Fatwa Kebangsaan’ tak wujud, tiada kuasa perundangan' 
(2017) <http://www.themalaymailonline.com/projekmmo/berita/article/asyraf-wajdi-majlis-
fatwa-kebangsaan-tak-wujud-tiada-kuasa-perundangan#doPSLTTMPzEsH5vT.97> 
accessed on 20 January 2017. 
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ii) Department of Islamic Development Malaysia (JAKIM)  
 
JAKIM is under the Prime Minister Department with the primary 
function is to be the central agency in the planning, management of Islamic 
Affairs and Muslim development. One of the functions is to assist in enacting 
and standardising the needed laws and regulations while evaluating and 
making it uniform for the implementation of the existing laws and 
administrative from time to time to settle the Muslim ummah (society) 
problems.518 It is proposed that JAKIM is consulted as one of the parties 
during LMO approval but it is yet to be seen to be implemented. 
 
iii) Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia (IKIM)  
 
IKIM was established on 18th February 1992 under Companies Act 
1965 with the aim to spread the actual Islamic teaching through various 
programmes and activities such as research, seminar, workshop, forum, 
consultancy, training and publication.519 Among the functions is to implement 
comprehensive and integrated research on the role of Islam and Muslim to 
face the contemporary challenges of the changing world. 
 
It is an interesting observation that it is a common practice that some 
members of IKIM (usually the Director or Deputy Director) are being 
                                   
 
 
518
 Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia (JAKIM), 'Fungsi JAKIM' (2017) 
<http://www.islam.gov.my/en/about-jakim/jakim-functions> accessed on 20 January 2017. 
519
 Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia (JAKIM), 'Fungsi, Visi, Misi & Nilai' (2017) 
<http://www.ikim.gov.my/index.php/fungsi-visi-misi-nilai/> accessed on 20 January 2017. 
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appointed as members of the National Bioethics Council.520 Thus it can be 
seen here that bioethics is considering Islamic point of view. 
 
3. The biosafety decision-making process 
The process of the decision-making in Malaysia can be summarised 
as in the chart below: 
 
 
Figure 20: Biosafety decision-making process  
                                   
 
 
520
 IKIM Media, 'Pelantikan Y. Bhg. Dr. Mohd Zaidi Bin Ismail Sebagai Timbalan Ketua 
Pengarah Institut Kefahaman Islam Malaysia (IKIM)' (2017) <tp://www.ikim.gov.my/new-
wp/index.php/2015/10/02/pelantikan-y-bhg-dr-mohd-zaidi-bin-ismail-sebagai-timbalan-ketua-
pengarah-institut-kefahaman-islam-malaysia-ikim-2/> accessed on 20 January 2017. 
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When a party wants to release, import or export the living modified 
organisms (LMOs), they have to obtain the approval from the NBB. If what 
they need is just the notification from the importing country, they can appeal 
to Minister against such decision.521 Minister according to Biosafety Act 2007 
is the minister charged with the responsibility for natural resources and 
environment.522 In the current situation, it is the Minister of Natural Resources 
and Environment. The Minister has the power to confirm, reverse or vary the 
decision of the Board. The aggrieved party can request for a variation in the 
case of terms and conditions imposed on the certificate of approval. They 
could not request the NBB to review its decision. The NBB may review its 
decision upon obtaining new information or evidence on the LMOs or 
products of such LMOs. It can do so at any time. The considerations taken 
into account before the NBB makes a further order upon the review are when 
the NBB is satisfied that there is a risk posed to human, plant or animal 
health, the environment or biological diversity by the activity.523 
 
The appeal is made to the Minister of Natural Resources and 
Environment, by: 
 
1) giving notice to the Minister in writing of the intention to appeal 
within 30 working days from the date the decision was 
communicated, and 
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 Biosafety Act 2007 s34. 
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2) submitting to the Minister the grounds of appeal and other relevant 
documents within 30 working days after giving the above notice.524 
 
Therefore, if the aggrieved party is again aggrieved by the decision by 
the Minister, can he proceed with judicial review? This is an issue not yet 
challenged and tested in court although it is legal, and it is their legal rights to 
do. Questions as to what extent court will interfere with the Minister’s 
decision are still left open.   
 
The working of the biosafety decision-making in Malaysia 
 
i) The approval for release and import of LMOs 
 
Malaysia in compliance with the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is 
bound to follow the AIA procedures also the notification procedures as 
prescribed by the Protocol. 
 
When the Director General of Department of Biosafety (DG) receives 
the application for approval, making sure that the IBC has checked the 
application,525 the DG then has to process the application and forward it to 
GMAC, relevant Government department or agency and initiates public 
consultation. 
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 Biosafety (Approval and Notification) Regulations 2010 reg 20.  
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a) GMAC 
 
DG must refer to GMAC for its recommendations. GMAC has been 
set up to provide scientific, technical and other relevant advice to 
the Minister or the NBB. GMAC then assess the application to 
release, import of the LMOs will not affect the environmental, 
health and safety of people.  
 
The application consists of risk assessment and management 
report by the applicant. GMAC then can further ask advice from 
experts including international experts to advice on the application. 
GMAC also can appoint subcommittee if they find it is necessary or 
expedient to do so.526 Having gone through all these, GMAC then 
makes recommendations whether or not to approve the 
applications. If GMAC advises approval GMAC then can advise 
terms and conditions to NBB upon approval. From here it can be 
seen that NBB is not just working together with GMAC but also 
other experts and subcommittee to work with.    
 
b) relevant Government department or agency 
If the application involves the expertise of relevant government 
department or agency, DG then forwards the application to the 
relevant department or agency. For instance, if the LMOs is 
soybean,  feedbacks from Ministry of Health, Department of 
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 Biosafety Act 2007 s7(1). 
  
 
285 
 
 
 
Chemistry, Department of Agriculture, Department of Fisheries, 
Department of Veterinary Services and Malaysian Quarantine and 
Inspection Services.527  
 
c) public consultation 
 
Simultaneously, the DG will then seek the public consultation for 
their view on the application. Public consultation in Malaysia is 
executed by adhering to the Guideline on Public Consultation 
Procedures. The Guideline was published in October 2014 as part 
of the National Policy on the Development and Implementation of 
Regulations provides the essential guiding principles in public 
consultation. According to the Guideline, there are two ways of 
consultation namely formal consultation and online public 
consultation. The Guidelines also provides the requirements to 
conduct public participation procedures. As there is no detail 
guideline on the public consultation on biosafety in Malaysia, it 
seems that in biosafety the Guideline on Public Consultation 
Procedures is followed.  
  
In implementing public consultation on biosafety, the DG will 
practically advertise the application for public view in the newspaper and 
Malaysian Biosafety Clearing House website. Usually, the view is on the risks 
                                   
 
 
527
 National Biosafety Board, National Biosafety Board Decision Application for Approval for 
Import for Release of Products of Das-68416-4 Soybean for Supply or Offer to Supply for 
Sale or Placing In the Market (National Biosafety Board JBK(S) 602-1/1/38, 2017) 1. 
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involved on how to manage the risks. In some cases, they will even ask the 
local people’s view if the case is directly affected with them at the cost of the 
applicant. This happened in the case of the release of GM mosquito in 
Pahang (a state in Malaysia). For this to realise, the public even was given 
the necessary information exclusive of confidential business information 
(CBI).  
 
Later, after GMAC recommendations, views of the relevant 
government department and the public will be submitted to NBB. NBB will 
then decides on the application.  
 
NBB will then make the decisions either:   
 
i. refuse to issue the certificate of approval; or 
ii. approve the application by issuing the certificate of approval. In this 
case, it may impose terms and conditions for the approval. 
 
To make a decision, the NBB must consider the following: 
 
• recommendations of GMAC on the assessment of the application; 
• comments of the relevant Government department or agency; 
• views of members of the public, if any; and 
• any additional information, particulars, documents (IPD) 
furnished.528 
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The NBB will decide within 180 working days from the date of issue of 
the acknowledgement of receipt of the application529 and a further extension 
of 60 working days maximum if necessary.530 
 
ii) Notification for Export, Contained Use and Import for Contained 
Use531 
 
As the name suggests, this is another type of application involving the 
LMOs. This application is for notification for export, contained use and import 
for contained use. ’Contained use’ is defined as ‘any operation including 
research and development, production or manufacturing operation involving 
living modified organisms, or storage of living modified organisms, 
undertaken within a facility, installation or other physical structure such that it 
prevents the contact and impact of the living modified organisms on the 
external environment’.532 
 
Therefore these are activities that need notification namely: 
a) export of LMO 
b) contained use, i.e. any operation including research and 
development, a production involving LMOs that prevents the 
contact and impact on the external environment 
c) import for contained use 
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 Biosafety (Approval and Notification) Regulations 2010 reg 8(1).    
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 ibid reg 8(2). 
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It is important to note here that only activities involving LMOs are 
covered under this Biosafety Act 2007 and not the products of the LMOs.533 
Under this notification, any individual, an organisation or a legal entity such 
as a corporation can give the notification. 
 
i. For contained use and importation for contained use, these are the 
information needed: 
a. Risk assessment; 
b. Risk management; 
c. Emergency response plan; and 
d. Other information such as description of the LMO and the facilities 
being used for the confined activities. 
 
ii. For export, the following information must be supplied: 
a. The requirements of the importing country on the importation of 
LMO; and 
b. Evidence of such compliance.534 
 
Once the notification has been prepared, the notification must be 
submitted directly to the DG or through the organisation’s registered IBC for 
consideration, where the NBB has directed the establishment of the IBC. This 
will be only in cases of R&D involving LMOs.535536 In all other cases, 
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including where there has been no direction for the establishment of an IBC, 
the notification is made to the DG.537 For export of LMO the notification is 
made to the DG in Form F.538 
 
The IBC must assess the activity in the notification and fill up the 
sections in Form E539 relating to their details and specified information 
relating to its assessment. The notification is signed by the Chairperson of 
the IBC. The IBC must submit the completed form to the NBB together with 
the IBC Assessment Report form.540 Once all the information required by the 
form has been completed, the notification may be forwarded to the NBB 
through the DG. 
 
Then the DG will screen the notification and ensure that it has fulfilled 
all the requirements of the Acts and Regulations and in important cases will 
make sure the IBC has already assessed the notification. If the DG is 
satisfied that the notification meets the necessary requirements, the DG 
sends an acknowledgement of receipt to the person giving the notification.541 
 
The main difference between the approval process (for direct release 
activity, as earlier discussed) and a notification process is that: 
                                                                                                   
 
 
536
 Department of Biosafety, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment 
Malaysia, User’s Guide to the Biosafety Act and 
Regulations (http://www.biosafety.nre.gov.my/guideline.shtml edn, ) Chap 6 . 
537
 Biosafety (Approval and Notification) Regulations 2010 reg 16(2).    
538
 Form F for export of LMOs. 
539
 Form E for contained used activities involving LMOs and import for contained use 
activities. 
540
 see Form E, p. 7, instruction under item 9. See also Guidelines for IBC, 
IBC/AP/10/ANEX2, p. 30. 
541
 Biosafety Act 2007 s25 ; Biosafety (Approval and Notification) Regulations 2010 reg.18. 
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i. For the approval process – the activity can only start after the 
approval is given; 
ii. For the notification process – the activity can start after the 
acknowledgement of receipt is given. 
 
In both cases, the applicant becomes an “approved person”.542 
 
The DG then refers the notification to GMAC and relevant Government 
department or agency as explained in the approval process above. The NBB 
then must consider the recommendations given by the GMAC543 in making 
the decision. Although not explicitly provided in the Act, the NBB would have 
before it as well: 
 
i. The comments of the relevant Government department or agency; 
and 
ii. Any additional IPD furnished. 
 
The NBB decision on this notification will necessarily be based 
primarily upon the evaluation by GMAC of the risk assessment report, the 
risk management plan, and emergency response plan; as well as the 
fulfilment of any other requirements under the Biosafety Act 2007 in Form E. 
 
However, it can be seen here that during the notification process, 
there is no public consultation process as in the approval process. 
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Presumably, the public does not need to know any research and 
development involving LMOs that is not being released into the environment 
as it does not affect them directly for the sake of the progress of science and 
biotechnology without much unnecessary hindrance from the public. 
 
From this, it can be seen that the IBC plays a vital role in the decision-
making process as making the first assessment of the approval application 
and notification. 
 
4. An examination of the Malaysian institutional framework for biosafety 
 
Scientific risk and management assessment 
 
From the organisational chart of institutional biosafety framework and 
the flowchart of the biosafety decision-making, the risk assessment report 
greatly influenced NBB decision-making process apart from the initial risk 
assessment exercise by the IBC. Although inputs were gathered from other 
relevant departments and agencies, those reports were exclusively scientific 
as well leaving little room for socio-economic considerations even though it 
may be taken into account by NBB. 
 
Another issue is the Risk Assessment and Management as mentioned 
above by Wynne544  that risk assessments are, as a rule, presented as open 
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Returns in Public science.’ Theor. Cult. Soc. 22(5): 67-94  (as cited in Latifah Amin and 
others. 'Risk assessment of genetically modified organisms (GMOs)' (30 September, 2011) 
10(58) African Journal of Biotechnology 12418-12424) 
  
 
292 
 
 
 
scientific knowledge, but in practice, always framed in a way that supports 
social control and authority. This is also the case in Malaysia whereby the 
actual information that is given by the applicant is nowhere to be seen in the 
NBB and GMAC report, only the GMAC assessment report based on their 
scientific assessment of that risk assessment. If that information is contained 
in Confidential Business Information (CBI)545 again, this issue could not be 
investigated further by an interested party, therefore, lack of transparency.  
 
Public participation 
 
It was mentioned earlier that public consultation is just practised in 
Part III application for approval but not for Part IV notification. This is perhaps 
as for the release of LMOs and products will directly affect the public, 
whereas Part IV is just for contained use thus the public does not need to 
know and aware what is being researched and developed at the biosafety 
labs.  
 
In Malaysia, it can be seen that limited effort is geared towards 
developing a structural model of public attitudes to modern biotechnology.546 
Therefore the perhaps more structured form of representation from the local 
communities and indigenous people, other than from the academic, Islamic 
and scientific background as in those abovementioned institutions, is needed 
for the input from the society to reflect democratic voice. 
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Socio economic considerations 
 
As mentioned above Regulation 25 provides for socio-economic 
considerations. From the country’s decision in approving TMOF_Yeast to 
control the Aedes mosquito larvae, it is mentioned in the report by NBB that 
product is intended for use to control outbreaks of dengue fever, which is one 
of the critical health issues in Malaysia population, therefore it can be seen 
that social issues are being taken into consideration.547 Again in the release 
of GM mosquitoes, socioeconomic consideration including the number of 
deaths and the cost of medication due to Dengue were included.548 However, 
the methodology on how the NBB go about assessing the socio-economic 
considerations is not mentioned in the NBB reports. In assessing the socio-
economic aspects of the biosafety decision making it is apparent that the 
institutions having consulted the relevant parties using the existing rules and 
regulations will ultimately make the decision what is the best for the 
communities especially when it is related to them directly based on the facts 
in hand. However, the decision may be reviewed when new and credible 
information is made available.549Therefore, the biosafety decision making is 
more likely authoritative in the end but making the public involvement as part 
of the decision-making process.  
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 Department of Biosafety, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment Malaysia. 
'Approval for Release For Field Trial | Food, Feed and Processing | Product of LMO' (2016) 
<http://www.biosafety.nre.gov.my/country_decision/app_plmo.shtml> accessed on 20 
January 2016. 
548
 ibid. 
549
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However, the biosafety institutions are open to new decisions if there 
is new evidence coming up in the future. The only element that is lacking 
perhaps is the transparency of the decision-making process to boost public 
confidence and acceptance of the LMOs and products. It is suggested that a 
comprehensive socio-economic analysis is needed especially for the 
biosafety decision-making process. However, this can only be realised with 
the necessary socio-economic experts.  
 
It is important to mention here that Section 35 and Regulation 25(b) 
state that the Board or Minster may take into account socio-economic 
considerations in his decision-making. The usage of the word ‘may’ indicates 
that is the discretionary power of the Board or Minister whether or not to take 
socio-economic considerations into account in assessing the GM application. 
Another point is that the NBB will take recommendations from GMAC 
indicates that NBB will base their decision purely on scientific and not ethical 
ones.550 Thus it is suggested that more involvement of experts other than 
from science background in GMAC. 
 
Therefore it can be seen that there is lack of clarity on the process of 
incorporating socioeconomic considerations in actual decision-making. It 
seems that from NBB report, socio-economic issues are mentioned but it is 
unclear when it is needed, what information should be used for the analysis, 
how that analysis should be done and by whom.551 In light of the importance 
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of socio-economic consideration, a comprehensive framework for socio-
economic considerations is needed to be included as part of the biosafety 
decision-making process.  
 
Bioethics 
 
Despite the establishment of the National Bioethics Council, the active 
and productive involvement of that Council in the biosafety decision-making 
process is somewhat questionable. At present, there is no specific law on 
bioethics relating to biotechnology552 as it is regulated under Biosafety Act 
2007. 
 
Other than that it is suggested that the involvement of National Fatwa 
Council and  JAKIM should either be part of the National Bioethics Council or 
among part of the relevant government department and agency to be 
consulted by the NBB to give feedback on Islamic ruling on that GM product. 
However, since the involvement of the National Bioethics Council is yet to be 
seen in the NBB report, perhaps political, consumers input or pressure 
should be channelled to the Minister of NRE to realise the involvement of 
these Islamic authorities. Alternatively, perhaps JAKIM should be consulted 
as part of the other relevant government agencies in issues of Islamic 
consumption of certain types of LMO. 
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Dual-use technology issue 
 
Another issue that has less concern in the Malaysian context is the 
dual-use technology issues that the concern that biotechnology instead of 
being used for peaceful means but hostile or military purposes. This issue is 
going to be discussed again in the Singaporean biosafety context in Chapter 
5. It is interesting to note here that Malaysia has its own Laboratory Biosafety 
and Biosecurity Policy and Guideline.553 The nation has three BSL-3 
laboratories, which handle potentially deadly pathogens like anthrax and 
plague and no BSL-4 laboratories yet.554 As BSL-4 labs are very expensive 
to build, there are concerns over the plans to construct a high-security 
biological research laboratory in Malaysia. There are some worries over 
possible proliferation of highly lethal disease materials as Pro Publica 
reported.555 However it is submitted that to be at par with modern 
biotechnology with other countries, Malaysia plans to build BSL-4 lab should 
be seen as a good step in combating lethal viruses in the future, not just for 
the nation also the Asia Pacific region. It is hoped that the stringent 
guidelines by WHO lab and other well-developed countries BSL-4 plans 
should be adhered to curtail any misuse of bioterrorism in the future.  
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Handling, transportation, packaging, identification 
 
At present, there is a similar provision in handling, transportation556 
and packaging in the existing Malaysian laws and regulations. The provision 
on the identification of LMOS as in Regulation 11(3A), 11(6), 11(7a-e) Food 
Regulations 1985 as required and monitored by the Ministry of Health 
(MOH), a different ministry from the main biosafety Ministry of NRE. This is 
because food regulation and safety issues are under the purview of MOH.   
 
Cross-cutting issues in decision making of biosafety  
 
The government has been making progress on biosafety. This is 
mostly scientific and technical based.557 It is crucial for the issue of 
transparency in the decision making process from the permission to import 
LMO, GMO to be addressed. This issue of transparency is vital in gaining 
public trust in the controversial GMO and LMO products. 
 
In the issue of public consultation, these institutions namely NBB, 
GMAC, Department of Biosafety have been said to consult the public on 
various occasions. Apart from that, there were numbers of workshop and 
seminars held to raise the biosafety awareness and educate the public. 
Announcements were released to invite public opinions on two national 
newspapers (Malay and English) with two announcements in each 
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newspaper. In that process, the public can upload information about the 
application to biosafety website. Then the input received for 30 days. The 
public’s other concerns or issues raised were reviewed and given to Board to 
make decision. 
 
There is a study on stakeholders’ perception towards modern 
biotechnology and biosafety in Malaysia. The 47 respondents are from six 
stakeholder groups which are as follows: 
 
a) Regulatory bodies/enforcement bodies/ policy makers (RB/EB/PM)  
b) Research institutions & universities (RI&U)  
c) NGOs, religious bodies & organic shops (NGO, RB&OS) 
d) Industry players (IP)  
e) Media & educators (M&E) 
f) Consumers (CONS) 
 
The findings showed that public awareness is low, but some initial 
work has been done thru the GEF project. Awareness level is reasonably 
good for regulatory bodies and research institutions group. However, 
awareness level has to be intensified in NGOs, industry players, media, 
educators and consumers group. 
 
While the resources are available, we need local expert also overseas 
expert assistance. However, consultations referred to a various government 
department that has the expertise in their relevant field should be embraced 
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to encourage not just international but local expertise as well. Nevertheless, 
the presentation by Department of Biosafety under Ministry of Natural 
Resources558 led to the conclusion that resources are not enough is seem to 
be the hindrance.  
 
 MoSTE plans to allocate an annual US$ 16,448 grant to each of the 
thirteen federated Malaysian States for biosafety public awareness 
programmes. Also, MoSTE will feed funds directly to an NGO to also carry 
out public awareness programmes. It will apportion US$5,263 per State per 
year for this purpose. However, it will also need to swiftly commence 
activities such as the production of education kits, flyers and posters for 
different target groups (consumers in general, school children etc.) as well as 
documentary films.  
 
MoSTE plans to hold an awareness workshop in 2002 to familiarise 
stakeholders from government, research organisations, media and NGOs on 
main issues covered in the Cartagena Protocol. 
 
Although MoSTE has stated that it will undertake the development of 
public awareness, it does not have the capability at hand to promote 
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awareness within policymakers and enforcement officers. At present, little 
provision has been made for activities targeted at raising awareness among 
members of the private sector.559 
 
5. An analysis of the Malaysian regulatory strategy on biosafety 
 
Command and control  
 
From the structure, it can be safely concluded that the strategy of 
regulation in Malaysia is primarily still of command and control approach. The 
primary legislation is Biosafety Act 2007 sets out what is permitted and illegal 
under the Act. In discussing on the Malaysian strategy on biosafety 
regulation, perhaps there is some political situation that needs to be 
understood. Malaysia is a Federation of thirteen (13) states and Federal 
government whereby there are a Federal list and State list and concurrent 
list. The land issues, for instance, are state matters, agriculture, Islamic law, 
whereas biotechnology is in the Federal list.  
 
The Federal list empowers the Federal government to manage 
essential issues of trade, commerce and industry (including imports and 
exports and the establishment of standards of quality of goods manufactured 
in or exported from the country), scientific and technical research and health. 
The Federal Government has the duty of general environmental protection 
and pollution control. The State governments have jurisdiction over forests 
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and other natural resources. Concurrently, both Federal and State may 
legislate on the protection of wild animals, national parks and town and 
country planning. Biosafety is a federal issue, and the development of the 
national biosafety framework has been at the federal level. 
 
National Biosafety Board (NBB) 
 
From the above discussion, it can be seen that Malaysia practised a 
two-tier biosafety framework. The National Biosafety Board acts as the 
biosafety decision-maker but advised by GMAC as the expert biosafety 
committee mostly on scientific issues also other relevant government 
department and agencies. Additionally, for import and export and release of 
LMO into the environment, the public participation is required. Thus it adds 
another tier to the biosafety decision-making process. The Board is 
responsible to the Minister,560 a government officers including politician, are 
making decisions on the part of the Malaysian public. Even though NBB is 
the biosafety decision-maker for LMO approval, any person aggrieved by the 
NBB’S decision will appeal towards the Minister561 of Natural Resources and 
Environment (NRE). Thus it shows the ultimatum lies within the purview of 
the Minister of Natural Resources and Environment.  
  
Presumably, the aggrieved party could bring the case to court under 
Judicial Review again if the outcome is not in their favour. It is assumed here 
that with the risk assessment report by GMAC also reports from the relevant 
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government department and agencies, as previously in the illustrated United 
Kingdom case of R v. Secretary of State of the Environment ex parte Watson 
562
 the court will pay more attention to those reports unless the plaintiff can 
prove that the LMO is safe in other countries elsewhere and no report of 
adverse effects to human health and environment. While again the reports of 
either risk assessment or socio economic considerations or other issues will 
play significant roles for the court to make the decision. Then hypothetically if 
the LMOs exporter dissatisfied with Malaysian court’s decision, they will bring 
the case to WTO against Malaysia for trade restrictions. Malaysia then 
should be ready with its national biosafety laws justifications. It is suggested 
at this juncture that Malaysian biosafety laws should be harmonised with 
WTO and other international laws and agreements as well as the CPB. As 
the issue is outside the scope of this thesis, this could be an exciting future 
area of research. 
 
The NBB is seen as having governmental and administrative power in 
biosafety decision-making process as board members are mostly 
representatives from various government departments. As biosafety is an 
essential pressing issue thus, it is justified that it is decided by ministries that 
are important and relevant. 
 
Apart from the institutional setup, the Malaysian biosafety laws and 
regulations is mainly a direct state regulation. It practices a command and 
control approach whereby fines will be imposed RM250,000.00 for individual 
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imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to both and fine 
RM500,000.00 for corporate for contravention of Section 36(4)(a) and (b) of 
the risk assessment and management requirement respectively. 
 
As a breach of biosafety regulation could affect human health and the 
environment, thus the state regulation strategy enable the regulator to act 
directly for instance to control nuisance. For instance to act in emergency 
response plan as provided in Section 37 of the Biosafety Act 2007 and for the 
enforcement officers to act towards any persons or corporations that act in 
contravention of any of the provisions.563  
 
Command and control impose positives acts and prohibits undesirable 
behaviour. Thus in compliance with the biosafety laws and regulations, the 
relevant person or corporations have to adhere to the approval procedures 
for release and import, notification for export, contained use and import for 
contained use, risk assessment and management requirement failures which 
could made them liable to civil and criminal and liabilities as mentioned 
above. It has the force of law either nationally or internationally. However, 
these measures as mentioned earlier could arguably be seen protective trade 
measures and anti-GM. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                   
 
 
563
 Biosafety Act 2007 Part VI. 
  
 
304 
 
 
 
Genetic Modification Advisory Committee (GMAC)      
 
The GMAC is perceived as an expert advisory committee. From the 
latest GMAC chart564 it seems that most of the members are from the various 
science backgrounds. It is suggested that GMAC composition should include 
from social science background as well such as members of the National 
Bioethics Council, Department of Islamic Development Malaysia (JAKIM), 
Institut Kefahaman Islam Malaysia (IKIM), Third World Network (TWN), 
Consumer Association of Penang (CAP), Muslim Consumer Association of 
Malaysia (PPIM) and other relevant associations. This is apart from scientific 
risk assessment; the socio-economic considerations will be of importance 
especially for some LMOs such as for palm oil and rubber as discussed in 
the previous chapter.  
 
The second layer lies with the advisory expert consultations and 
relevant expertise from the relevant government departments. This two-tier 
system seems prima facie reliable as it seems that NBB relied heavily on 
GMAC and government agencies that will provide mostly technical and 
scientific expertise. While acknowledging that there is public consultation 
involved, the pertinent issue at hand is to what extent the public views are 
sufficiently heard and taken into account into the decision-making process, 
as there are not much details on them on the Department of Biosafety 
website.  
 
                                   
 
 
564
 Department of Biosafety, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment Malaysia, 
'Genetic Modification Advisory Committee (GMAC)' (2016) 
<http://www.biosafety.nre.gov.my/about/gmac.shtml> accessed on 20 November 2015. 
  
 
305 
 
 
 
Thus there is a need for the advisory committee to have a public 
dialogue and addressing cross-cutting issues related to the ethical, legal, and 
social implications of biotechnology. While there is GMAC as an advisory 
committee in Malaysia to address crosscutting issues related to the ethical, 
legal and social implications of biotechnology, the impact of these issues 
being brought up seem insignificant. This is because from the Department of 
Biosafety website, issues of socio-economic considerations was mentioned 
but no details were provided in the report. 
 
The Department of Biosafety (DOB) 
 
The Department of Biosafety (DOB) that is from Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Environment that plays the prominent role as the secretariat 
for implementing biosafety is seen as administrative. It seems that the fact 
that DOB is from within NRE shows Malaysian commitments towards 
protecting its biodiversity and environment in developing biotechnology and 
biosafety. However, again lack of integration and coordination with other 
ministries that stand alone even on the same issues of biosafety such as 
MOSTE or MOH, unlike some countries is something to be looked for in the 
future. It is submitted that this perhaps could start with a comprehensive 
national biosafety policy.    
 
Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) 
 
The IBC plays a crucial administrative role within the organisations 
that use LMO. Thus the risk assessment and management are vital in 
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ensuring compliance towards the biosafety laws and regulations. Thus 
Malaysian and international standard Guidelines on LMO, risk assessment 
and management, environmental assessment, etc. should be adhered to by 
these IBC as a failure which can make them liable to an offence.565 This is 
another feature of command and control approach. 
 
Other relevant institutions 
  
Other institutions such as National Bioethics Council, National Fatwa 
Council, Department of Islamic Development Malaysia (JAKIM), IKIM roles 
are very much raising the awareness and educating not just the public but 
the stakeholders in biosafety as well. It is not to be forgotten that they have 
more general and specialised (other than biosafety) roles and duties such as 
the former in advising on general ethics and bioethics, medical ethics issues, 
the latter is more on fatwa on contemporary Muslim issues, Islamic 
development, food consumption and spread the authentic Islamic teaching. 
Their roles in advising the GMAC or NBB is yet to be suggested and 
proposed in the future.    
 
In strengthening its biosafety capacity building, as stated earlier 
Malaysia has established Bioeconomy Corporation and MABIC. Bioeconomy 
is a Malaysian Government-linked company (GLC) that support the business 
of biotechnology industry whereas the latter a non-profit organisation funded 
by Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications South East Asia 
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Center (ISAA). MABIC is a biotechnology and biosafety information centre 
that supports the dissemination of knowledge to the public. 
 
New governance strategies 
 
Apart from the command and control as the primary biosafety 
regulatory strategy, there are elements of new governance being practised in 
Malaysian biosafety. 
 
Smart regulation and regulatory pluralism 
 
Biosafety regulation contains the element of smart regulation and 
regulatory pluralism (as discussed at a great length previously in Chapter 2) 
as there are numerous actors and various strategies in the decision-making 
process. This can be seen from the two-tiered biosafety decision-making 
process in Malaysia whereby the NBB is making the decisions based on 
advice by GMAC, another relevant department and (also) public 
consultations especially for the release of LMOs into the environment. The 
actors are the government as the regulator, the business as self-regulator 
(theoretically) and the third parties such as public interest groups.  
 
The instruments and range of actors of smart regulation might not 
seem suitable or no role to play in biosafety regulation. This is examined not 
just from the principal Biosafety Act 2007 and Regulations 2010 but other 
relevant Acts, Regulations and guidelines also the institutional framework. A 
significant feature of the Malaysian biosafety instrument is the government is 
imposing penal sanctions for non-compliance with the laws and regulations. 
Moreover, the regulator is to educate and advise the public on safe handling 
of LMO also the other biosafety related parties and decision-makers. This is 
an element of smart regulation. The issue is to what extent it is applicable 
when dealing with other stakeholders such as the biotechnology companies. 
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Other instruments such as disqualifications, notices, warnings, persuasion 
might not be applicable or even suitable due to the gravity of the biosafety 
consequences that can cause irreversible damage.  
 
However it is argued that prima facie, the applicability of the regulatory 
strategy would depend on the Biosafety level (BSL) involved and also the 
type of use of LMOs such as for contained use in the labs. For lower level of 
BSL (Biosafety Level) such as BSL 1 and just for contained use, the various 
instruments such as warnings, notices, persuasion could be applied.  
  
However, the law and biosafety institutions instruments to range from 
one extreme to another, i.e. from education or advice to penal sanctions and 
no suitable in-between instruments (warnings, notices). Perhaps for a lesser 
risk of biosafety activity for instance LMO, these standard instruments 
(warnings, notices) are applicable rather than straight to impose sanctions as 
this could be seen to restrict biotechnology research and development 
innovation. For example for IBC that did not comply with the documentation 
and record-keeping requirement as required566 for release or import approval 
on terms and conditions imposed by NBB. This certificate should not be 
revoked straight away, but instead, warnings and notices should be imposed 
to make things rights. However, the standard biosafety procedures should 
not be compromised. 
 
As for third parties as a biosafety actor, that can include the public, 
interested groups, for the instruments, only advice (participation and 
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awareness) through education are seen as vital and applicable compared to 
other instruments. This is mostly due to the fact in capacity building of 
biosafety, the cost in empowering the regulator is a lot, and thus educating 
the third parties would involve more cost thus making it a secondary 
biosafety strategies.      
 
Reflexive and meta-regulation 
 
Reflexive regulation is procedure-oriented seeks to design self-
regulating social systems by establishing norms of organisation and 
procedure.567 This strategy can also be viewed as a form of ‘meta-risk 
management’ whereby government rather than regulating directly, manage 
the risk management of individual enterprises.        
 
Meta-regulation, as explained in Chapter 2, is whereby regulatory 
authority oversees a control or risk management system rather than carries 
out regulation directly.568 The main Ministry that has the power to appeal in 
approving LMO in Malaysia is the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment. NBB with the Director of NRE as the head decides upon 
receiving a risk assessment and management report from GMAC. This is 
seen as a meta-regulation element as the main NBB who is composed of 
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government administrative officials basically, by delegating the power to 
GMAC to assess the risk assessment and management are steering rather 
than rowing.569  
 
Thus NBB makes biosafety decision according to GMAC’s advice. The 
applicant for LMO approval is to make the risk assessment and management 
to be assessed by GMAC. Thus for this risk assessment and management to 
be valid must be carefully scrutinised by the government also with the threat 
of intervention if it fails. Thus it will both beneficial to the industry and 
regulator if both work cooperatively. 
 
 
 
Civil regulation 
 
The fact that public and the non-governmental organisations (NGO) 
such as consumer and environmental groups are participating in biosafety 
should be commended. This can be seen earlier in the drafting of Biosafety 
Bill and later after Biosafety Act was enacted. This has been explained in the 
chapter before as public and NGO participation in LMO approval also the 
controversial case of release of GM mosquito in Bentong, Pahang and 
Melaka. However, from the earlier Biosafety Bill, it has been seen that 
perhaps the business community has pressurised the government in shaping 
the biosafety law.  
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However, in issues such as labelling of LMO, it seems that the public, 
academic and Third World Network have pressured the government in 
legalising the mandatory labelling requirement. Thus in short even though 
seems ineffective in some issues, civil regulation in Malaysia even though not 
as aggressive as abroad has played essential roles in Malaysia. However, in 
future, it is hoped that this public and civil regulation should be more 
systematic in its education and awareness rising thus could give useful and 
effective input on the biosafety decision-making process. This could be done 
in a more diplomatic manner rather than hostile to the democratic 
involvement of the public.  
 
However, it is argued in light of the current Malaysia social, economic 
and political position; there will be lesser roles of civil regulation. The 
pressure and inputs from the public and non-governmental organisations will 
only be able to create awareness but not means for effective solutions either 
through mainstream media or social media.     
 
Licence model 
 
The licence model propounded Gunningham, Kagan and Thornton are 
examining corporate behaviours towards the environment. Thus perhaps in 
future, the licence model could be explained in examining the biotechnology 
corporate behaviour toward human health and the environment namely 
regulatory, social and economic licences.  
 
The public and interested parties, for instance, may use the regulatory 
licence for the public to participate in the biosafety decision-making process 
to give inputs on the LMO approval. The environmental group with the 
economic licence may use social media, for instance, to disgrace the LMO 
products especially the controversial ones thus consumer will boycott those 
products. The companies that ignore the social licence, for instance, the 
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consumers’ wary on the LMO products without adequately explaining of the 
safety of the LMO ingredients will face rejection of their products. Thus 
product labelling as a regulatory licence that is required by the biotechnology 
companies to follow is essential in this regard. However, it is argued these 
licences model will face the same future like civil regulation in light of the 
current Malaysian position. There is little practice of licence model in 
Malaysia. However, the involvement of broader parties will enable further 
space for the inclusion of socio-economic factors in the biosafety regulatory 
field.  
 
Malaysian good biosafety governance 
 
Based on this research, there are some aspects that Malaysia needs 
to pay attention to namely: 
 
i. transparency of the regulatory process 
ii. transparency (data) 
iii. public information (application) 
iv. use of external scientific expert 
v. post-approval monitoring 
 
However, Malaysia is found competent in these aspects namely:570 
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i. the use of existing legislation  
ii. mandatory premarket approval  
iii. established safety standards  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, Malaysia is gearing up its legal and institutional 
biosafety framework not just to comply with the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety 2000 but to empower it to protect human health and the 
environment. Nevertheless, much needs to be improved to achieve its 
ambition to utilise its biological resources using modern biotechnology 
entirely. Modern biotechnology that is seen as a new engine of economic 
growth should be complemented with a useful, practical and transparent legal 
and institutional biosafety comprehensive framework. Lack of proper 
biosafety framework will undermine not just future issues of sustainable 
development of biological diversity but also the future transboundary 
movement of living modified organisms (LMOs) and genetically modified 
(GM) products between Malaysia and other countries. Apart from that being a 
party to Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 2000, Malaysian government is 
answerable the Protocol and related parties also other international 
agreements such as the WTO agreements.  
 
Beside the existing legal framework on biosafety, further compliance 
towards the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety should be addressed such as 
the liability and redress aspect as previously discussed in Chapter 3. The law 
and regulations are arguably should not be measured according to its width 
but rather in depth to ensure essential issues are dealt with efficiently to 
avoid conflict with other international agreement. The institutional framework 
arguably should be broadened to include the relevant stakeholders for 
knowledge and legitimacy. This, in turn, will provide rooms for harmonisation.   
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This will lead to a further discussion of the Singapore biosafety laws to 
examine its existing aspects of implementation.  The comparative legal study 
is important as justified in Chapter 1 in order to analyse the existing 
similarities or differences between both countries approaches in the 
Conclusion Chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5  
AN ANALYSIS OF THE SINGAPORE BIOSAFETY LEGAL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In this thesis, the Singapore biosafety law is analysed and compared 
with Malaysia on the essential aspects of legal and institutional 
implementation. This study is essential to examine Singapore as a non-party 
to Cartagena Biosafety Protocol on how they implement their biosafety 
framework.  
 
The comparative approach between Malaysia and Singapore as 
discussed in Chapter 1 is academically justified as both are very close 
neighbouring ASEAN countries thus harmonisation of biosafety laws is 
necessary.  It is also probable that Singapore’s implementation of its 
biosafety and biosecurity laws is reflected due to its obligations towards the 
WTO namely the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS Agreement), the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
Agreement and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
  
The study will examine and analyse Singapore’s response to the Key 
Biosafety Protocol issues namely risk assessment and management, public 
participation, socio-economic considerations, precautionary principle, 
labelling, liability and redress, procedures for transboundary movement and 
many more. Even though Singapore is not a party to the said Protocol, the 
Key Protocol issue is being used as guidance for biosafety framework of 
comparison between both countries, Malaysia and Singapore and this is 
mentioned in the concluding chapter. 
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2. Singapore legal framework on biosafety law 
 
First and foremost, it is essential to note here that, in the Singapore 
context, the laws and regulations explicitly distinguish between biosafety and 
biosecurity. Biosafety is based on principles and techniques that protect 
workers from exposure.571 Biosecurity based on security measures designed 
to reduce the risk of loss, theft or diversion.572 Biosafety is to ensure national 
biosafety and biosecurity are safeguarded, with minimum hindrance to the 
development and growth of bio-industries in Singapore. 
 
So far Singapore has no specific umbrella legislation for transgenic 
organisms or products thereof, only guidelines. Therefore the regulation of 
GMOs and LMOs are not by Biological Agents and Toxins Act (BATA) 
2005573 only by Guidelines as mentioned below. Biological Agents and 
Toxins Act (BATA) 2006 primarily deals with biosecurity as Singapore 
separates laws for biosafety and biosecurity. 
 
Since both laws in Singapore are inter-related, thus the discussion on 
Singapore will be on both biosafety and biosecurity. Although the paper 
intends to deal on biosafety mostly, the written biosecurity Act in Singapore is 
most relevant to the biosafety institutional arrangement since they are both 
                                   
 
 
571
 Koh Peng Keng, 'Singapore’s Perspectives on Biosafety & Biosecurity' 
<http://www.biosecurity.sandia.gov/ibtr/subpages/pastConf/20032005/redi/koh-peng-
keng.pdf> accessed on 11 November 2015. 
572
 World Health Organization, Biorisk management: Laboratory biosecurity 
guidance (Geneva: World Health Organization 2006)6. 
573
 GMAC Guidelines, ‘Overview on GMAC Guidelines’, < 
http://www.gmac.sg/Index_Guidelines_Overview_on_GMAC_Guidelines.html> accessed on 
20th January 2014. 
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either for biosecurity or biosafety purposes. As for biosafety issues that are 
related to GMOs, they are regulated by Genetic Modification Advisory 
Committee (GMAC) Guidelines.  
 
Singapore and national aspiration 
 
Singapore is a developed country that is situated in the South East 
Asian region. As it is an industrialised city country, coupled with the fact that 
it is a small territory with very limited land and natural biodiversity also 
agricultural land for agriculture to less than 3% due to urbanisation in the late 
1980s but aspired to be a ‘global city’.574In the late 1990s, Singapore opened 
up to biotechnology in agriculture and genetically modified products with very 
limited areas available for field experiments.575 Singapore then progressed 
further according to its resources’ availability. 
   
Singapore biosafety and biosecurity background 
 
The controversy about the SARS incident in Singapore’s labs has 
sparked the country’s concern over the importance of biosafety and 
biosecurity measures. Thus the Singapore biosafety historical perspective is 
essential to appreciate Singapore’s early involvement in the biosafety and 
biosecurity. This is to understand the rationale of the different legal and 
                                   
 
 
574
 LePoer BL, Area Handbook Series: Singapore: A Country Study (Library of Congress 
Washington DC Federal Research Div, 1989) 83. 
575
 ibid. 
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institutional approaches in biosafety and biosecurity adopted by Malaysia and 
Singapore.  
 
Singapore’s intensive involvement in the biosafety and biosecurity576 
can be traced back to the first event of the spread of Nipah virus in 1998 that 
infected bats and later pigs in Malaysia, its neighbouring country. Previously 
Singapore had in place Animals and Birds Act 1965577 also, Infectious 
Disease Act 1976.578 Later Singapore was taking precautions during the 
Anthrax letter events in the United States in 2000. 
 
In 2001 Singapore aspired by Singapore’s Economic Development 
Board’s (EDB)579 drive to develop biomedical industry an area that included 
the pharmaceutical biotechnology and medical technology sectors.580 EDB 
has shifted new focus to these industries namely chemicals, electronics and 
engineering.581  
 
Aspired by these aims and national priorities, Singapore then 
strengthened its national biosafety and biosecurity laws and regulation to 
                                   
 
 
576
 Ai Ee L, 'Singapore’s response to biorisk events at home and abroad' (Biosecurity 
Challenges of the Global Expansion of High-Containment Biological Laboratories The 
National Academies Press, Istanbul,Turkey 10-13 July 2011 2012) 73. 
577
 (Chapter 7)(Original Enactment: Ordinance 3 of 1965). 
578
 (Chapter 137) (Original Enactment: Act 21 of 1976). 
579EDB Singapore, 'Economic Development Board' (2018) 
<https://www.edb.gov.sg/en/about-edb/who-we-are.html>accessed on 27 December 2017. 
580EDB Singapore,'Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology' (2018) 
<https://www.edb.gov.sg/en/our-industries/pharmaceuticals-and-biotechnology.html> 
accessed on 27 December 2017. 
581
 EDB Singapore, 'The Nineties' (2016) <https://www.edb.gov.sg/content/edb/en/why-
singapore/about-singapore/our-history/1990s.html> accessed on 20 October 2017. 
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attract potential researchers and future investors to Singapore. In 2002 
Singapore enacted Strategic Goods (Control) Act.582 
 
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) incident that occurred in 
2003 is the Singapore’s major event that shaped Singapore biosafety and 
biosecurity regulation. In 2003 Ministry of Health commissioned Biosafety 
Level 3 lab at the same time of SARS outbreak. During that event, the SARS 
lab acquired the infection.583 That has led to the making of the Biological 
Agents and Toxins Act (BATA) 2005. There are some primary existing 
biosafety rules and regulations in places in Singapore namely BATA 2005 
mainly for biosecurity and Genetic Modification Advisory Committee (GMAC) 
Guidelines for Research and Agriculture using Genetically Modified 
Organisms (GMOs).  
 
Singapore’s  aspiration not so much on developing agrobiotechnology 
products due to its limited land and biodiversity but ambitiously growing to be 
biotechnology research and development hub notably on intellectual property 
and later to commercialise those modern biotechnology products.  
 
In 2006 Genetic Modification Organisms (GMO) Guidelines was 
released followed by 2008 Guidelines on Animal Transport and Use in 
Clinical and Public Areas (IACUC). In 2009 during the Influenza A (H1N1) 
                                   
 
 
582
 (Chapter 300) (Original Enactment: Act 40 of 2002). 
583
 Review Panel on New SARS Case and Biosafety, Biosafety and SARS Incident in 
Singapore September 2003 Report  (, 2003) 1. 
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outbreak lab guidelines were issued and in 2009 Codes of Ethical Practice 
were issued.   
 
Singapore's Biological Agents and Toxins Act (BATA)584 2005 came 
into force on 3 January 2006. In writing the legislation, recommendations 
were from the National Biosafety Committee (NBC), and its Technical 
Working Committee (TWC). TWC are represented by related government 
agencies, research institutions, hospitals and vital industry players were 
taken into considerations. The Ministry of Health (MOH) conducted public 
consultation for the draft BATA from 11 April 2005 to 14 May 2005. The 
Parliament approved Singapore's first-ever law on the use of biological 
agents (BA) and toxins on 18 October 2005585.On the recommendation of the 
NBC, the MOH has adopted the Laboratory Biosafety Manual, 3rd edition 
(World Health Organization, 2004) as the national guidelines for biosafety to 
supplement the BATA 2005. The World Health Organization (WHO) has long 
recognised that biosafety and biosecurity are critical international issues.586 
 
Singapore despite their lack of natural resources became the next 
research and development hub of genetically modified food. Singapore has 
an extensive lab collaboration and co-operation with other countries. This is 
the leading target of future exports from Singapore worldwide. Therefore 
                                   
 
 
584
 Chapter 24A. 
585
 Legislative History of BATA 2005 can be found at 
<http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/search/display/view.w3p;ident=40a79baa-78b5-4303-bb08-
39399539d2f0;page=0;query=DocId%3A%226b6eae33-48b3-4aeb-bbbd-
651b14629c01%22%20Status%3Ainforce%20Depth%3A0;rec=0#xv-.> 
586
 Tun T, Sadler KE and Tam JP, 'Biological Agents and Toxins Act: Development and 
Enforcement of Biosafety and Biosecurity in Singapore' 39. 
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prima facie it is an assumption as to why is Singapore more liberal and 
acceptance towards the genetically modified goods compared to Malaysia 
with less strict regulations and laws to comply with other than for hazardous 
materials and high-risk lab-containment activities. 
 
Singapore biosafety and biosecurity laws 
 
These are the existing laws and regulations on the Singapore 
biosafety and biosecurity; 
 
1) Biological Agents and Toxins Act (BATA) 2005 is the legislation to 
promote biosafety and enhance biosecurity 
2) Singapore Guidelines on Release of Agriculture-Related 
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) Genetic Modification 
Advisory Committee of Singapore August 1999 by Genetic 
Modification Advisory Committee (GMAC) 
3) Singapore Biosafety Guidelines for Research On Genetically 
Modified Organisms (GMOs) 2006 by Genetic Modification 
Advisory Committee (GMAC) 
The first two (2) guidelines regulate GMOs whereas BATA 2006 
regulates biosafety, biosecurity and bioterrorism. These guidelines have 
been developed together with the Ministry of Health (MOH), the Agri-food 
and Veterinary Authority of Singapore (AVA), the National Environment 
Agency (NEA) and the Ministry of the Environment and Water Resources 
(MEWR). On the very outset, Singapore has lesser laws as it depends on 
guidelines as compared to Acts of Parliament in regulating LMOs or GMOs.  
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Biological Agents and Toxins Act (BATA) 2005 (Act 36) 
BATA 2005 is an Act to prohibit or otherwise regulate the possession, 
use, import, transhipment, transfer and transportation of biological agents, 
inactivated biological agents and toxins, to provide for safe practices in the 
handling of such biological agents and toxins.587 Its objectives include 
preventing acts of bioterrorism, establishing a robust national biosafety 
culture and facilitating emerging bioscience industry in Singapore. The critical 
objectives of the BATA 2005 are provisions of safety practices in the handling 
of BA and toxins and promotion of biosafety training.588 The BATA is related 
to companies and institutions in biomedical and life sciences research 
working with biological agents and toxins listed in schedules. 
 
There are some essential components in the BATA legislation which is 
summarised589 as follows: 
 
Biological agent and toxins lists 
 
There are five (5) separate schedules with different degree of control 
based on risk assessment. Apart from that, there are 38 biological agents, 
and 5 toxins with biosecurity concerns identified to have potential to be 
weaponised. These agents require maximum controls. This is attached as 
Table 14.590 
                                   
 
 
587
 Biological Agents and Toxins Act (Chapter 24a) Long title. 
588Tun T, Sadler KE and Tam JP, 'Biological Agents and Toxins Act: Development and 
Enforcement of Biosafety and Biosecurity in Singapore' 39. 
589
 ibid. 
590
 ibid 40. 
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Schedule 
Classification 
Risk 
Group 
Descriptions 
of Schedule 
No. 
of BA 
Facility 
Requirements 
Schedule 1 
(Part I) 
3 (1) Potential to 
cause serious 
disease 
which is high risk 
to individual 
56 BSL3 Certified 
(Uncertified facility 
can 
appeal) 
Schedule 1 
(Part II) 
3 (1) Potential to 
cause serious 
disease 
which is high risk 
to individual 
(2) Potential to be 
weaponized 
23 
 
 
 
 
BSL3 Certified and 
Protected Place 
(Uncertified facility 
and 
protected place 
can 
appeal) 
Schedule 2 4 (1) Can cause 
severe/lethal 
disease, 
high risk to 
individual and 
community 
(2) Potential to be 
weaponized  
14 BSL3 Certified and 
Protected Place 
with 
Special Approval 
granted 
by the Director 
(Medical 
Services) 
Schedule 3 2 (1) Can infect 
humans 
(2) Need special 
attention in large 
scale 
Production 
3 Specified in the 
Approval 
by the Director 
(Medical 
Services) 
Schedule 4 2 (1) Can infect 
humans 
250+ Conditions of a 
Permit 
granted by the 
Director 
(Medical Services) 
Schedule 5 - (1) Microbial 
toxins with 
potential to 
be weaponized  
5 Protected Place 
and 
Conditions of an 
Approval granted 
by the 
Director (Medical 
Services) 
 
 
Table 14: Singapore Biological agents and toxins list 
 
Five schedules in BATA with their descriptions, corresponding Risk 
Group, number of BA in each schedule and Facility Requirements. 
From this table, it can be seen that Singapore has identified the types 
of biological agents and toxins and further identified the types of them that 
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are possible to be weaponised. Thus it can be concluded here that Singapore 
is preparing its legislation not just for biosafety but biosecurity and 
bioterrorism prevention as well. The types of lab facility are also identified 
with presumably the same standard Biosafety Level (BSL) level labs 
elsewhere and also identified certification and approval by Director of Medical 
Services. 
 
The risk group classification of hazardous agents varies from country 
to country, even though there are global standard laboratory practices and 
many aspects of laboratory culture are shared throughout the world. This is 
due to ‘…geographic and climatic distribution of the micro-organisms, their 
reservoir and vectors, especially when an animal or plant pathogens are 
concerned.’ 591An agent classified into Risk Group 2 in one country may be 
classified as Risk Group 3 in another country. 
 
Agent tracking system 
 
There are: 
 
Import control 
 
All biological agents in the schedules from 1 to 5 require an import 
permit. This is provided for in Subdivisions 2 on Import and Transhipment592 
                                   
 
 
591
 Belgian Biosafety Server, 'International classification schemes for micro-organisms based 
on their biological risks' (2017) <http://www.biosafety.be/RA/Class/ClassINT.html> accessed 
on 3 January 2018. 
592
 Division 2 (First Schedule) to Division 6 (Inactivated) for biological agents. 
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for all the biological agents and Subdivision 3593 for toxins.594 The 
applications for import permits can be submitted online at Singapore 
Customs Tradenet System.595 The TradeNet launched in 1989 is the world’s 
first nationwide electronic data interchange system that enables traders to 
submit permit applications electronically to government bodies for 
processing. In 2006 TradeNet® processed over nine million permits, with over 
90% processed in less than 10 minutes. The importer of the BA into 
Singapore must obtain approval, i.e. a valid permit to possess the BA. Even 
when engaging a courier service provider in applying for the import permit on 
behalf of the institution, the importer must verify that the correct permit has 
been obtained from the Ministry of Health (MOH). 
 
There are no requirements for export of biological agents and toxins in 
BATA 2005 as it is controlled by the Strategic Goods (Control) Act 2002 
administered by Singapore Customs. The said Act is  ‘…to control the 
transfer and brokering of strategic goods, strategic goods technology, goods 
and technology capable of being used to develop, produce, operate, 
stockpile or acquire weapons capable of causing mass destruction, and 
missiles capable of delivering such weapons; and for purposes connected 
therewith.’596 
 
 
                                   
 
 
593on Import and Transhipment.  
594Fifth Schedule for toxins. 
595
 Singapore Customs, 'Features' (2008) 
<http://www.customs.gov.sg/~/media/cus/files/insync/issue02/features/features.html> 
accessed on 20 October 2017. 
596Strategic Goods (Control) Act 2002 Long title.  
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Possession control 
 
The law on possession controls of biological agents (BA) and toxins in 
Singapore according to BATA 2005 relate to biosecurity. However, BATA 
2005 provided the institutional aspect of biosafety and biosecurity 
implementation in Singapore. Approval to possess BA and toxins are by 
Director of Medical Services of Ministry of Health, and the facility must be 
certified as a BSL facility that fulfils all the requirements. For genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs), approval must be sought from Genetic 
Modification Advisory Committee (GMAC) before an application for approval 
and permit to MOH is submitted. 
 
 
Transfer control 
 
These are the essential controls for the biological agents identified, 
starting from import, possession and transfer of those biological agents. 
There are clear and specific directions to notify MOH of the proposed transfer 
with notification requirement. 
 
Transport requirements 
 
Transport by postal mail or public transport is strictly prohibited. The 
packaging and labelling must follow the principles as stipulated by the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA) during the transportation. The 
drivers have to undergo training in the management of accidents involving 
biohazardous materials and affixed with biohazard labels. 
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Facility requirements 
 
The facilities are certified by MOH approved certification bodies while 
the facilities must undergo annual re-certification. The inventory record must 
be maintained of scheduled Biological Agents (BA), and toxins and MOH 
must be notified of all labs-acquired infections and accidents involving them. 
The certified facility must be gazetted as a protected place. It is noted here 
that Singapore is also a party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 
which is linked to the UN Security Council Disarmament initiative. 
 
Singapore Guidelines on the Release of Agriculture-Related GMOs 
(1999) 
  
These Guidelines were developed to ensure safe import, release and 
use in Singapore of agriculture-related organisms obtained through genetic 
engineering.  
 
They cover two main issues: 
 
i) the assessment of risk to the environment and human health and  
ii) the mechanism for approval of agriculture-related GM organisms in 
Singapore.  
The term agriculture-related organism is used to indicate plants, 
animals, microorganisms and vaccines used in cultivation, farming, 
horticulture, husbandry and agronomy.  
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Thus from the Guidelines, the applicants need to comply the 
procedures for notification597 to submit a proposal which GMAC will later 
approve according to the approval procedure.598 
 
Anyone who intends to import agriculture-related GM organisms into 
Singapore is required to apply to GMAC, which then forwards it to the 
Subcommittee on the Release of Agriculture-Related GMOs. Each 
application is evaluated on a case-by-case basis and can either be fully 
approved or endorsed under specified conditions. The Guidelines deal with 
the food safety issue based on substantial equivalence599 as the concept that 
if a new food or food component is found to be substantially equivalent to an 
existing food or food component, it can be treated in the same manner 
concerning safety. 
 
Procedures for Approval are listed as follows: 
 
i. The GMAC will then forward the proposal to the Sub-Committee 
who may either approve/reject the proposal or appoint the relevant 
agency or an expert panel to evaluate the proposal within 90 days.  
ii. The panel of experts will then review and assess the risks 
associated with each stage of the release using the questionnaire 
and risk assessment criteria. The agency/expert panel will submit 
their recommendations to the Sub-Committee within 90 days. The 
                                   
 
 
597Guidelines on the Release of Agriculture-Related GMOs (1999) s5. 
598
 ibid s6. 
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GMAC will decide on the recommendations of the Sub-Committee 
within 60 days. The GMAC can request further information/ 
clarification from the Proponent if any need arise.  
 
iii. The GMAC will decide on the release on a case-by-case basis. 
The GMAC will either: 
 
a) endorse the release of the agriculture-related GMOs, 
b) endorse the release of the agriculture-related GMOs under 
specified conditions, 
c) require the Proponent to submit additional information which 
the GMC deems necessary to complete the assessment, 
followed by decision (i) or (ii). 
 
 
Figure 21: Flow Chart for Evaluation, Approval and Registration of Agriculture-
Related Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs). 
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Singapore Biosafety Guidelines for Research on GMOs (2006) 
 
In 2006, after consultation with researchers, regulatory authorities and 
biosafety experts, the Singapore Genetic Modification Advisory Committee 
released the Singapore Biosafety Guidelines for Research on Genetically 
Modified Organisms (GMOs). The guidelines take into account international 
regulations and recommendations (mainly from Australia, USA, Europe, 
World Health Organization and United Nations Environment Programme)600 
and are not legally binding. These guidelines were designed to grant safe 
containment, handling and transport of GMOs intended for research 
purposes and moreover to keep track of the status of research on GMOs. If 
the GMOs are derived from biological agents and toxins are known for their 
danger to human health, the research work must comply with the Biological 
Agents and Toxins Act 2005. 
 
 The scope of the guidelines covers experiments that involve the 
construction and/ or propagation of all biological entities (cells, organisms, 
prions, viroids or viruses) which have been made by genetic manipulation 
and are of a novel genotype and which are unlikely to occur naturally or 
which could cause public health or environmental hazards.601 The GMAC 
research guidelines differentiate experiments involving GMOs or derived 
products into three categories according to the level of risk, giving clear 
                                   
 
 
600
 s1.1. 
601
 s2.1.1. 
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indications on how to manage each situation, which is the responsible 
authority and how to apply them to adhere to the requirements.602 
 
However for work with GMOs derived from biological agents and 
toxins known to be hazardous to human health are regulated, under the 
Biological Agents and Toxins Act 2005.603 Large-scale production of GMOs 
derived from biological agents and toxins known to be hazardous to human 
health may be regulated under the Biological Agents and Toxins Act (2005). 
 
Research proposals where the introduction into human subjects of 
nucleic acids (genetically manipulated or chemically synthesised), or 
genetically manipulated micro-organisms, or cells, is designed to stimulate an 
immune response to antigenic determinants of infectious agents, as in the 
case of a classical vaccine, should be submitted to the appropriate Bioethics 
Committees. If necessary, advice from GMAC could also be obtained.604 
 
GMAC guidelines list down the regulatory agencies related to 
GMOs.605 According to the GMAC Guidelines, the national agencies 
responsible for enacting the various aspects of GM technology and activities 
in Singapore are tabulated as below. 
 
                                   
 
 
602
 Adduci G, 'GM Crops and Biosafety in South-East Asia: Singapore as Case Study' in 
(2012)9. 
603
 BATA 2005 s2( c ) 
604
 s2.1.5. 
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 s2.3. 
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Agencies Roles 
Agri-Food and Veterinary 
Authority of Singapore 
(AVA) 
Regulation of laboratories dealing with GMO 
research, involving animal pathogens and plant 
pests 
AVA, Ministry of Health 
(MOH) and National 
Environmental Agency 
(NEA) 
Importation of organisms including GMOs 
MOH 
Certification or Inspection of Laboratories handling 
biological agents or toxins regulated under the BATA 
Ministry of Manpower 
(MOM) 
Regulation of Workplace Safety and Health 
 
Table 15: National agencies legislating GM in Singapore 
 
Section 3 of the Guidelines provides for a summary of procedures. 
Section 3.1 outlines the decision flowchart for assessment and notification of 
research work. Section 3.2 provides flow chart for the importation of GMOs 
for research. 
 
GMAC also emphasises the institutions that deal with GMOs are 
required by GMAC to have Institutional Biosafety Committee. Section 6 of the 
Guidelines is on import, export and transport for GMOs and/or GMOs-derived 
materials. 
 
Section 4 of the Guidelines list out the Category A, B, C that requires 
IBC, GMAC or nil approval at all according to the level of risks namely which 
is summarised as follows: 
 
a) Category A – Experiments Requiring IBC Approval And GMAC 
Notification (Regulated Experiments with Significant Risks) 
b) Category B – Experiments Requiring IBC Approval (Notifiable 
Experiments with Low Risks) 
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c) Category C – Experiments Exempt From The Guidelines 
(Experiments with Extremely Low Risks) 
 
From these GMAC Guidelines, it can be summed up that they 
established and identified some essential institutional framework on biosafety 
namely the relevant government departments also involved the Institutional 
Biosafety Committee (IBC). GMAC involvement can be seen as advisory on 
GMOs on research and agriculture products. Apart from IBC and GMAC, the 
Principal Investigator (PI) is the person responsible inter alia to apply for an 
import permit, before commencing work for proposal and later to experiment. 
The Guidelines606 list the roles and responsibilities of the institutions, IBC and 
PI. 
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3. Singapore Institutional Framework on Biosafety Law 
Ministry responsible 
 
These are ministries that are competent national agencies which are 
entrusted with biosafety responsibilities in Singapore namely: 
 
Agri-Food and Veterinary Authority of Singapore (AVA) 
Ministry of Health (MOH) 
Ministry of Manpower (MOM) 
National Environmental Agency (NEA) 
 
Table 16: Singapore competent national agencies 
 
This is mentioned in the GMAC Guidelines as mentioned above. 
Apart from these ministries, there is system In-place to facilitate the 
Administration of the BATA 2005. This is listed as follows: 
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Table 17607: System In-place to facilitate the Administration of the BATA 
 
The leading authority on the topic is the Agri-Food and Veterinary 
Authority of Singapore (AVA) which is responsible for food, animals and pets 
as well as the agricultural and fisheries sectors. AVA regulates the import of 
plants, plant products, fertilisers of plant origin, insects or microorganisms of 
agricultural importance and cut flowers, to safeguard plant health and to 
prevent any introduction of exotic pests and diseases into the country. The 
central regulation for cultivation, import and export of plants and plant-derived 
products is the Control of Plants Act (1994). This Act covers the import and 
transhipment of fresh fruit and vegetable, control of plant cultivation (licences 
and use of pesticides), any issue related to prohibited plants, pest controls, 
licences and permits.608 The Act does not cover GM plants as the importer 
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 Ai Ee L, 'Singapore’s response to biorisk events at home and abroad' (Biosecurity 
Challenges of the Global Expansion of High-Containment Biological Laboratories The 
National Academies Press, Istanbul,Turkey 10-13 July 2011 2012). 
608
 ibid. 
Gazetting of facilities as protected place by the Ministry of Home Affairs 
Vetting of personnel accessing protected facilities by the Internal Security Department, MHA 
Involving Singapore Civil Defense Force, MHA in emergency response of Labs 
Collaborating with other ministries & agencies (esp. the Singapore Police Force, MHA)on 
sensitive materials  
Annual certification of BSL3facilities by MOH-Approved Facility Certifiers 
Training of biosafety training courses by MOH-Approved Training Providers 
On-line application for approval & permit using IT system (MOH & Singapore Customs) 
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Committee (GMAC) before importation.
Figure 
 
In Singapore 
namely;
Bioisafety Branch
National Biosafety Committee
Genetic Modification Advisory Committee
Institutional Biosafety Committee
Bioethics Advisory Committee
 
Table 
 to get the recommendations from Genetic Modification Advisory 
 
22: Singapore Biosafety Organizational Chart
these are the
 
 
 
 
18: Singapore main institutions in biosafety
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 leading institutions that deal with Biosafety 
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Biosafety Branch 
 
The Biosafety Branch was established in 2005 to cater for all biosafety 
matters in a sustainable and organised manner. The Biosafety Branch is to 
promote high standards of biosafety in the research and biomedical 
community, establish the framework and guidelines for biosafety training, 
promote links with the international biosafety community and prevent 
bioterrorism by controlling the use of high-risk biological agents. It is set up 
under the Operations Group as it works closely with the Communicable 
Diseases Division (CDD) and Preparedness & Response Division to facilitate 
implementation of containment measures in the event of laboratory accidents 
of public health significance.  
 
The Biosafety Branch plays a vital role in administering the Biological 
Agents and Toxins Act 2005 (BATA 2005). The Biosafety Branch also acts as 
the secretariat for the National Biosafety Committee, and the three Technical 
Working Committees, namely, Select Agents List, Biosafety Training and 
Biosafety Standards.609 
 
 
 
 
                                   
 
 
609
 Ministry of Health (MOH) Singapore,'Biosafety' (2nd September 2015) 
<https://www.moh.gov.sg/content/moh_web/biosafety.html> accessed on 11th November 
2015. 
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Roles and functions of the Biosafety Branch can be summarised as 
follows to: 
 
 
Figure 23: Roles and functions of the Biosafety Branch 
 
The branch keeps lists of Approved Facility Certifiers (AFC) and 
Approved Training Providers (ATP), and also sets the topics for biosafety 
training and the checklists for facility certification and biosafety audit purpose. 
There is a dedicated webpage, and all relevant information is available online 
for the Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) facilities in Singapore.610 
 
IT system of biosafety allows all users to perform activities such as 
registering the facility, applications for permits and approvals, notification of 
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 Ministry of Health (MOH) Singapore, 'About us' (2015) 
<https://www.moh.gov.sg/content/moh_web/biosafety/about-us.html> accessed on 10 
January 2015. 
• Administer and enforce BATA 
• Represent the Ministry of Health as the National Authority (NA) for Biological Agents 
and Toxins  
• Promote biosafety awareness and nurture biosafety culture in Singapore  
• Act as a resource and coordination centre for all biosafety and biosecurity issues in 
Singapore. 
• Provide secretariat support for the National Biosafety Committee, including appointed 
technical committees. 
• Develop policies, procedures and guidelines for biosafety emergencies and response. 
• Keep abreast with the latest biosafety and biosecurity development, and to review and 
update existing policies to ensure policies are always kept in line with the emerging 
biosafety and biosecurity trends. 
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transfers, receipt, inactivation and disposal, reporting of incident and 
inventory for biological agents, and many others.611 
 
National Biosafety Committee 
 
The formation of the multi-disciplinary National Biosafety Committee 
(NBC) is to implement the Biosafety Framework in March 2003. There are 
three (3) Technical Working Committees (TWCs) namely as follows: 
 
i) TWC for Select Agents 
ii) TWC National Biosafety Standards 
iii) TWC Training 
 
The Three Technical Working Committees (TWCs) appointed by the 
NBC with specific tasks to:  
 
i) draw up and update the biological agent list  
ii) formulate and update the biosafety standards  
iii) define the training requirements  
 
Genetic Modification Advisory Committee (GMAC) 
 
Genetic Modification Advisory Committee (GMAC) was established 
under the Ministry of Trade and Industry in April 1999 with aims to administer 
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and advise on the research and development, production, use and handling 
of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) in Singapore. 
 
The Committee is currently chaired by Prof Paul Teng from the 
National Institute of Education (NIE). Twelve (12) agencies represent the 
GMAC members. Each member of GMAC is of different expertise to the 
committee, thereby enabling GMAC to make decisions based on holistic 
views of issues related to genetic modification.612 
 
The GMAC Main Committee consists of: 
 
i) GMAC Chairman 
ii) Deputy Chairman 
There are four (4) subcommittees namely: 
 
i) Subcommittee on release 
ii) Subcommittee on research 
iii) Subcommittee on labelling 
iv) Subcommittee on awareness 
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 Genetic Modification Advisory Committee (GMAC) Singapore, 'The GMAC Main 
Committee' (2015) <http://www.gmac.gov.sg/Index_The_Committee.html> accessed on 11 
November 2015. 
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There are eight other members inclusive of one (1) Consumers 
Association of Singapore. The GMAC consists of representatives from 
national agencies listed as below: 
 
 
Table 19: GMAC representatives 
 
 
 
 
• Agency for Science, Technology & Research (A*STAR) 
• Agri-Food and Veterinary Authority of Singapore (AVA) 
• Attorney General’s Chambers (AG Chambers) 
• Consumers Association of Singapore (CASE) 
• Institute of Molecular and Cell Biology (IMCB) 
• Ministry of Health (MOH) 
• Ministry of Manpower (MOM) 
• Nanyang Technological University (NTU) 
• National Institute of Education (NIE) 
• National Parks Board (NParks) 
• National University of Singapore (NUS) 
• Temasek Life Sciences Laboratory (TLL) 
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The national agencies responsible for the various aspects of 
regulatory affairs on behalf of the GMAC are:613 
 
Regulation of laboratories dealing with GMO research, involving animal 
pathogens and plant pests – AVA 
Importation of organisms including GMOs – AVA, MOH and NEA(please also 
see section 6) 
Certification of Safety and Health of workers – MOM 
Research Laboratory Certification – MOM 
Clinical Laboratory Certification – MOH 
Table 20: National agencies responsible on behalf of GMAC 
 
From the composition of GMAC, it seems that the stakeholders are 
well represented from the legal, relevant government departments and 
national agencies, consumer association, research institute, universities and 
parks authority. The only setback is in the environment department as 
perhaps Singapore is a city-state with not much biodiversity and limited land, 
Singapore perhaps will not involve in the massive scale of GM agriculture. 
Thus it will not have a significant impact on the environment and biodiversity. 
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 The Singapore Biosafety Guidelines for Research on Genetically Modified Organisms 
(GMOs) 2006. 
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The tasks and responsibilities of GMAC are listed as follows: 
 
To advise and recommend for approval, or otherwise, the research and 
development, production, use and handling of GMOs 
To monitor the control of release of GMOs into the environment 
To review proposals related to the release of GMOs into the 
environment.GMAC may establish sub-committees of experts in specific 
areas to assess the risks involved 
To provide advice on matters related to the release of GMOs 
To inform the public, where deemed necessary, on planned release of GMOs 
To establish mechanisms for exchange of information with overseas 
agencies and to facilitate the harmonisation of guidelines with regional and 
international authorities 
To develop and approve biosafety guidelines for the research and 
development, production, use and handling of GMOs 
To create public awareness on GMO and GMO-related issues 
 
Table 21: Tasks and responsibilities of GMAC 
 
Bioethics Advisory Committee Singapore (BAC) 
 
Singapore Cabinet established BAC614 in December 2016 with a task 
to address ethical, legal and social issues in biomedical research in 
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 Bioethics Advisory Committee Singapore, 'Bioethics Advisory Committee Singapore' 
(2016) <http://www.bioethics-singapore.org/> accessed on 11th November 2015. 
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Singapore. Singapore acknowledges bioethics as essential and integral to 
rapid progress in biomedical science and research to be based on high 
ethical and legal standard. To this aim, BAC gathers the relevant views and 
information from the local and international community to advise the 
Singapore government. However, BAC’s view is not binding but only 
persuasive.  
 
Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) 
 
This Committee was appointed under the Biological Agents and Toxic 
Act 2005 (BATA). Its duties include to conduct risk assessments on the 
activity proposed by the applicant, evaluate the correlated risk management, 
advise the applicant on the best practice and code of conduct to carry out the 
proposed activity safely (including personnel training). Finally, IBC is to 
review and control the proposed activity every two years to make sure it is 
appropriately conducted. In the specific context of activities involving 
genetically modified organisms, the Committee is responsible for conducting 
inspections, monitoring the facilities and assessing the level of competence 
of the personnel involved in the work.615 
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 Adduci G, 'GM Crops and Biosafety in South-East Asia: Singapore as Case Study' in 
(2012) 8. 
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Other important biosafety institutions in Singapore: Institutional 
Biosafety Committees 
 
National University of Singapore (2002) 
Singapore General Hospital Animal Facility Biosafety Committee (2006) 
SGH Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) (2007) 
 
 
Table 22: Other important biosafety institutions in Singapore 
According to Sing Health IBC (2010)  there is overarching oversight of 9 
national institutes using common structure, standard risk assessment 
template, expert panel that provide interagency liaison, compliance with 
BATA, secretarial assistance (annual reports, etc.).616 
  
                                   
 
 
616
 Ai Ee L, 'Singapore’s response to biorisk events at home and abroad' (Biosecurity 
Challenges of the Global Expansion of High-Containment Biological Laboratories The 
National Academies Press, Istanbul,Turkey 10-13 July 2011 2012) 1. 
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Biorisk Association of Singapore (BAS) 
 
The Biorisk Association of Singapore (BAS) was founded in 2010 by 
Dr Ai Ee Ling. BAS is a non-profit, multidisciplinary association promoting 
biosafety in Singapore with the aim of fostering the development and 
recognition of biorisk management as a profession, promoting safe 
management of biological materials, providing a vital platform for knowledge-
sharing in biorisk management, facilitating collaboration within the local and 
international biorisk management groups/ associations, promoting education 
in biorisk management, and promoting applied biorisk research. BAS is 
affiliated with the American Biosafety Association (ABSA International) and 
the Asia-Pacific Biosafety Association (APBA). APBA offers biosafety training 
throughout the region, including principles and practices, biosafety 
management, and Certified Biosafety Coordinator for Singapore.617 
 
4. Singapore Biosafety and Biosecurity Law 
 
Singapore BATA 2005 is said to contain similar terms with the United 
States regulations; only it is stricter regarding non-compliance.618 
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 Asia Pacific Biosafety Association, 'About A-PBA' (2016) <http://www.a-pba.org/about> 
accessed on 22 January 2016. 
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 Reynolds M. Salerno, Jennifer Gaudioso (ed), Laboratory Biorisk Management: Biosafety 
and Biosecurity (2015)4. 
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The non-compliance part of BATA 2005 Offences is  
summarised as follows:619 
Use of BA or toxins for non-peaceful 
purpose 
Life imprisonment and/or S$1 million 
Possession of BA or toxins without 
approval 
10-years imprisonment and/or 
S$100K 
Large scale production of BA without 
approval 
1 year imprisonment and/or S$10K 
Importation/transshipment of BA or 
toxins without permit 
½ year imprisonment and/or S$5K 
Transportation of BA or toxins by 
mail/public transport 
(Severity of punishment depends on 
degree of offence) 
Failure to perform duties and obligations  
 
 
Table 23: BATA 2005 offences and punishments 
Perhaps Singapore has learnt its lesson from the SARS incident in 
2003 in Singapore lab also in Taiwan and China,620 thus strengthen its laws 
empowerment. Singapore also realises the potential use of some biological 
agents as weapons of bioterrorism.621 Thus there are some solutions to the 
                                   
 
 
619Ai Ee L, 'Singapore’s response to biorisk events at home and abroad' (Biosecurity 
Challenges of the Global Expansion of High-Containment Biological Laboratories The 
National Academies Press, Istanbul,Turkey 10-13 July 2011 2012)1. 
620
 Wen-Chao Wu, Li-Li Lee, Wei-Fong Chen, Shih-Yan Yang, Ho-Sheng Wu, Wen-Yi Shih, 
and Steve Hsu-Sung Kuo, ‘Development of Laboratory Biosafety Management: The Taiwan 
Experience’ (2007) Applied Biosafety, 12(1) pp. 18-25 © ABSA  
621Koh Peng Keng, 'Singapore’s Perspectives on Biosafety & Biosecurity' 
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biosafety and biosecurity issues by having the Singapore BATA 2005, 
whereby they developed a biosafety framework to promote biosafety culture 
which is transparent and follows internationally recognised standards. 
Singapore followed the international standard, as its biosafety lab procedure 
and guidelines are according to the WHO standard, and its BATA 2005 
content is quite similar to the United States.  
 
As the issue of transparency, it is yet to be examined. BATA 2005 is 
said to be comprehensive but not prescriptive. Another advantage of BATA 
2005 is said to be balanced between safety and research freedom. While this 
is supposedly the ultimate best aims of biosafety culture, again this is not an 
easy issue to be analysed, however presumably all the best procedures are 
being implemented and followed, hopefully in future, there will be no more 
SARS acquired lab incident occurred again in Singapore labs. As to the issue 
of research freedom, again this is a complicated issue to be examined in 
detail only a fair view could be presented. 
 
An excellent regulatory framework will strengthen Singapore’s 
standing as a biomedical hub and help it to attract world-class researchers. 
Therefore there is the need for the laws to strike a balance between keeping 
research safe and being too restrictive. The requirements should not result in 
unnecessary cost increases, research being hampered, and scientists being 
discouraged from working to prevent disease outbreaks.  
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A fine up to $1 million Singapore dollars and life imprisonment for a 
deliberate attempt to use biological agents and toxins for biological warfare or 
any non-peaceful purpose. Such severe penalties for convicted offenders 
reflect Singapore’s serious commitment to biosafety and biosecurity.622 This 
is the general overview of the Singapore BATA 2005. It is submitted that this 
view is right in light of the seriousness of the offence also the severity of the 
nature of biosafety and biosecurity taking into account of the SARS incident 
that occurred previously in Singapore. 
 
Singapore, GM products and Genetic Engineering (GE) 
 
Singapore does not produce any GE agricultural plants or animals, 
and so far there is no GE field trial.623 GE related activities in Singapore 
confined to laboratory research primarily related to pharmaceuticals. Animal 
biotechnology in Singapore is not significant. As for food labelling on GM, 
there is nothing yet as Singapore adopts the substantial equivalence Codex 
Alimentarius principle.  
 
Issues of dual use of technologies 
 
Another issue of importance is the dual-use issue of modern 
biotechnology. The dual-use issue is primarily the use of technology either for 
peaceful or military purposes. Dual use in the modern biotechnology means 
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 Tun T, Sadler KE and Tam JP, 'Biological Agents and Toxins Act: Development and 
Enforcement of Biosafety and Biosecurity in Singapore'. 
623USA Foreign Agricultural Service, Singapore Agricultural Biotechnology Annual 2015 
(USDA GAIN Report SN5003, 2015) 3. 
  
 
350 
 
 
 
that apart from the good use of modern biotechnology or science in general 
for the betterment of peoples health and environment mainly, however, there 
is an evil tendency on the scientist part due to greed, fame, or money or for 
whatsoever reason. This led them to use the modern biotechnology or 
science for an evil purpose other than good, i.e. for instance military purpose 
or to create bioterrorism. 
 
In the South Pacific Region, recent studies suggest that the dual-use 
issue has gained low awareness among the life scientists. Singapore is said 
to have a traditional emphasis on biosafety and a relatively low awareness on 
the dual issue.624 Their concerns are mostly on the preservation of 
biodiversity and human health and maintaining agricultural security. One of 
the reasons suggested is due to the lack of academic courses on dual-use 
risks associated with certain types of biotechnological research.625 
 
Singapore who has an advanced biotechnology industry aspired to 
become a biomedical hub in the Asia Pacific region, is said to have 
comprehensive biosafety legislation modelling the WHO biosafety guidelines 
having the research, handling and transport of GMOs. 
 
It is rightly observed that the primary trend in the governance of dual-
use technologies is done through the reinforcement of the international 
treaties such as CPB, BWC and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) via 
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domestic legislation that establishes biosafety and biosecurity at the national 
level. This is the current trend that has been followed by many countries 
worldwide and Malaysia for instance signed and ratified the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety. Singapore although themselves involved in the 
Cartagena negotiations decided to join the like-minded group but set up their 
national biosafety legislation and not signing the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety. 
 
Another set of governance tool is the use of soft laws and informal 
measures that are not legally binding such as professional guidelines, codes 
of ethics, education and awareness rising. These soft measures are 
voluntary and lack of strict enforcement. It is aimed to create a culture of 
responsibility of dual-use research and to forestall strict government 
intervention. 
 
However, due to the security risks of emerging technologies such as 
synthetics genomics, it is rightly submitted that it is sufficient to warrant a 
mixed-governance method. For example for both Malaysia and Singapore, 
there are biosafety acts that regulate the critical parts of research, handling 
and transport of LMOs. Apart from that the guidelines on LMOs research are 
soft laws, also code of ethics developed by bioethics councils also education 
and awareness rising by other biosafety related-bodies. It is opined that there 
should be a critical need for collaboration between government and non-
governmental actors including scientific and industries, also the ability to 
strike up the balance between the top-down and bottom-up regulatory tools. 
The mixed governance strategies are said better to keep up with the 
changing phase of rapid evolution of technologies. 
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Singapore investment in modern biotechnology 
 
It is a fact that Singapore has BSL-3 laboratories at Biopolis, at the 
time estimated at 16 laboratories. Several uncited accounts are reporting that 
the Singapore Defense Science Organization operates a BSL-4 facility. 
Biosafety Level 4 is required for work with dangerous and exotic agents that 
pose a high individual risk of aerosol-transmitted laboratory infections, agents 
which cause severe to fatal disease in humans for which vaccines or other 
treatments are not available, such as Bolivian and Argentine hemorrhagic 
fevers, dengue fever, Marburg virus, Ebola virus, hantaviruses, Lassa fever, 
Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, and other various hemorrhagic 
diseases.626 
 
A 2009 WHO report, supported by other sources, indicates that 
Singapore operates a mobile BSL-4 autopsy suite.627 The BSL-4 lab is very 
expensive to build.628 
 
 
Singapore's negotiation in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
 
Singapore had their share of involvement in the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety starting from the earlier negotiations. Singapore perhaps due to 
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 Bionity.com, 'Biosafety level' (2017) 
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2016. 
627Chui P and others, 'Mobile Biosafety Level-4 Autopsy Facility—An Innovative Solution' 
(2007) 12(4) Applied Biosafety 238. 
628
 ibid. 
  
 
353 
 
 
 
their economic aspirations and biosafety history were among the 
Compromise Group, and later did not sign and ratified the Cartagena 
Protocol. However, besides being a non-party Singapore developed their 
comprehensive biosafety and biosecurity system.  
 
5. An Analysis of the Singapore Legal and Institutional Biosafety 
Framework 
 
This analysis will be based on the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
even though Singapore is not a party to the Protocol. This is arguable 
because the Key Protocol issues focus on the most crucial biosafety issues. 
However, the discussion will not be as detailed in Malaysian compliance but 
to what extent Singapore fulfils it. Singapore previously was part of the 
Protocol discussion and became the Compromise Group in the negotiations 
together with Switzerland and other countries. 
 
Risk Assessment and Risk Management 
 
This so-called scientific risk assessment and management can be 
seen from the application for the use of LMOs in Singapore as there are sets 
of questions and answers provided in the GMAC Guidelines that need to be 
answered by the applicants in their applications. The GMAC Guidelines on 
the Release of Agriculture-Related GMOs (1999) provide a common 
framework for the assessment of risks of agriculture-related GMOs to human 
health and the environment and the approval mechanisms for their release in 
Singapore. Thus the risk assessment also taking food safety issue into 
account as it adopts the substantial equivalence concept. This risk 
assessment is known as Appendix 1, and 2. As for Singapore Biosafety 
Guidelines for Research on GMOs (2006) only requires proposal form for 
assessment of genetic manipulation work. 
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For dealing with the human subject in research experiments, the 
Bioethics Advisory Council (BAC) and GMAC should be consulted.629 
However, there is a member of consumer association in GMAC perhaps 
giving a room for socio-economic other than the scientific input. Thus at this 
juncture, it can be safely be concluded that Singapore assessments risk of 
biosafety and biosecurity are technocratic, purely taking scientific risk 
assessment into accounts, leaving little room for socio-economic 
considerations possibly to its lack of biodiversity and Singaporean better 
perception towards LMOs as explained in Chapter 1. 
 
Public Awareness and Participation 
 
As for public awareness and participation, during the earlier tabling of 
Biological Agents and Toxins Bill, there were public consultations done, thus 
raised the awareness of what intended to be protected namely biosecurity 
and biosafety. By looking at GMAC websites, there are contests done on 
raising the awareness of the public on biosafety and biosecurity issues in 
Singapore. 
 
On the biosecurity issues, apart from the earlier public consultation 
done during the BATA Bill, however, it seems that Singapore government 
either legislator or institutions applied the technocratic method whereby 
scientific risk assessment being used or those directly related with the LMOs. 
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The public only can be informed of the outcome from biosafety website of the 
current news on Singapore biosecurity.630  
 
On the research and agriculture that involves with GMOs, GMAC is 
responsible for informing the public, where deemed necessary, on planned 
releases of GMOs.631 However, GMAC at the same time is to facilitate public 
education and create awareness on GM issues.632 GMAC efforts on 
educating and raising Singaporeans awareness can be seen from GMAC 
website on various activities done by GMAC and the types of underlying 
knowledge that Singaporeans should know about GMOs.633 This is because 
GMAC has its own Public Awareness subcommittee that bears the 
responsibility to disseminate information that is objective, factual and 
scientific so that members of the public can make educated, rational 
decisions on GM technology and its products.634 
  
 There  is no legal requirement for the public to be consulted for LMOs 
and biologcal agents and toxins, through website or newspaper, only raising 
awareness and educate them. However, the public awareness has been 
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instutionalised through GMAC Public Awareness subcommittee. As raising 
awareness is literally different from participation during the biosafety 
decision-making process, thus it is yet to be seen which medium effectively 
encourage the public participation.  
 
Socio economic considerations 
 
There is no direct mentioned on socio-economic considerations for 
GMOs. However, GMAC Agriculture Guidelines provides a common 
framework for (a) assessment of risks of agriculture-related GMOs to human 
health and the environment. However, it seems it is not so much of the 
equals to Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety which stressed the importance of 
GMOs effect on the biodiversity and the local and indigenous people. This is 
perhaps because Singapore has not much biodiversity, a city country and not 
an agriculture exporter country. 
 
Precautionary principle 
 
The concept of the precautionary principle is nowhere to be found 
either in the biosafety GMOs related Guidelines or on biosecurity. Thus this 
concept is not being approved and used in Singapore either for BA or toxins 
or GMOs products. This seems to be in line with the United States approach 
rather than EU stand on GMOs. Singapore seems to be more in line with the 
WTO trade-related agreements either on BA, toxins or GMOs. The GMAC 
Agriculture GMOS Guidelines address issues related to food safety based on 
the concept of substantial equivalence. 
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Handling, transportation, packaging and identification of GMOs 
 
As for Singapore, as they learnt many lessons from the SARS 
acquired lab incident as in Taiwan and China, they developed their lab 
biosafety protocol also the model WHO lab biosafety Protocol. 
 
As for handling, transportation, packaging and identification of GMOs, 
Singapore differentiates between biosafety and biosecurity issues, whereby 
biological agents and toxins are being listed according to biosafety level in 
accordance to Biological and Toxins Act (BATA) 2006. As for GM products 
for research and agricultural, it is by the GMAC Guidelines which are not 
compulsory but usually followed by the institutions that deal with GMOs. As 
for handling, transportation, packaging and identification of Biological Agents 
and Toxins, these are contained in the BATA 2006. While for handling, 
transportation, packaging and identification of GMOs, these are contained in 
the GMAC Guidelines on GMOs for Research or Agricultural purposes. It is 
important to note here that Singapore adopts a liberal attitude towards GMOs 
as they applied the substantial equivalence concepts towards GM food. 
 
Information sharing 
 
The information for biosafety in Singapore can be seen in Singapore 
Biosafety website that is maintained by Ministry of Health Singapore. The 
website seems user-friendly, as it looks easy to be used for those companies 
or individuals who want to apply for biological agents and toxins application. 
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For application related to GMOs, it is to be seen at the GMAC website. The 
current news of the types of biological agents, toxins and GMOs can be seen 
from those websites. 
 
Another issue is that GMAC website also published the lists of GMOs 
being approved in Singapore, as this can be seen from the website.635 
 
Liability and Redress 
 
For liability and redress for BATA 2005 on biological agents and 
toxins, it can be seen clearly that the offender will suffer heavier punishments 
compared to the United States rules and regulation. For GMOs related 
offences, as the GMAC Guidelines are not legally binding, it seems GMOs 
are treated no different than conventional products. If the GMOs are either 
Biological Agents or Toxins, perhaps BATA 2005 will be applicable thus fall 
under that Act and offenders can be punished accordingly.636 
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Procedures for moving LMOs across border 
  
There is an approval procedure like AIA procedure for LMOs that 
cross-border Singapore that is to be imported into Singapore for agriculture-
related GMOs. These Guidelines are established to ensure the safe 
movement and use of agriculture-related GMOs in Singapore. There is 
monitoring procedure after approval. This can be seen from GMAC approval 
procedure flowchart. These Guidelines provide a common framework for (a) 
assessment of risks of agriculture-related GMOs to human health and the 
environment; and (b) approval mechanisms for their release in Singapore. 
From the GMAC Agriculture Guideline, it can be seen that Singapore is 
concerned with the effect of GMOs on the environment and the human health 
of Singaporean. This can be seen from the Risk Assessment questionnaires. 
 
Also, it is a requirement that if LMO is part of the BA or toxins whereby 
they have to be labelled as Biohazard and follow the strict BATA 2005. 
 
For export of GMOs from Singapore otherwise, they are up to the 
Singapore import and export Act perhaps Strategic Goods Act and other 
relevant rules and regulations, the relevant countries and international rules 
and regulations. 
 
Advanced Informed Agreement (AIA) 
 
From BATA 2005 there is no mention of AIA Procedure, however, 
from GMAC Guidelines, there is approval needed from GMAC for the release 
of agriculture-related GMOs. Thus this procedure as mentioned above look 
like an AIA procedure before importing of GMOs into Singapore. This risk 
assessment is done at this stage to be forwarded to GMAC for approval. 
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As for research on GMOs as it is within contained use in the research 
labs only notification is needed for GMAC, not approval. For research on 
GMOs, the IBC plays a critical role whereby the Principal Investigator and 
Biosafety Officer are to assess and report also notify the GMAC.  
 
LMOs intended for direct use as food or feed, or processing (LMOS-
FFP) 
 
As Singapore treated food safety issues as substantial equivalence to 
conventional food, thus there is no strict requirement for FFP, as to labelling 
and such in other countries. Thus this is not a big issue. It is to be recalled 
the LMOS that contain in the FPP are excluded from all the rules contained in 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, thus no AIA requirement and such. 
 
Contained used and transit 
 
For contained use of GMOs, this is covered by GMAC Guidelines on 
LMOs research that IBC plays essential roles, only notification to GMAC. 
However, for the transit of GMOs, there is no specific mention of any specific 
procedure of that unless those GMOs contain BA or toxins that falls under 
BATA 2005 thus the rules and regulations are applicable with Biohazard sign. 
Thus the relevant local Singapore rules and regulations apply such as 
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customs and others. Besides, the party needs to apply for a transhipment 
permit for BA and toxins as provided by BATA 2005.637 
 
Unintentional transboundary movements  
 
For GMOs, there is no specific procedure for unintentional 
transboundary movements only there were questions that need to be 
answered and assessed by GMAC during the approval process according to 
the GMAC Agriculture Guidelines. This is further strengthened by the 
monitoring process by GMAC after approval. Thus this issue is addressed. 
As for BA and toxins or LMOs that contain them, this is strictly according to 
BATA 2005 that punishes the offenders for non-compliance. 
 
Monitoring and Reporting 
 
Singapore system of biosecurity as provided in BATA 2005 that lays 
down the going on of any incidents in the Biological Agents and toxins. The 
biosafety website also provides the forms to be completed mainly MOH to be 
notified of any incidents.638 Apart from this BATA 2005 also specify the 
contact person to be notified if any incidents occur. BATA 2005 listed down 
various duties and obligations of the applicants in which failure to comply with 
reporting will make them liable to be punished under BATA 2005. 
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Roster of Experts 
 
It seems that from Biosafety MOH and GMAC website, there is no 
exact information of the members of Biosafety Branch, only an organisational 
chart. The same for National Biosafety Committee there is no details of the 
members, only the relevant government agencies involved with biosafety. 
The contact person for BA and toxins is the Director of Health MOH. As for 
GMAC that deals with GMOs the members of the subcommittee are listed. 
Thus it seems in line with Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety that needs the 
roster of expert that relates GMOs not very much on BA and toxins 
(biosecurity) which seems outside Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety scope. 
 
Biosafety Clearing House (BCH) 
 
The Biosafety Clearing-House (BCH) is set up by the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety to facilitate the exchange of information on Living 
Modified Organisms (LMOs) and assist the Parties to better comply with their 
obligations under the Protocol.639 Since Singapore is not a party to 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, thus they are not required to have the BCH. 
However, according to Biosafety under MOH website for BA and toxins, they 
had their systematic information and organised institutional contact point 
whereby it is user-friendly and easy to use. From the website, the steps and 
forms needed for different types of application and the Ministry or agency to 
be contacted are provided. 
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 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 'Welcome to the BCH Central Portal' (2017) 
<https://bch.cbd.int/> accessed on 20 March 2015. 
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On the dealing with LMO or GMO, as the Guidelines are not legally 
binding as such, the relevant GMAC Committees are listed thus making it 
easy for them to contact the relevant contact person. The information on the 
GMO approvals by GMAC are listed on the website.640 
 
Thus in a way Singapore has their BCH for information of lists of 
LMOS approved in that country and the reports. However, the details of 
those applications are not available, unlike Malaysia. 
 
6. Singapore regulatory strategy on biosafety 
 
Command and control  
 
From the above discussion, it is opined that the primary strategy is still 
the state regulation whereby the Ministry of Health is taking the lead role in 
governing the biosecurity and biosafety issues in Singapore with other 
ministries and government agencies and department. The command and 
control is the primary strategy as there are laws and guidelines that must be 
followed by the interested and relevant parties in biosafety and biosecurity or 
else they will be liable to sanctions and punishments.  
 
The law imposed the fines ranging from $5000 to $1 million also 
imprisonment for non-compliance of the LMO and hazardous materials for 
handling, transport, packaging and identification. It is important to note here 
while Singapore is very strict in hazardous materials that trigger biosecurity 
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issues. From BATA 2005, for handling of LMO that is other than higher BSL 
levels, Singapore is using soft laws such as the Guidelines rather than Act of 
Parliament. This measure is seen as embracing the biotechnology research 
and development and future commercialisation rather than hard laws all the 
way. 
 
Smart regulation and regulatory pluralism 
 
However, apart from the primary command and control approach, 
there are elements of smart regulation in Singapore biosafety governance. 
This can be seen from the institutional biosafety chart as shown above. The 
Biosafety Branch of the working biosafety committee for BATA 2005 is 
providing the secretariat for the National Biosafety Committee. It is also 
representing the Ministry of Health as the National Authority (NA) for 
biosafety in general. They are performing the biosafety administrator and 
enforcer roles in ensuring compliance towards BATA 2005. Whereas the 
GMAC is an advisor also approver of the LMO applications after the relevant 
IBC have performed their roles, duties and responsibilities of scientific risk 
assessment and management. Thus there is ‘regulatory pluralism’ as well in 
Singapore biosafety governance as there is more than one actor in the 
decision-making process. The National Biosafety Committee regulates 
biosafety and biosecurity in general whereas GMAC and IBC are in charge of 
LMO risk assessment and management for research and release. The 
government in Singapore (Ministry of Health in particular) biosafety 
governance is seen to take more steering rather than rowing role as it seems 
to delegate the task of biosafety and biosecurity to NBC and GMAC for 
issues in handling biohazardous materials and LMOs respectively.  
 
The Singapore NBC as the regulator is practising instruments of smart 
regulation such as penal sanctions, education and advice. NBC roles in 
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educating and advising are by promoting biosafety awareness and nurture 
biosafety culture in Singapore through coordinating and monitoring training 
programmes in Singapore and the region also making recommendations to 
the Ministry of Environment for the revised Science guidelines for schools. 
Thus it can be seen that Singapore is making biosafety and biosecurity of 
paramount importance by introducing it at the early school level. 
 
The business as the self-regulator can be liable for sanctions for non-
compliance with BATA 2005 also other relevant laws and regulations. They 
are also given guidance on how to conduct their biosafety and biosecurity 
related-business by Singapore non-binding Guidelines which they are not 
bound to follow but usually followed as a matter of practice and custom. 
These strategies perhaps reduce business tense in following the standard 
strict procedures but ensure compliance as a matter of right business 
practice. 
 
The role of third parties such as the consumer association in GMAC is 
embraced as a good practice of democratic involvement thus ensuring public 
voices is heard. Public education on GM has increased and as to the public 
and groups but there is no significant oppositions against GMO in Singapore. 
 
Reflexive and meta-regulation 
 
The reflexive regulation is the self-regulation procedure whereby 
Singapore biosafety governance also practices the established norms and 
procedure. This can be seen by IBC risk assessment and management that 
is monitored by GMAC for LMOs. The risk assessment and management is a 
form of meta-regulation seems a norm for countries biosafety governance. 
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Self-regulation 
 
Biosafety self-regulation can be seen in IBC that mainly oversees its 
biosafety management but still tied to the BATA 2005 and GMAC approval 
for LMO also the Guidelines for GMOs and Agriculture. Singapore apart from 
being a member of Asia Pacific Biosafety like Malaysia is also hosting 
Singapore Biorisk Association. These bodies are self-regulated thus support 
and supplement the biosafety organisations and development in Singapore at 
the national and international level. 
 
Civil regulation 
 
Civil regulation in Singapore role is being formalised and 
institutionalised as the members of consumers association are part of GMAC 
for LMOS approval committee for research and release. Thus when voices of 
members of the public are being legalised in one of the most crucial biosafety 
institutions such as GMAC, thus public confidence could be restored thus 
enable more natural public acceptance of the LMO. It must be mentioned that 
Singapore aspiration is for the commercialisation of the biotechnology 
research and development. Thus public acceptance of the commercialised 
LMO products is vital not just in Singapore, but to the neighbouring countries 
such ASEAN and further abroad. Thus elements of transparency in LMO and 
biosafety can be seen here that could prove Singapore can go further with its 
biotechnology products. While this is seen as a good biosafety strategy, 
which is further enhanced by biosafety and biosecurity education that begins 
at the school level. These moves could bring Singapore to a further level that 
it intends with its billion dollars of biotechnology investment in biomedical 
research not just on the technology but human resources as well.  
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Licence model 
 
Again the three main licences namely economic, social and regulatory 
licences are the three licences that could be used by the various actors in 
biosafety and biosecurity in Singapore. The business sector if they ignore the 
regulatory licence could risk their biotechnology investments and licences 
through the Guidelines were not binding. However, BATA 2005 enforcement 
is strict on hazardous materials. Thus the regulator either NBC, GMAC, MOH 
also should be very careful on the trust put to them by the interested groups 
and the public could tarnish if, for instance, the same incident of SARS 
occurs again in the future thus jeopardising their regulator's licence.  
 
The public and interested parties could then resort to using social 
licence by joining international powerful vocal voice against LMO such as 
movements against Monsanto, Greenpeace and others. This is partly 
because Singapore is more open and liberal in accepting those international 
environmental, consumer organisations and non-governmental organisations.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, Singapore biosafety and biosecurity law seems to be a 
comprehensive model although not based on Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety but very much the US and international model. Singapore paradigm 
on biosafety and biosecurity issues is more towards protecting human health 
rather than the environment. This is perhaps understandably due to the 
Singapore SARS events and the fact that Singapore is a city-country with not 
much rainforest unlike its neighbour, Malaysia. Thus the fact that Singapore 
treats hazardous substance of importance rather than LMOs alone shows 
Singapore’s more liberal attitude in research, development and biomedical 
commercialisation towards LMO. This stand seems balance stance with 
Singapore BATA 2005 that deals with issues of biosecurity and GMAC to 
deal with LMOs approval in Singapore.  
 
Apart from the above analysis, perhaps Singapore obligations towards 
WTO further explains Singapore framework on biosafety. Singapore is 
dependent on free and open international trade for its economic growth.641 
Singapore membership in GATT ensured vital access to international market. 
This is especially essential for the product commercialisation also intellectual 
property rights (IPR) of the modern biotechnological products where billions 
of money have been invested in research and development. The free and 
open international trade is vital for Singapore to market the biotechnology 
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 Singapore Government. 'Singapore accedes to the GATT' (2014) 
<http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/history/events/c290cadb-54f9-45b1-bc95-7c25186e4a93> 
accessed on 30 December 2017 citing Hon on how S’pore fosters trade. (1973, September 
14). The Straits Times, 24. 
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products and IPR. Thus this explains Singapore liberal attitude towards 
LMOs. As one of the GATT principles is to trade without discriminations, 
which explains Singapore’s attitude of non-labelling of LMOs as it is equally 
as good as the conventional food. 
 
Singapore also attempts to reduce TBTs as standards, regulations 
and conformity assessment procedures as considered as TBTs.642 There is a 
commitment that in trading, parties should confer no less favourable than its 
jurisdiction. As Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is often argued a disguise as 
a TBT, that explains Singapore stance not being party to it. 
 
Another important of Singapore obligation towards WTO can be seen 
in Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) whereby measures are used to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health by preventing the introduction of pests 
and diseases and to help ensure that food is safe for consumption.643 Thus 
Singapore develops its biosecurity regulation, BATA 2005 to prevent 
biological agents and toxins. SPS measures require Party to favourably 
consider accepting the equivalence of each other’s SPS measures thus no 
further measures need be applied. As Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety644 
requires identification of LMOs which is not required by SPS, thus there 
seem to be conflicts in future. In short, it is argued that Singapore prepares 
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 International Enterprise Singapore, 'Technical Barriers to Trade' (2015) 
<https://www.iesingapore.gov.sg/Trade-From-Singapore/ASTEP/Technical-Barriers-to-
Trade> accessed on 26 December 2017. 
643
 International Enterprise Singapore, 'Sanitary & Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures' (2015) 
<https://www.iesingapore.gov.sg/Trade-From-Singapore/ASTEP/Technical-Barriers-to-
Trade> accessed on 26 December 2017. 
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its biosafety and biosecurity regulations and institutions in anticipation of its 
obligations with WTO. 
 
This will lead to the conclusion chapter of comparison between 
Malaysia and Singapore, not just for understanding but for the betterment of 
the biosafety system in Malaysia and harmonisation at the South East Asia 
region. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The present research aims to examine the legal and institutional 
framework on Malaysia biosafety in compliance with Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety and a comparative legal study with Singapore biosafety laws. The 
analysis is based on the regulatory theory primarily the risk regulation as 
explained at length in Chapter 2. The various strategies of the biosafety 
regulation are examined to analyse and demonstrate the shift of trend in 
regulation from command and control approach to new governance.  
 
There are some significant findings emerged from this study. It is 
found that there are many shortcomings of the existing biosafety legal and 
institutional framework in Malaysia (Chapter 3 and 4) when compared with 
Singapore (Chapter 5). The existing regulatory strategies of command and 
control, and the new governance such as  smart regulation, civil regulation, 
reflexive and meta-regulation and licence model645 were identified in Chapter 
4 and Chapter 5 on Malaysia biosafety and Singapore respectively. 
 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is used as a model biosafety 
framework in the thesis as it includes the most pressing biosafety issues 
worldwide thus provides the parameter of discussion. The thesis analyses 
towards the extent of Malaysia compliance with the Protocol in the legal and 
                                   
 
 
645Gunningham N, 'Regulating Biotechnology: Lessons from Environmental Policy' (2007) in 
Somsen, H, The Regulatory Challenge Of Biotechnology: Human Genetics, Food And 
Patents (Edward Elgar 2007). 
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institutional framework. As for a comparative legal study with Singapore, how 
the pertinent biosafety issues at hand are being implemented and 
institutionalised.   
 
This study is important in future, for knowledge and legitimacy for 
possible wider stakeholders and for the possible inclusion of cultural and 
socio-economic factors apart from scientific risk assessment and 
management for better governance of biosafety. 
  
This chapter is concluded with suggestions and recommendations to 
improve Malaysian biosafety law and institutions. 
 
1. A Comparative Legal Analysis of the Malaysia and Singapore 
Biosafety based on the Regulatory Theory:  
 
Command and control or new governance 
 
From the discussion of Malaysian (Chapter 3 and 4) and Singaporean 
(Chapter 5) respective legal and institutional framework, it is submitted that 
both countries’ biosafety regulations seem to practice mainly the command 
and control approach. However, there are elements of new governance 
approaches such as smart regulation, reflexive and meta-regulation, licence 
model as well as civil regulation in the biosafety regulation and 
implementation. This is to be elaborated further in the end of each country’s 
discussion of the existing legal and institutional framework.   
 
Malaysia 
 
Before moving on to the biosafety regulatory strategy, the 
shortcomings of Malaysian existing legal and institutional biosafety are to be 
highlighted initially. The Biosafety Act 2007 is the primary Act that regulates 
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the movement of LMOs in Malaysia either for contained use or release in the 
environment. Biosafety Act 2007 also established the important biosafety 
institutions such as NBB also GMAC thus making the biosafety law 
comprehensive. The Biosafety Rules and Regulations 2010 established IBC 
requirement for LMOs related research and release and also detailed out the 
further biosafety regulations such as risk assessment and management. 
Additionally, Malaysia also formulated the Guidelines on Lab Biosafety 
Procedure646 for lab biosafety. However, Malaysia does not have a 
comprehensive biosecurity laws like Singapore and the European 
countries647 in controlling biological agents and toxins.  
 
Malaysia Biosafety Act 2007 is also being criticised as being not fully 
compliant with the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety as some Key Protocol 
Biosafety issues are not being adequately addressed such as labelling, 
public participation, socio-economic considerations, religious, bioethics and 
many others. These aspects of biosafety are to be elaborated further below. 
Thus despite having a ‘comprehensive’ biosafety law, there are many issues 
that need to be addressed by Malaysia either by strengthening the Act or 
further producing more regulations or Guidelines like Singapore.  
 
Malaysia biosafety law is seen trying to accommodate and satisfy 
relevant stakeholders namely the existing government economic and political 
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 Ministry of Health Malaysia, Malaysia Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity Policy and 
Guideline (First edn, National Public Health Laboratory 2015). 
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 Anna Bielecka and Ali Akbar Mohammadi, ‘State-of-the-art in biosafety and biosecurity in 
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also international relations, public, business community, consumer 
associations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) also religious, 
international trade and environmental organisations. In order to strengthen 
the existing laws and regulations, the institutional role is to support them.    
 
In Malaysia, the NRE is the main Ministry that gives the final approval 
but again GMAC Malaysia provides mostly the scientific advice. The National 
Biosafety Board is the most important institution that will approve or 
disapprove LMOs applications based on GMAC’s advice and consultation 
with relevant government agencies and the public (where needed). The 
Biosafety Department acts like the Secretariat for the National Biosafety 
Board and ensures the implementation and enforcement of Biosafety Act 
2007. Other than that Act, there is Biosafety Approval and Regulation 2010 
which is a binding instrument, as part of the delegated legislation. 
 
Another crucial aspect of biosafety implementation in Malaysia is the 
bioethics issues with the aim to balance the enthusiasms of research and 
development in modern biotechnological development with the good ethical 
values in science. Malaysia has its National Bioethics Council which was 
established in 2010. However, the institutionalisation of this Bioethics Council 
is yet to be seen in the biosafety context as it seems there is lack of this 
Council’s participation in the biosafety decision-making process. From the 
website, it can be seen that Malaysia is still at the early developing stage of 
this National Bioethics Council presumably at the education and awareness 
level towards its staff and joint co-operation with other Bioethics Council in 
other countries. 
 
It is submitted that the importance of this Bioethics Council could not 
be emphasised more, coupled with the fact that Malaysia is a multi-ethnics, 
multi-religious and multi-cultural countries. It is not just about respecting 
consumer choice per se (which could be done inter alia through labelling) but 
  
 
375 
 
 
 
also reflecting the public participation in the biosafety decision-making 
process as part of democratic process. 
 
Another important findings is the institutional approach that can be 
deduced from Malaysian biosafety as mentioned above is that it is the usual 
Malaysian top-down approach whereby laws and regulations are to be abide 
and implemented from Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment to the 
National Biosafety Board with GMAC’s advice. NRE and NBB are the 
decision makers whereas GMAC Malaysia plays an influential advisory 
besides an administrative role in scientific matters mostly in GMO application. 
Apart from scientific risk assessment, a limited public and NGOs’ views are 
said to be taken into account in the biosafety decision-making process. This 
seems to be an element of civil regulation which is formerly discussed in 
Chapter 4. The only problem is the transparency and effectiveness of those 
mediums.   
 
From these biosafety related institutions, it seems the primary 
biosafety regulatory approach is still the command and control approach, 
whereby the central Ministry either in Malaysia or Singapore are given the 
statutory power to regulate and are also equipped with the administrative 
roles and responsibilities with fines and imprisonment power are given to 
punish those individuals or institutions that breach the said Acts. 
 
Besides having its primary command and control approach Singapore 
laws and regulations are more liberal and open with not so much restrictions, 
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especially on LMOs. Singapore in GM food consumption adopts the Codex 
substantial equivalence approach rather than Malaysia Biosafety Act 2007 
that adopts the more cautious precautionary approach. This approach is in 
line with the United States approach on GMOs.648 The issue on which 
approach is better, is outside the scope of this research. However, in 
Singapore, there are elements of smart regulation whereby there is voluntary 
adherence to the non-binding Guidelines, where parties concerned usually 
follow.  
 
In Malaysia, there is a binding Biosafety (Approval and Notification) 
Regulation 2010 where parties are bound to follow. This is the difference 
between Malaysia and Singapore and questions might arise as to the 
effectiveness of these different measures which are yet to be seen in the 
future. 
 
Malaysia biosafety regulation applies some elements of smart 
regulation strategy and ‘regulatory pluralism’ as there is various strategies 
and actors involved. Smart regulation strategy can be seen in the public also 
interested groups awareness and participation in biosafety decision-making 
process. However, other smart regulation instruments such as 
disqualifications, notices, warnings, persuasion might not be applicable or 
even suitable, unless those are purely administrative measures in 
compliance with the law and regulations.    
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 Restrictions on Genetically Modified Organisms: United States, which can be found online 
at <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions-on-gmos/usa.php> accessed on 20th November 
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Reflexive and meta-regulation strategy, i.e.  the ‘steering rather than 
rowing’  function of the regulator , can be seen from the GMO application to 
the NBB as NBB are advised by GMAC who gives opinion based on risk 
assessment.  
 
Civil regulation in biosafety decision-making process through public 
awareness and participation further adds to the democratic involvement. 
However, this should not be seen effective solutions as the public and NGOs 
in Malaysia are only seen able to exert pressure but not as powerful like in 
the Europe, to change policy or making differences. A more systematic and 
organised public awareness and participation together with the consumer 
associations and environmentalists could provide more effective pressure 
towards the regulators asserting their rights and beliefs. 
    
Model licence propounded by Gunningham, Kagan and Thornton are 
examining corporate behaviours towards the environment. This regulatory, 
social and economic licences, like the civil regulation also of little application 
in Malaysia. It is arguably due to the low level awareness of the consumers, 
the environmentalists propagating more political rather than environmental 
issues and many more reasons. However, due to the Malaysians (‘netizens’) 
recent trend of high level of time spent and engagement on social media 
such as Facebook and Twitter, it is predicted that in future, provided that the 
level of education, awareness and education on GMO is widespread, the 
licence model could be realised.   
 
Singapore 
 
As for Singapore, the existing biosafety legal and institutional 
framework is summarised as follows. Singapore has two sets of laws one for 
biosecurity another for biosafety. Biosecurity law, especially on BA and 
toxins, is regulated by BATA 2005 whereas biosafety law regulated by GMAC 
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Guidelines on Research and Agriculture. BATA 2005 besides providing the 
laws for biosecurity, regulation of BA and toxins, also provides the 
institutional framework for biosafety and biosecurity. GMAC Guidelines on 
Research and Agriculture provides rules and regulations for GMO regulation, 
also the GMAC and relevant government ministries, departments and 
agencies also IBC as the essential biosafety institutional framework. BATA 
2005 details out the transport, handling, biosafety level, for BA and toxins 
also the fines and punishment for non-compliance. This is a command and 
control approach to the biosecurity governance. However, on the biosafety 
issues, it seems more flexible as soft laws such as Guidelines are being used 
for adherence, thus boost up modern biotechnology especially on GMOs 
research at the same time allowing research freedom. 
 
From the institutional discussion above, it can be seen that the 
Ministry of Health under Biosafety Branch that provides the secretariat of 
National Biosafety Committee plays a major regulatory including 
administrative roles and responsibilities in relation to the working of biosafety 
decision-making with the implementation of BATA 2005. However, it is 
observed that GMAC plays a significant role as advisory although mostly 
scientific advice such as scientific risk assessment and also non-scientific 
perspective. It is important to stress again that the two (2) GMAC guidelines 
on research and agriculture are non-binding as the final approval lies with 
GMAC. Moreover, there are other institutions such as AVA or MOH 
respectively depends on whether it is related to agriculture or research 
matters on biological agents and toxins. Even though the adherence to 
GMAC is voluntary however it seems the parties that deals with these 
biological agents seem to adhere to these guidelines. 
 
In line with the regional biomedical hub plans, Singapore maintains a 
high standard of biosafety lab procedure in biomedical research and 
development. It is important to note here that on biomedical research 
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Singapore has its own Bioethics Advisory Committee (BAC) that offers more 
comprehensive ethics review. Singapore has its Code of Ethical Practice 
2009 for biomedical researches. Thus Singapore has institutionalised its 
ethics issues more efficiently than Malaysia. However again BAC works as 
an advisory body not deciding on any biomedical proposals.649 
 
Singapore’s approach in the GMOs is more towards soft law and there 
is no umbrella legislation on GMOs only GMAC Guidelines on Agriculture 
and Research. These Guidelines have no binding effect as they are not Acts 
of Parliament as such but customarily being followed by those parties who 
would like to apply for GMOs in agriculture and research in Singapore.   
 
Among the advantages of these soft laws are research and 
development are expected to grow in line with Singapore economic 
aspiration, at the same time controlling the critical safety features of GMOs 
release in Singapore. In the release of GMOs in agriculture, the parties 
obtain the approval from GMAC together with the scientific risk assessment. 
Thus it seems here GMAC, apart from being only advisor role, also have a 
strong institutional influence on biosafety. This is the same compare to 
Malaysia. 
 
Singapore’s stance towards biosafety seems almost like the United 
States approach. The US however does not have specific federal laws that 
relate to the GMO regulation. In the US, the LMOs are treated equal like the 
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conventional products which regulations are contained in the health, safety 
and environmental aspects. This further explains the fact that the US being 
the world’s number one producer of GMO products. The law is favourable to 
the development and commercialisation of the modern biotechnological 
products. There are little restrictions for GMOs “that differs significantly in 
structure, function, or composition from substances found currently in food,” 
thus a premarket approval of the product is required.650However, recently in 
December 2018, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) laid out 
it first ever requirement labelling of LMO or GMO food to be implemented in 
2020.651 The U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue on 20th December, 
2018 announced the National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard 
following the National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Law, which was 
passed by Congress in July 2016. The law directed USDA to establish this 
national mandatory standard for disclosing foods that are or may be 
bioengineered.652This big step by the world’s largest producer of GMO 
produced should be applauded, following the consumers’ outcry for greater 
transparency in food consumption. 
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20th November , 2018 
651
 Reuters, ‘USDA Outlines First-Ever Rule for GMO Labeling, Sees Implementation in 
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However when dealing with biosecurity in Singapore, i.e. Biological 
Agents (BA) and toxins, they have to adhere to BATA 2005 that imposed 
strict punishment for non-compliance. This is due to the fact of SARS incident 
that occurred previously thus Singapore is taking a strict approach to 
controlling BA and toxins. This biosecurity law reflects a command and 
control approach. Besides that, Singapore also adopted the smart regulations 
elements such through penal sanctions and educating the public awareness 
and participation as elaborated in Chapter 5. ’Regulatory pluralism’ can also 
be seen from the Singapore biosafety and biosecurity strategies. The NBC 
played the important role in educating the Singapore public on biosafety and 
biosecurity from the school level. The business community as self regulators 
abide the GMOs guidelines rather than strict laws. The role of third parties 
such as the public and consumer associations, such as through GMAC 
membership, even though currently there is no strong opposition from them 
towards the biosafety regulator, adds to the more democratic involvement in 
Singapore biosafety.   
  
The reflexive regulation through IBC and GMAC risk assessment is 
another practice for biosafety administration. There is also element of self- 
regulation in Singapore Biorisk Association as a society that regulates its 
membership with its own rules and regulations to fulfil its objectives. The civil 
regulation in Singapore is formalised as one of the GMAC members is a 
representative from the consumer association (as discussed in Chapter 5) for 
LMOs approval committee for research and release. The licence models of 
social, economic and regulatory could be of application in Singapore 
biosafety and biosecurity. The business sects may lose their regulatory 
licence if they do not comply with the GMO guidelines or worse contravene 
BATA 2005 as sanctions and punishments can be imposed. The social 
licence by the public and consumers on their wary against LMO products if 
ignored by the biotechnology companies can drive them out of business. The 
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economic licence can be used by the public to pressure the biotechnology 
companies such as a campaign against Monsanto worldwide. 
 
It is submitted here that these are possible regulatory strategies 
applicable in biosafety governance in Malaysia and Singapore by analysing 
the legal and institutional framework. The issue of whether in reality these 
strategies play little or important roles in Malaysia and Singapore 
respectively, is very much dependant on the current social, economic and 
political conditions of both countries. It is in line with Gunningham’s view that 
the political, social, economic and scientific contexts in which biotechnology 
and environmental regulation must operate are very different.653 This is 
especially true even though Malaysian and Singaporean share a lot of 
similarities; however they might have different attitudes, perspectives and 
level of trust towards the government. For example, even though there is no 
formal requirement of public participation in the LMO application (as an 
element of civil regulation) in Singapore (unlike in Malaysia), the Singapore 
public instead are being informed of the types of LMOs approved through the 
websites. It seems here the Singaporeans have higher trust in their 
government to decide what is best on the citizens’ behalf. The effectiveness 
of these regulatory strategies either traditional or new governance, is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. It could be an interesting area for future research.   
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It can be concluded that due to the sensitive and changing nature of 
modern biotechnology also severity and unpredictable of the damage 
towards human health and environment, there are new strategies of 
regulation rather than the usual command and control approach.  
 
It can be seen that the changing trend of regulation is perhaps to 
accommodate many stakeholders, provides transparency, better reception 
and perception to the public.  
 
Furthermore, with modern information technology communication 
nowadays not just from mainstream media but widespread usage of social 
media, leaving the consumers to search for the unlimited modern 
biotechnology information at the tip of their fingers. Thus public instead of 
being indoctrinated by the regulator or the government through mainstream 
media will get access to various types of information that can shape their 
opinions and views also beliefs.  
 
Another trend observed is the emergence of various global regulatory 
agreements such as Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety as it affects 
transboundary movement of LMOs to provide better global governance. 
These agreements once negotiated and agreed later to be ratified and signed 
then implemented by countries’ national laws. 
 
Malaysia and Singapore shape their own national biosafety laws even 
though both countries were part of the negotiating parties but in the end have 
different stance towards the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. The national 
biosafety laws are enacted accordingly with differences in breadth and depth. 
 
There might be similarities and differences of both biosafety laws as 
discussed and there are various reasons for that practice which is discussed 
below. 
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2. An analysis of Malaysia and Singapore difference stance towards 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
 
The result of this study indicates that, firstly, the main ministries 
involved reflect the countries’ leading focus and priorities. This perhaps 
shapes the different approaches of biosafety laws in Malaysia and 
Singapore. 
 
For Malaysia, the primary focus besides research and development in 
modern biotechnology is the preservation of biodiversity and further 
commercialisation of Malaysian abundant natural resources and agricultural 
products. Thus that is the reason the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment being the main ministry in charge of biosafety instead of 
Ministry of Health (MOH) or previously Ministry of Science and Technology 
(MOSTE). Although Malaysia also conducts research and development of 
modern biotechnology products, the primary focus now seems on the further 
R&D of important staple food such as rice, also main export product such as 
rubber and palm oil. 
 
In contrast, Singapore’s primary ministry that deals with biosafety is 
the Ministry of Health. This reflects Singapore concerns over SARS, H1N1 
and issues concerning public health like Anthrax threat that occurred in the 
United States. The fact that biomedical industry is the focus of modern 
biotechnology research and later commercialisation is due to Singapore 
limited land resources that unable to expand its agrobiotech business. Apart 
from MOH, there are other primary agencies that deals with biosafety namely 
AVA, MOH, Ministry of Manpower (MOM) and National Environmental 
Agency (NEA). AVA deals with agriculture and veterinary GM related 
products and MOH in relation to research and development of biological 
agents and public health issues for concerns over biosecurity and 
bioterrorism. MOM is perhaps directly related to the recruitment of many 
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international scientists and researchers from all over the world to Singapore’s 
billion investments in research and development. NEA is understandably 
responsible for the release of biological agents in the Singapore environment. 
 
Apart from the economic aspiration factor above, it has been 
discussed in Chapter 5 that Singapore’s involvement with the existing WTO 
agreements related to GMOs such as TBT, GATT and SPS are among the 
reasons of the different stance taken by Singapore in not ratifying the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. Coupled with the facts of billion dollars 
investment in modern biotechnology research and development mainly for 
intellectual property and further product commercialisation, this Singapore 
stance seems the right strategy for a wider market liberalisation and 
acceptance. These scenarios perhaps also provide the reason for 
Singapore’s different approach towards biosafety laws. 
   
Malaysia and Singapore implementation of the key biosafety issues  
 
Thus, the next question is the Malaysian and Singaporean formulation 
of crucial biosafety issues into national biosafety laws namely as follows: 
 
Scientific risk assessment 
 
From the legal and institutional biosafety framework of Malaysia and 
Singapore, both countries placed importance stress on the scientific risk 
assessment on the approval of GM related products. Primarily the GM 
products are tested on their allergenicity, toxicity and safety. The only issue is 
on the breadth and width of these scientific risk assessment by Malaysia and 
Singapore, whether they are sufficient to cover the biosafety risks concerns. 
It is submitted that beside the scientific part, the details of the risk 
assessment in Malaysia should cover the socio-economic considerations that 
are relevant to Malaysia.  
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Public participation in Malaysia 
 
Biosafety Act 2007 provides for public participation. In Malaysia, GM 
approval report contains feedbacks from the public and NGOs with not many 
details. More controversy in Malaysia in this regard is the release of the GM 
mosquito in Pahang, Malaysia that raises the issue of the effectiveness of the 
provision of public participation in biosafety decision-making process. GMAC 
Malaysia consists of members from the universities that perhaps could give 
the public feedback on biosafety. 
 
However, to what extent the Malaysian public are being informed as to 
the LMOs are still issues especially on the GM mosquitoes in Pahang. By 
looking at Malaysian biosafety website, advertisements are inviting 
Malaysians public to involve in the GMOs decision-making process. The 
Malaysian GMAC reported that there are some inputs from the concerned 
public on those issues. Another issue here is to what extent did the 
Malaysians participate? This public consultation is advertised in the two 
leading local newspapers and website. In light of the current IT era whereby 
newspapers are rarely being bought physically, this practice seems 
appropriate. The problem lies to those who are illiterate on information 
technology especially the rural areas. The awareness and sufficiency of the 
biosafety information are doubted. 
 
GMAC reported that there were some inputs from the public and some 
consumer associations presumably TWN and CAP, but to what extent GMAC 
and NBB incorporated Malaysian public views in the decision-making 
process, is questionable. This is based on GM mosquito in Pahang also the 
lack of details report from GMAC.  
 
Another issue is on labelling that relates to consumer choices 
preferences, belief, religion and also cultural. Thus there are two main issues 
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here namely the extent of public concerns is being taken into decision-
making process also the type of information and education given to the public 
on GMOs. 
 
Further issue that is being overlooked is the socio-economic 
considerations that are closely related to the small farmers’ views that almost 
unheard of in Malaysia but also raising concerns. With limited capital and 
access to the recent research and development in agriculture, the 
introduction of better seeds and cultivation seems could be either a threat or 
opportunity depending on the circumstances. The fact that some local and  
indigenous people live in the intended area or agriculture related to LMOs 
also small farmers’ living, are issues that should not be just ignored. It is 
submitted that in future these are the areas of concerns that should be further 
to be taken into consideration by the regulators.  
 
Public participation in Singapore 
 
As for Singapore, the earlier public consultation was done on BATA 
Bill 2005. GMAC provides Subcommittee for Public Awareness that educates 
the public. There are also members of the Press and consumer association. 
Presumably Singaporeans are more liberal and open towards GM products 
rather than Malaysian who seem to be more sensitive especially on religious 
and cultural concerns.  
 
However, GMAC also states that public involvement only when it is 
needed. Thus there is not so much room for public participation in GMOs 
release in agriculture. It is up to GMAC to decide based on the risk 
assessment done to evaluate before approval of the effect of LMOs on 
human health and environment for Singapore. 
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Thus on this issue, for those countries that join Cartagena Protocol, 
there are rooms for public participation. The only issue is how efficient that 
medium is being used as part of the decision-making process. For those 
countries that did not sign the Cartagena Protocol like Singapore, perhaps 
the biosafety institutions are educating the public on GMOs rather than 
making the public to participate in the biosafety decision-making process. It is 
the country that decides for the good of the people rather than the public 
themselves on the issues of human health and environment.  
 
Labelling 
 
While Malaysia is going towards mandatory labelling of GM products 
from its Biosafety Act 2007, and Food Regulation 1985 that makes it 
mandatory for GM food that enters Malaysia to be labelled, Singapore has no 
such labelling ruling. The labelling concern in Malaysia partly due to some 
active consumer associations and environmentalist NGOs such as Consumer 
Association of Penang (CAP), Third World Network (TWN), Muslim 
Consumers’ Association (PPIM) and few others. Issues raised were religious, 
cultural, ethical also environmental concerns that pressured the government 
for mandatory labelling also government consultation with these bodies. 
  
In Singapore on the other hand, there is no active consumer group’s 
opposition.654 Singapore authorities follow internationally proven science-
based standards in enacting the regulatory framework for approving the 
imports of agriculture-related GMOs.  Singapore tends to follow the lead of 
                                   
 
 
654USA Foreign Agricultural Service, Singapore Biotechnology Agricultural Biotechnology 
Report 2006 (Global Agriculture Information Network SN6006, 2006)7. 
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developed countries and international bodies like Codex Alimentarius in 
allowing the entry of GMOs into the country.655 This is because Singapore 
adopted the substantial equivalence concept for GMOs food rather than 
being cautious. Singapore has no labelling of GMOs unless it contains BA 
and toxins thus being labelled as Biohazards. 
 
Liability and redress 
 
Malaysia is one of those developing countries that voice upon the 
issues of liability and redress over the side effects of the GM products during 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety negotiation process. The fear of being 
dumping grounds of GM products also the unintentional transboundary 
movement made Malaysia of imposing fines up to Ringgit Malaysia 
500,000.00 for non-compliance with Malaysia Biosafety Act 2007. However, 
to date, Malaysia due to its lack of building capacity has not ratified The 
Nagoya – Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
 
As for Singapore, those parties need to follow GMAC Guidelines on 
Agriculture for the release of GMOs. Moreover, as for contained use or 
research, they have to follow GMAC Guidelines on Research in which the 
relevant IBC only notifies GMAC for LMOs research. However, for breach of 
BATA 2005 on BA and toxins, Singapore imposed severe penalties for 
breach of the laws and regulations. This is much more related to biosecurity 
rather than biosafety. 
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Socio-economic considerations 
  
In recent years there are growing socio-economic considerations 
issues being discussed namely ethics, bioethics, religious, cultural, the effect 
on local agriculture apart from scientific assessment in Malaysia perhaps due 
to the fact Malaysia is party to Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety whereas 
Singapore is not. According to the Protocol, there are mentions on the socio-
economic issues to be taken into consideration by the signing countries with 
guidelines on how to implement them. However, it seems that it is still up to 
countries’ laws on how to go about dealing with socio-economic issues. Thus 
the legality or non-legality of these laws will only arise when any countries 
challenge in the court or WTO. In a study by Gupta and Falkner, the socio 
economic requirement in the WTO or other international medium argued by 
developing countries during the negotiations of the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety  ‘…are not officially voiced as a reason to restrict trade or domestic 
GMO releases.’ Simultaneously, ‘…such concerns are constantly present as 
the backdrop to domestic application of scientific risk assessment processes 
and decisions about uptake.’656 
 
As for Singapore, being a developed country also obligations towards 
WTO as discussed in Chapter 5, this socio-economic considerations perhaps 
is not a key issue compared to a developing country.657 Perhaps that is the 
reason as to why Singapore takes the same stand in Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety like other developed countries such as the US. In Singapore 
                                   
 
 
656Gupta A and Falkner R, 'The influence of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: Comparing 
Mexico, China and South Africa' (2006) 6(4) Global Environmental Politics 49. 
657ibid. 
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biomedical research as mentioned above, BAC plays an essential role in 
giving bioethical views. This organised bioethics involvement in Singapore 
biomedical research as part of biosafety should be applauded and lesson 
learnt by Malaysia to improve the institutionalisation of bioethics in Malaysia. 
 
Economic impact 
 
The economic impact of Malaysia’s modern biotechnology is to be 
taken into account considering its exports of agricultural products mainly 
rubber and palm oil and involvement in the WTO. The socio-economic 
considerations as in Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety outlines on the impact 
of modern biotechnology products on the local and indigenous people which 
are later inserted in the Malaysian Biosafety Act 2007. Malaysia then needs 
to balance between the country’s aspiration to generate growth based on 
modern biotechnology products and the need to protect human health and 
the environment. For example, the import of cheaper GM products resulting 
from the new Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, for instance, will affect the Malaysian agriculture especially the 
small agriculture industries. 
 
As for Singapore, a country gearing towards being a biomedical hub in 
the region, with less local and indigenous people issue to be taken into 
account, this economic impact of modern biotechnology is going towards a 
positive direction. This started from billions of money invested in modern 
biotechnology research later further commercialised, even though Singapore 
is a city-country with limited land, unlike Malaysia. 
 
Precautionary approach 
 
Malaysia adopts the precautionary principle as being a party to 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. This precautionary approach is said to be 
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trade restrictive658 compared to other WTO agreements. Malaysia’s view 
seems to be in line with the European Union’s reliance on the precautionary 
principle towards the GMO products. However, the European has a 
comprehensive and strict legal regime on the GMO regulation due to it 
sceptical consumer, farmers and environmentalists.659 It is argued that 
Malaysia should have its own liberal stance towards GMO regulation i.e. 
neither be too open like the Singaporean and the US, nor too strict like the 
European Union. Each country has their different approaches in regulating 
modern biotechnology. An interesting comparison is between the more 
optimists US and the pessimist European Union. Their philosophical 
differences have shaped their origins of rule legal and institutional biosafety 
framework.660 The same is true for Malaysia and Singapore. Malaysia should 
take a medium approach in taking advantage in commercialising its 
biodiversity through modern biotechnology and protecting its rich biological 
resources.  
 
As for Singapore that adopts substantial equivalence principle in GM 
food consumption, this difference in approach perhaps attracts more 
countries to trade with Singapore more freely than with Malaysia. 
 
                                   
 
 
658ibid 29. 
659
 Acosta L, ‘Restrictions on Genetically Modified Organisms: United States Mayis 
16(2014)2015 can be found online at <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions-on-
gmos/eu.php> accessed on 20 November 2018. 
660Young TR, ‘National Experiences with Legislative Implementation of the Protocol’(2013) in 
Cordonier Segger, MC and Others (ed), Legal Aspects of Implementing the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety (Cambridge University Press 2013) 331. 
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In summary, Malaysia, like other developing countries (also the 
European Union), adopt stricter measures than the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety as can be seen from its subject matter and administrative 
procedures661 presumably to protect its natural biodiversity from being 
exploited by other developed countries. Singapore on the other hand is in 
agreement with other developed countries like the US adopt an open and 
liberal approach in the biosafety and biosecurity laws. This in part explains 
the economic growth of these countries’ revenue from GMO business 
worldwide.    
 
3. Some recommendations on Malaysia biosafety law 
 
From the analysis of Malaysia compliance report with  
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, it can generally be observed that while 
improving its biosafety capacity building, Malaysia made various efforts to 
fulfill it. Despite those efforts to implement the essential biosafety issues, 
enormous amount of country’s budget and outside funding are needed. 
Some recommendations for future development on biosafety legal and 
institutional framework are suggested.   
 
Legal framework on biosafety 
 
As stated earlier the primary biosafety laws of Malaysia are the 
Biosafety Act 2007 and Biosafety (Approval and Notifications) Regulation 
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2010. The inadequacies of the laws have been highlighted and identified as 
follows: 
 
a) the adequacy of the enforcement labelling of GMOs. This is to reflect 
ethics principles of consumer choices that reflect beliefs, religious and 
cultural preferences in a multi-cultural society in Malaysia. This labelling 
should be more effective if the consumers are educated in the LMOs rather 
than leaving them curious and unsatisfied. 
b) public participation element and to what extent they are transparent and 
have been incorporated in the biosafety decision-making process. It is 
suggested that the public in giving input should be well informed of the 
product or process of the LMOs or products for them to give an active 
contribution. It is suggested that the LMOs in contained use should be left 
within the expertise of science and technology unless it is related to human 
and environment whereby bioethics consideration to be taken into account. 
 
As for release with the environment, the public should be actively involved 
especially in relation to the area of release involved. As for import control of 
LMOs, the factors of local agriculture business should be taken into 
paramount consideration as it might significantly affect local farmers. As for 
export of LMOs, Malaysia should abide by the WTO agreements, the 
Cartagena Protocol also other international guidelines, the proposed 
countries laws, regulations and guidelines. This is with a view that Malaysia 
will be answerable and liable for any claims later if standard international 
procedures are followed.  
 
c) The importance of bioethics and biosafety education could not be stressed 
more. Thus the efforts by the organs or enforcers of the laws and bodies that 
provide biosafety information should be strengthened to build up Malaysia 
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capacity building in biosafety. As mentioned earlier this should start with a 
firm stance on bioethics then to formulate Malaysia’s own bioethics policy. 
d) As socio-economic considerations are unique to Malaysia as discussed in 
the previous Chapter 3 and 4, thus it is time for Malaysia to seriously 
consider to include the detail of socio-economic impact assessment if 
necessary. It was previously discussed in Chapter 3 that socio-economic 
considerations ‘may’ be taken into consideration as stated in Section 35 of 
the Biosafety Act 2007 with no details in its application. Regulation 25 of the 
Biosafety (Approval and Notification) Regulations 2010 list out several socio-
economic considerations that may be taken into account by the NBB or 
Minister namely:  
a) changes in the existing social and economic pattern, means of the 
livelihood of the communities  
b) effects on the religions, social, cultural and ethical values by the 
introduction of the LMOs. 
The discussion of these possible social-economic considerations in Malaysia 
has been much discussed in Chapter 3.  
It can be summed up these areas of concern are of paramount important 
namely: 
i) The LMOs that involve Malaysia’s main agriculture commodities namely 
palm oil, rubber and rice 
ii)The small farmers ventures with limited capital as compared to big 
agriculture companies 
iii)It is submitted that without much emphasis on either the product or process 
of LMOs, according to the religious view in Islam, provided that it complies 
with the general ruling in Islam for instance in slaughtering no cruelty against 
animal, ‘halal’ (permissible) food consumption requirement, LMOs should be 
accepted for the betterment of human life and the environment. However, if 
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modern biotechnology does more harm than good as against the five (5) 
main necessities in Islam namely religion, progeny, aql’ (mind), life and 
property, even though it adheres to the general Islamic ruling, thus it should 
be prevented. For example the betterment of LMOs palm oil will cause quality 
seed monopoly, driving the poor small scale farmers poorer, perhaps 
development in modern biotechnology should not be stopped only 
mechanisms should be improved. 
In short, it can be summarised that the Islamic ruling on LMOs should be 
based on the general ruling on food consumption as mentioned above. Apart 
from that the five (5) necessities should be adhered to. Thus the Islamic 
ruling can be based on the general and specific ruling based on the 
cicumstances of the case, it can be broad and flexible and it can be rigid as 
well. Based on the ‘maslahah’ (importance) and various methods of Islamic 
ruling, the Islamic scholars are to be advised by the scientists on the working 
of the products or process of LMOs in order to give the Islamic ruling or 
‘fatwa’. Practically in Malaysia, the ultimate labelling of ‘halal’ apart from LMO 
labelling, determines the Muslim consumerism issues. Thus it can be said 
that there are two (2) important aspects of the Islamic ruling :  
i)as religious views from the Muslim scholars for the Muslim consumers (as 
Islamic laws in Malaysia is only applicable to the Muslims only).       
ii)Labelling of ‘halal’ upon checking the premises, ingredients, process or 
procedures etc by the JAKIM officers based on the general Islamic ruling and 
Malaysian ‘halal’ labelling. 
Thus it is important for the National Bioethics Council to involve the Muslims 
scholars (from IKIM, JAKIM and the muftis (Islamic scholars) and other 
religion scholars for different views on LMOs. 
The LMOs acceptance do not go against the  Malaysian multi-religious 
beliefs such as Muslim, Christian, Hindus and Buddhists on special dietary 
requirement especially vegetarian, vegans, etc. While social, cultural and 
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ethical can be closely related with religions, the discussion can be broaden in 
the Malaysian context from the various religions’ view abovementioned. 
The social, cultural and ethical issues are inter-related depending on the 
religions and ethnicity. A dialogue among the various religious scholars also 
representative is desirable in giving out especially controversial areas of 
LMOs. For instance the genetic engineering inter breed between plants and 
animals that are considered as holy (such as cows for Hindus) or ‘haram’ 
(such as pork consumption for Muslim). 
In other probabilities when it involves the more diverse ethnics of Sabah and 
Sarawak also the aborigines living near the jungle in Peninsular Malaysia that 
have their own social, cultural beliefs based on their established religions, 
paganism or aninisminic. This is especially true when the LMOs is released 
or directly affected their economic and means of livelihood. Thus perhaps a 
special attention should be estbalished involving the leaders of these tribes 
with the biosafety regulators.  
However, it is submitted that the assessment should not hinder growth in 
research and development of modern biotechnology development that could 
generate income for the country’s economy. It is submitted that a 
comprehensive social, economic, religious, cultural and ethical that best suits 
the multi-ethnics Malaysians be established. While religious and cultural 
might be specific on races and religions of Peninsular and the East Malaysia, 
it can start off with a clear ethical stance like Norway’s practice on LMOs as 
discussed in Chapter 3. As a start, a code or guide on the standard good 
bioethical practice on modern biotechnological research and development 
should be developed. It is suggested that a working committee between the 
researchers and National Bioethics Council should be established to produce 
the very own Malaysian bioethics. 
The same is with the general social and economic stance on biosafety, 
perhaps a national policy that reflects all these concerns should be 
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formulated as a start. Thus the specific Guidelines based on religions and 
cultural will complement that policy. In this regard the biosafety framework 
should not be seen as rigid as the policy and guidelines to legalise Malaysia 
stance on biosafety for future law enactment also to encourage research and 
development in modern biotechnology. This strategy might be seen as smart 
regulation that allows more stakeholders’ views for biosafety decision making 
process for public acceptance and trust for biosafety regulators to decide 
what is best for the nation and country’s economy. On the other hand a 
further enactment of these concerns into Malaysian biosafety laws might add 
to the command and control approach but legalise Malaysia efforts in case 
Malaysia’s actions is questioned by any WTO members. It is hoped that it will 
be developed further in future in Malaysia. A socio-economic impact 
assessment might be seen to be too ambitious so do trade and modern 
biotechnology research and development restrictive. Thus a detailed study 
and justification for inclusion of the socio-economic impact assessment as 
part of the risk assessment if it is necessary in the future. 
e) A broad and comprehensive national biosafety policy should be in place. 
Thus it would cater for the future issues of biosecurity and bioterrorism like 
Singapore for dangerous biological agents and toxins. Beside, a good biorisk 
management according to the international standard should be formulated to 
complement the policy and laws. 
f) The law662 provides for any applicants who are dissatisfied to appeal 
towards the decision of the National Biosafety Board but to the Ministry of 
Natural Environment and Resources on notification procedures on LMOs. 
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Thus if the applicants are still not satisfied with the NBB and Ministry 
decision, options for judicial review is open to them. However, it is argued 
that court’s decision upon review of the LMOs application should be guided 
based on scientific and relevant socio-economic considerations as provided 
by the law. The court of law is to balance those considerations unless there 
are glaring errors of law and facts in principles and implementation.  
 
Institutional framework on biosafety 
 
Apart from the laws, rules and regulations of biosafety, the institutional 
framework of Malaysia should not be neglected. The primary boards namely 
the National Biosafety Board (NBB) and Genetic Modification Advisory 
Committee (GMAC) are seen to be in place. However, it is suggested that 
GMAC should be more democratic involving the fields of social science, 
consumer association also members of the National Bioethics Council as 
well. The National Bioethics Council should widen its scope and contribution 
towards the biosafety decision-making process. The inclusion of the Islamic 
views on biosafety such as from IKIM, JAKIM and Muftis is desirable taking 
into account that Malaysia is a majority Muslim population. The views of other 
religions from various ethnics in Malaysia are equally important that shape 
Malaysian public social, cultural and ethical beliefs. 
 
4. Harmonisation of national biosafety laws 
 
Harmonisation of the various national biosafety laws among the 
ASEAN countries especially between Malaysia and Singapore is crucial 
especially when there are dealings between the parties and non-parties to 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. While the parties are tied to compliance 
towards the Protocol, the non-parties on the other hand possibly have their 
obligations towards WTO as previously mentioned in Chapter 1.It is argued 
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while there are fewer issues for members that are already parties to the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the main problems lie for non-parties. This 
is because the essential biosafety issues are dealt with their respective 
national laws. The only difference is that the way the countries legislate their 
national laws and institutions are diverse, provided that they comply with the 
Protocol. 
 
Thus for dealings among the parties and non-parties on transboundary 
movement of LMOs, the relevant international agreement by WTO should be 
adhered to such as GATT, TBT and SPS. However, it is anticipated that 
there might be future conflicts on these dealings as arguably these WTO 
agreements might conflict with Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in some 
aspects. Thus it is for the countries to settle the disputes by their national 
laws provided that they do not contradict with the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety and the WTO agreements. Consequently, any conflicts will end in 
the case of EC Biotech as previously explained in the Introductory Chapter, 
as the countries will further pursue their claims at the WTO trade dispute or 
another international medium. 
 
It is argued that while the need for harmonisation should be 
conceptually examined, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety itself provided a 
model national biosafety laws for countries to follow. The only difference 
perhaps is how the ASEAN countries would approach the risk assessment, 
socio-economic considerations and other issues in line with their capacity 
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building.  In line with the report by Bumiratna663 there are some important 
aspects of harmonisation for the South East Region which is summarised as 
follows: 
 
a) the structure of the LMOs food-processing industry 
b) the policy and institutional framework 
c) issues, challenges and trends 
d) recommendations for policy options, viable mechanism for capacity 
building, coordination and reviewing 
 
At the ASEAN level, there are three (3) different bodies namely: 
 
i. Senior Officials Meeting - ASEAN Ministers on Agriculture and 
Forestry (SOM-AMAF) 
ii. ASEAS Senior Officials on Environment (ASOES) and  
iii. ASEAS Committee on Science and Technology (COST), from 
three different perspectives: agriculture, environment and science 
and technology.  
 
This rather seems a fragmented attempt and a lack of holistic 
approach can also be found at the national level. There is also no concrete 
action plan for systematic monitoring of GMOs.664 Thus harmonisation of 
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biosafety laws at the ASEAN level should integrate those policy and 
institutional aspects for better biosafety coordination. 
   
There is the Asia Pacific Biosafety Association that comprises of 
countries across the Asia Pacific region, and beyond including Malaysia and 
Singapore also Australia, New Zealand and other countries with the 
headquarters in Singapore. This Asia Pacific Biosafety Association which 
was founded in 2005 is the forum of discussion among the biosafety experts 
and practitioners for the promotion of biosafety and biosecurity and exchange 
of information. Thus a harmonised biosafety and biosecurity will facilitate this 
cooperation among countries and reduce further future conflicts. This 
Biosafety Association is seen as a suitable medium that arguably could 
prevent any issues of conflict among countries through discussion and 
information exchange.  
 
In a publication of the Asia Pacific countries biosafety regulations, 
there are some biosafety vital issues reviewed which is outlined as follows: 
a) risk assessment and management 
b) monitoring and inspection 
c) public information and participation 
 
It seems it narrowed down the broad range of biosafety issues as 
compared to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. This is understandably 
because some of the Asia Pacific countries are not members of the said 
Protocol.  
 
It was suggested that for future regulatory management at the Asia 
Pacific level these measures are necessary namely: 
 
a) establishing National Regulatory Systems  
b) infrastructure and Human Resource Development  
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c) reducing compliance cost 
d) regional cooperation 
 
These measures should be regarded as ways ahead of harmonisation 
at the Asia Pacific level. This should be further complemented by the ASEAN 
cooperation on biosafety as mentioned above. 
 
In relation to Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety harmonisation it is 
essential as Malaysia is a signatory and party to the Protocol whereby 
Malaysia should show support, not in opposition. The only issue is whether 
the harmonisation is enough or not, i.e. the content of Malaysia Biosafety Act 
2007 in relation to Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety whether they cover the 
essential elements or doing it otherwise. This is examined in detail in the 
previous Chapter 3 on the legal framework on biosafety. This is further 
complemented by Chapter 4 on the institutional aspect of implementation on 
biosafety. 
 
Malaysia compliance of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is 
anticipated. Malaysia even defended in their publication stating Malaysia 
does not go over and above the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety but in line 
with it. This is proven by some examples given in relation to Biosafety Act 
2007 and Biosafety Regulations 2010. Malaysia harmonisation of various 
laws related to biosafety, biotechnology and biodiversity should be prioritised 
in the future. This should be done to producing better biosafety regime which 
is not just protective of its biodiversity but for biotechnology growth. Thus a 
call for a more comprehensive biosafety to protect human health and the 
environment is needed to cover more complex issues of biosecurity and 
bioterrorism.  
 
However when dealing with issues with harmonisation with Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety at the South East Asia level perhaps it is anticipated 
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future conflicts may arise for the non-ratifying countries to the Protocol 
namely Singapore and Brunei.  
 
As to South East Asia or Asia Pacific Biosafety as there are no formal 
agreements on biosafety to be agreed upon, however, it governs the 
diplomatic relationship with the countries. There is some consensus on some 
issue of biosafety to be agreed upon at the South East Asia level. Thus the 
move towards harmonisation of South East Asian biotechnology laws665 or 
biosafety should be applauded as it should strengthen each countries 
biosafety laws regardless whether they are a party to the Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety or not. Thus collective actions towards other regimes of 
biosafety laws are right to safeguard the biosafety interest of that region 
mainly South East Asian (SEA) region. It is important to note here that each 
country has their national priorities and aspiration with the different capacity 
building. If the same areas of interests, concerns, priorities in biosafety are 
harmonised, it is for the benefit of the regions thus that should be highlighted. 
For instance, if the ASEAN countries agreed to prioritise on SARS epidemic 
thus various steps in that regard should be uniformed to produce efficiency 
and effectiveness in combating SARS in that region. 
 
5. Biosafety in East Asia 
 
There were three SARS incidents in  2003 and 2004. This shows that 
biosafety will be a material concern in East Asia. Each incident could have 
                                   
 
 
665
 Jusoh S, 'Developing Biotechnology Legal Systems in Developing Countries: The Case 
for Malaysia (Part I)' (2006) 3(4) Journal of International Biotechnology Law 160. 
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elicited effects comparable to a biological weapon attack or a natural disease 
outbreak.  
 
However, the best overall national commitment to biosafety in East 
Asia is provided by Japan, China and Singapore as the regulatory biosafety 
coverage is extensive.666 In East Asia overall, however, biosafety regulations 
are lacking. In East Asia, it is clear that biosafety lags dangerously behind 
expansions in the biotechnology industry. As more laboratories and scientists 
are assigned to address the region’s infectious disease problems, whether of 
natural origin or biological weapons-related, it is vital that such research not 
increase the risk of outbreaks occurring by accident. 
 
Dual use issue 
 
The issue of dual-use of LMOs should be looked into by Malaysia and 
Singapore for the non-peaceful purposes, i.e. military purposes. The dual-use 
issue should be discussed further not just in both countries context but also 
the ASEAN and the Asia Pacific level. The awareness and method to deal 
with this issue in future should be learnt from other developed countries that 
are more advanced in knowledge, expertise and implementation. 
 
 
                                   
 
 
666
 "Preventing Accidental Disease Outbreaks: Biosafety in East Asia", APSNet Policy 
Forum, September 07, 2006,available online at <http://nautilus.org/apsnet/0631a-enemark-
html/>accessed on 27th May 2017. 
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South East Asian biosafety co-operations 
 
Apart from Malaysia biosafety experts’ involvement in Asia Pacific 
Biosafety Associations, Malaysia needs to take advantage of the South East 
Asia cooperation in biosafety. This should be done with a view even though 
short of European Community uniforms laws on biosafety, this cooperation is 
a window to regional harmonisation and cooperation on biosafety. Thus the 
uniforms rules and regulations by South East Asian countries should set the 
standard by which the countries are dealing with these countries. 
 
 
6. Contribution to the body of knowledge 
 
This study examines the biosafety legal and institutional  
framework from a regulatory aspect namely risk regulation and its possible 
strategies from the traditional command and control to the new governance. 
The study adds to the existing body of knowledge from the analysis of the 
important issues from the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to be complied by 
Malaysia and the identification of relevant biosafety regulatory strategies. 
This thesis analysing the existing Malaysia and Singapore’s legal framework 
in light of the regulatory theory. It provides a useful examination of the 
essential aspects of biosafety implementation in Malaysia from the country’s 
report on the decision on LMOs also the compliance report to the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety.  
 
A comparison with Singapore biosafety law using Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety as a biosafety governance model further adds to the existing 
knowledge.  
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7. Future directions for research 
 
As biosafety rules and regulation is still at the developing 
capacity building stage, there are broad areas for future research in Malaysia 
and South East Asia region. However the most vital issues of future research 
are identified as below. 
 
 It is hoped that in future detailed analysis of the relevant  
socio-economic factors to be taken into consideration by Malaysia will be 
carried out in order for legitimising the inclusion of such factors in the 
decision-making process. The public participation study in biosafety is also 
essential to pave the way for future effective participation. Another possible 
interesting of research is the possible future conflicts of Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety with the various WTO agreements signed by Malaysia. This 
future research is useful to prevent Malaysia from being liable for any 
possible legal actions or trade sanctions for transboundary movement of 
LMOs from or outside Malaysia. A further research of harmonisation among 
ASEAN countries is desirable for better biosafety governance at that region.  
 
8. Conclusion 
 
Malaysia has a long way to build up its capacity in its biosafety from 
human resources, lab and safety procedures, rules, regulations, and 
implementing various aspects as contained in the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety.  
 
This thesis, while acknowledging the importance of the scientific risk 
assessment and management, also argued the need for socio-economic 
considerations to be taken into account. The inclusion of the socio-economic 
considerations should be adequately consulted with the relevant socio-
economic expert also the relevant stakeholders thus a useful and efficient 
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guideline is produced that will legitimise Malaysia inclusion of those 
considerations. 
 
It is hoped that Malaysia is not so ambitious in developing modern 
biotechnology thus neglecting the long term effects on the human health and 
the environment. The current legal and institutional framework, biosafety 
regulatory strategies are in place only need more funding, expertise and 
research to broaden its scope of implementation. 
 
As from the regulatory aspect, the ‘regulatory reconfiguration’ in the 
area of biosafety marks the new era of modern biotechnology governance 
should be applauded as the new trend of regulation. The traditional 
command and control approach still plays a dominant role in biosafety 
governance as the adverse effect of the modern biotechnology is irreversible 
towards human health and the environment. The various mixed of the new 
governance strategies in biosafety regulation such as smart regulation, 
licence model, civil regulation reflexive and meta-regulation even though is 
found challenging in its application , complements it and provides   
‘regulatory pluralism’ for better biosafety governance. These regulatory 
strategies even though have considerable effect on environmental 
governance are relevant in biosafety regulation but with limitations and 
weaknesses.667 It is hoped that the best combination of both strategies could 
be achieved through the improvement of the existing biosafety legal and 
                                   
 
 
667Gunningham N, 'Regulating Biotechnology: Lessons from Environmental Policy' (2007) in 
Somsen, H, The Regulatory Challenge Of Biotechnology: Human Genetics, Food And 
Patents (Edward Elgar 2007). 
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institutional framework in order to achieve the desired ends, i.e. better 
protection of human health and environment from the adverse effects of 
modern biotechnology.            
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